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Labour’s	moralised	rhetoric	and	the	media’s	response	
Amongst	his	body	of	work	on	economic	declinism,	Tomlinson	has	highlighted	the	‘moralisation’	of	
economic	discourse	in	the	post-war	era.	The	government’s	rhetoric	on	wages	was	shaped	for	a	
working-class	audience	that	had	been	long	seen	as	having	‘distinct	cultural	assumptions	of	a	
collectivist/solidaristic/moral	nature,	and	to	be	at	least	potentially	sceptical	about	how	far	such	
moral	values	could	be	reconciled	with	a	market	economy’.8	Although	the	meaning	of	‘fairness’	in	an	
economic	context	was	‘always	doubtful	and	contestable’,	one	of	the	key	versions	of	its	meaning	
propagated	by	the	government	was	derived	from	the	link	to	productivity,	part	of	the	establishment’s	
defence	of	its	ability	to	produce	‘morally	acceptable,	“fair”	outcomes	alongside	the	implementation	
of	the	Keynes	and	Beveridge	agenda’.9	Although,	as	this	research	has	already	established,	moralised	
language	was	not	new	to	the	field	of	industrial	relations	coverage,	the	shift	in	government	
engagement	of	such	themes	marked	an	important	change.	To	adjudge	a	wage	claim	as	‘fair’,	the	
alleged	and	attempted	breach	of	that	policy	was	to	be	considered	‘unfair’	or	‘bogus’.	If	this	
moralised	language	was	an	important	device	for	the	government	to	convince	working	class	groups	of	
modern	capitalism’s	merits	by	appealing	to	feelings	of	solidarity,	it	was	also	a	way	of	isolating	and	
delegitimising	those	that	did	not	respect	the	system.	In	this	respect,	the	media	played	a	vital	role	in	
defining	and	delineating	those	moral	boundaries	in	more	aggressive	and	partisan	ways	than	a	Labour	
government	could	dare.		
	
The	emphasis	of	the	Daily	Mirror’s	industrial	relations	coverage	changed	after	the	election	of	a	
Labour	government.	This	was	a	common	and	predictable	element	to	coverage	but	had	an	important	
impact	on	the	Mirror’s	attitude	to	wage	restraint.	In	1962,	the	Mirror	greeted	the	conclusion	of	the	
Conservative	government’s	‘Pay	Pause’	with	a	provocative	front	page	article,	headlined	‘Want	more	
Pay?	You’ll	be	lucky!’,	in	which	it	declared	the	government	would	provide	‘no	more	pay	just	because	
the	cost	of	living	goes	up;	no	more	pay	just	because	you	are	working	harder;	no	more	pay	just	
because	your	industry’s	profits	are	going	up’	and	other	reasons	presumably	deemed	worthy	of	an	
increase	by	the	Mirror’s	editors.10	In	1965,	the	Mirror	described	the	payment	gap	as	‘the	loudest	
wailing	baby	ever	dumped	into	the	arms	of	an	incoming	government’	but	already	alluded	to	the	
need	to	‘do	our	jobs	in	a	new	way,	with	a	new	spirit’.11	
	
																																																						
8	Tomlinson,	‘Reinventing	the	“moral	economy”’,	p.	363.	
9	Ibid.,	p.	373.	
10	Daily	Mirror,	3	February	1962,	p.	1.	
11	Daily	Mirror,	1	January	1965,	p.	1.	
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Within	a	few	months,	it	was	clear	that	the	Mirror	would	absorb	much	of	the	Labour	Government’s	
moralised	rhetoric	but	it	did	so	in	ways	which	were	far	more	partisan	and	outspoken	than	politicians.	
In	a	front	page	editorial	that	evoked	war-time	notions	of	solidarity,	‘the	Battle	of	Britain,	1965’,	the	
Mirror	claimed	that	‘dishonesty	and	lousy	service’	were	no	longer	regarded	as	‘shameful	and	
intolerable’	and	were	accepted	as	if	they	were	a	‘natural	malaise	of	our	time’.12	‘Ignorance,	sloth	or	
selfishness’	were	‘imperilling	the	position	in	the	world	of	us	all’,	suggesting	that	Britain’s	economic	
struggle	and	lack	of	global	competitiveness	was	underpinned	by	a	lack	of	pride	in	work,	rather	than	
the	failure	of	policy	or	the	anxiety	of	change.13		In	response	to	another	wage	claim	from	the	National	
Union	of	Railwaymen	(NUR)	in	February	1966,	Woodrow	Wyatt	launched	a	scathing	double-page	
attack	on	the	union.	Wyatt	argued	that	in	demanding	wages	which	far	exceeded	the	current	wage	
policy,	the	NUR	should	be	‘ashamed’	of	its	‘monstrous	blackmail’,	‘irresponsibility’	and	‘fatuous	
ways’	which	threatened	to	‘sabotage’	the	Labour	government,	indicative	of	a	kind	of	selfishness	on	
the	NUR’s	part.	14	Such	articles	from	the	Mirror	provided	a	distinct	and	toxic	mixture	of	moral	
judgement	with	political	indignation.	This	infusion	of	politics	into	coverage	of	wage	claims,	and	an	
expectation	of	political	loyalty	from	the	trade	unions,	provided	a	curious	inconsistency	to	an	
editorial	line	which	had	become	uncomfortable	with	political	intervention	from	trade	unions,	as	a	
threat	to	the	power	of	the	Labour	government.		
	
																																																						
12	Daily	Mirror,	26	April	1965,	p.	1.	
13	Daily	Mirror,	26	April	1965,	p.	1.	
14	Daily	Mirror,	16	February	1966,	pp.	16-17.	
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Figure	4.7:	‘Exposing	the	Fifth	Column’,	Daily	Mirror,	26	April	1965,	p.	1.	
	
While	a	double-page	Mirror	editorial	claimed	that	‘nobody’	disputed	that	‘men	and	women	must	
have	the	right	to	bargain	collectively	over	wages’,	it	was	claimed	that	trade	unions	were	‘groping	for	
the	shadow	of	victory	instead	of	the	substance’,	where	some	of	the	‘zanier’	wage	claims	suggested	
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unions	were	‘hellbent	on	sabotaging	the	national	economy’.15	In	their	demands	for	shorter	hours	
and	longer	holidays,	unions	had	been	‘basically	dishonest’,	arousing	the	moralised	language	of	
government	and	demands	for	wage	increases	without	a	corresponding	rise	in	productivity	was	
‘suckerdom	in	technicolor’.	16	In	these	cases,	no	mention	was	made	of	the	profitability	of	industries,	
concerns	about	the	cost	of	living	or	the	shortcomings	of	welfare	structures,	as	had	been	the	case	
with	1962’s	disgruntlement	over	slow	increases,	and	instead	focused	on	the	morality	and	rationality	
of	union	claims.	Although	it	claimed	to	support	the	principles	of	organised	labour,	the	Mirror	
supported	government	and	management	decisions	to	refuse	wage	rises	and	deflected	attention	
away	from	governmental	responsibility	for	a	lack	of	industrial	investment.		
	
Unsurprisingly,	this	kind	of	moralised	judgement	was	not	unique	to	the	Mirror	and	was	prevalent	
across	the	spectrum	of	British	newspapers.	When	the	1966	wage-freeze	kicked	in,	the	Times	argued	
that	there	was	simply	‘no	alternative’	because,	despite	claims	that	this	should	not	be	interpreted	as	
an	‘attack	on	trade	unions’,	too	many	had	‘refused	to	take	any	notice	of	interests	wider	than	their	
own’,	indicative	of	the	same	moral	judgements	on	union	self-interest	.17	The	strength	of	this	rhetoric	
was	apparent	from	the	kind	of	stories	seen	in	the	Daily	Express.	In	one	example,	during	1966’s	
freeze,	the	Express	reported	on	a	book-keeper	who	had	resigned	because	her	employer	had	offered	
her	a	minor	rise	to	reward	good	work,	one	which	she	rejected	not	just	on	grounds	of	legality	but	
because	she	believed	it	to	be	‘unethical’.18	
	
The	inconsistencies	and	problems	with	moralised	rhetoric	
However,	in	defining	these	moral	boundaries,	much	as	many	media	outlets	had	attempted	to	
delineate	and	qualify	‘political’	from	‘industrial’	strikes,	there	were	undoubtedly	moral	
inconsistencies	for	journalists	to	navigate.	In	February	1964,	prior	to	Labour’s	victory,	Trevor	Evans	
reminded	Express	readers	that	postmen,	in	being	granted	a	6	and	a	half	percent	wage	increase,	did	
so	because	they	were	a	‘special	case’,	and	that	other	unions	should	not	‘ignore	the	fact	that	the	
postmen	started	on	a	comparatively	low	rate	anyway’	or	‘conveniently	forget’	it	had	been	19	
months	since	their	last	‘measly’	increase.19	Of	course	this	kind	of	nuanced	contextual	information	
was	rarely	found	when	‘bogus’	or	‘dishonest’	claims	were	reported	on	and	these	kinds	of	exceptions	
would	continue	to	provide	problems	for	both	journalists	and	the	Labour	government.	As	far	as	the	
																																																						
15	Daily	Mirror,	25	October	1965,	pp.	16-17.	
16	Daily	Mirror,	25	October	1965,	pp.	16-17.	
17	The	Times,	26	July	1966,	p.	13.	
18	Daily	Express,	19	October	1966,	p.	15.	
19	Daily	Express,	27	July	1964,	p.	4.	
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Daily	Mail’s	editorial	line	was	concerned,	special	cases	and	exceptions	were	merely	‘gaps’	or	
vulnerabilities	in	the	wage	policy,	which	were	essentially	‘invitations’	to	trade	union	leaders	to	
‘squeeze	as	much	as	they	could	out	of	industry’	but	the	Mail	was	unusual	in	its	rejection	of	special	
cases.20	It	was	inevitable	that	in	a	rapidly	evolving	economy	such	as	Britain’s	in	the	1960s	that	some	
industries	would	be	more	‘deserving’	of	wage	increases	than	others,	in	these	moral	terms,	partly	due	
to	discrepancies	in	industrial	productivity.	The	precise	contours	of	this	moralised	support	were	rarely	
explained,	but	were	based	on	tacit	assumptions	and	deep-seated	social	attitudes.	Managing	these	
differences	would	either	mean	holding	those	that	had	earned	an	increase	back,	undermining	the	
very	moral	argument	of	the	policy,	or	the	less	productive	industries	riding	on	the	coat-tails	of	others,	
risking	further	inflation	and	degradation	of	the	productivity	policy.	Although	Labour	had	built	a	
policy	founded	upon	ideas	of	collectivist	solidarity	on	moral	terms	in	order	to	manage	wages,	the	
rewards	for	following	such	a	policy	were	divisive.	As	Shanks	had	predicted	in	1961,	a	widening	in	pay	
differentials	as	a	result	of	the	productivity	agreements	would	soon	be	regarded	as	‘socially	
intolerable’.21		
	
According	to	the	Times,	it	was	important	not	to	‘underestimate	the	difficulties,	even	absurdities’	in	
managing	a	wage	policy	which	made	it	‘difficult	to	accept’	that	productive	companies	like	Ford	and	
Vauxhall	should	be	kept	down	to	the	level	of	‘others	not	so	efficient’	just	to	avoid	wage	increases	
elsewhere.22	In	another	article,	it	argued	that	it	was	‘hard	to	see	why	a	generous	pay	offer	in	one	
trade’,	the	prosperous	motor	industry,	‘should	be	condemned	on	the	grounds	that	it	might	be	
followed	by	similar	increases	in	trades	unable	to	show	similar	prosperity’.23	Simultaneously	and	
paradoxically,	in	a	nod	to	its	readership,	a	primary	concern	for	the	Times	was	the	‘increasingly	
crushed’	workers	in	the	middle,	victims	of	the	government’s	emphasis	on	the	productivity	
agreements	of	the	lower	paid,	which	were	‘always	a	response	to	an	emergency’,	and	the	new	
willingness	to	commit	to	industrial	action	from	the	likes	of	air	pilots	and	white-collar	workers,	rather	
than	a	focus	on	the	maintenance	of	‘incentives	for	skill	and	responsibility’	or	adjustment	for	the	
‘long-term	needs	of	industry’.24	Having	helped	to	bolster	an	economic	narrative	which	emphasised	
the	importance	of	restrictions	rather	than	economic	opportunities	for	expansion,	enhanced	
industrial	productivity	in	the	manufacturing	industries,	particularly	the	automotive	industry,	was	
incredibly	complex	for	the	press	to	negotiate.	The	provision	of	socially	acceptable	solutions	which	
																																																						
20	Daily	Mail,	26	April	1965,	p.	1.	
21	Shanks,	The	Stagnant	Society,	p.	72.	
22	The	Times,	3	February	1964,	p.	11.	
23	The	Times,	2	November	1963,	p.	9.	
24	The	Times,	22	December	1967,	p.	17.	
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minimised	gaps	in	pay	without	the	risk	of	inflation	threatened	to	compromise	the	very	essence	of	a	
‘fair’	wage	policy.	An	emphasis	on	union	tactics	and	industrial	strife,	particularly	when	the	car	
industry	became	so	adept	at	providing	newsworthy	cases,	was	one	technique	for	deflecting	critical	
attention	away	from	the	inconsistencies	of	low	wages	in	productive	industries.	
	
A	series	of	industrial	disputes	by	teachers	also	complicated	the	Mirror’s	moralised	rhetoric.	As	early	
as	1961,	the	Mirror	defended	the	teachers’	right	to	strike	as	a	‘devoted	group	of	people’	who	would	
only	use	striking	in	‘the	last	resort’.	It	even	went	so	far	as	to	describe	them	as	‘victims’	of	a	‘raw	deal’	
from	the	government.25	In	a	similar	article	earlier	that	year	it	adjudged	that	‘when	dedicated	people	
like	teachers	talk	about	striking,	something	must	be	wrong’.26	Despite	the	consistency	of	problems	
within	the	teaching	sector,	the	Mirror	was	convinced	that	teachers	would	not	choose	to	take	
industrial	action	lightly,	such	was	their	loyalty,	a	message	which	was	buttressed	by	the	juxtaposition	
of	such	articles	next	to	a	discussion	of	a	dispute	over	morning	breaks	at	Fords.27	There	was	a	clear	
implication	that	teachers	were	more	worthy	than	car	workers	of	financial	reward,	partly	as	a	result	
of	their	perceived	difference	in	moral	attitude	to	industrial	action.	Notably,	this	position	on	
industrial	action	by	teachers	did	not	change	under	a	Labour	government,	despite	the	Mirror’s	
enthusiasm	for	the	moralised	rhetoric	of	wage	restraint.		
	
In	1967,	once	again	in	reference	to	‘dedicated	people’,	the	Mirror	felt	it	was	important	to	reward	
‘the	quality	of	devotion	to	duty	which	every	teacher	must	have’	and,	although	it	rejected	the	union’s	
‘totally	unrealistic’	demand	for	a	30	per	cent	rise,	it	would	not	be	drawn	on	the	acceptability	of	the	
government’s	6	per	cent	offer.28		Gallup	Polls	suggested	that	teachers	commanded	a	great	deal	of	
public	sympathy,	as	60	per	cent	of	respondents	in	April	1966	believed	they	were	deserving	of	a	pay	
increase,	while	in	October	1969,	53	per	cent	sympathised	with	teachers,	compared	to	only	21	per	
cent	for	local	authorities.	At	the	end	of	1969,	Clive	Jenkins	wrote	a	column	to	urge	the	government	
to	avoid	a	‘barefisted	brawl’	with	teachers,	concerned	that	the	shortage	of	teachers	in	state	
education	was	worrying	enough	‘without	repelling	good	people	by	low	standards	of	pay’.29	
Explaining	the	Mirror’s	unswerving	defence	of	the	teachers’	claims	is	complex.	Firstly,	class	
perception	would	have	been	an	influence,	where	overtly	militant	industrial	action	was	firmly	
associated	with	low-paid	labour,	such	as	those	in	private	manufacturing,	rather	than	middle-class	
																																																						
25	Daily	Mirror,	21	September	1961,	p.	2.	
26	Daily	Mirror,	4	April	1961,	p.	2.	
27	Daily	Mirror,	21	September	1962,	p.	2.	
28	Daily	Mirror,	12	July	1962,	p.	2.	
29	Daily	Mirror,	30	December	1969,	p.	4.	
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public	sector	workers.	Furthermore,	the	support	of	the	teachers’	claim	would	have	strengthened	
and	been	consistent	with	the	newspaper’s	demand	for	improved	funding	in	state	education,	where	
teaching	represented	another	‘deserving’	sector.	Finally,	it	could	have	simply	been	driven	by	their	
enthusiasm	to	prevent	unnecessarily	lengthy	disruption,	as	exemplified	in	a	1969	column	that	
complained	about	the	‘leisurely	approach’	to	pay	negotiations.30	These	motivations	aside,	this	
example	further	illustrated	the	pressure	on	Britain’s	manufacturing	industries,	due	to	the	unspoken	
status	held	by	certain	groups	of	workers,	where	moralised	language	was	used	to	sustain	this	
inconsistent	position	on	wage	restraint.		
	
Public	doubt	about	Labour’s	intent	
Significantly,	polling	data	from	1968	suggests	that	the	moralised	language	of	productivity	and	wage	
restraint	had	not	been	wholly	successful	in	convincing	the	public,	perhaps	partly	due	to	these	
inconsistencies.	Although	there	is	limited	statistical	value	to	a	single	poll,	the	fact	that	the	majority,	
52	per	cent,	felt	that	unions	should	‘remain	free	to	negotiate	at	whatever	levels	the	unions	think	
[was]	right’	instead	of	following	the	government’s	wage	policy,	reflected	the	government’s	failure	to	
impress	the	economic	necessity	to	ground	wages.31	It	also	suggested	a	certain	respect	for	the	
government’s	judgement	on	what	could	be	deemed	‘right’	or	fair.	Doubt	about	the	power	of	
government	rhetoric	was	further	reinforced	by	the	fact	a	significant	proportion,	39	per	cent,	felt	
their	sympathies	lay	with	the	trade	unions	in	1968	when	Barbara	Castle	had	promised	to	‘veto’	wage	
rises.32	Geoffrey	Goodman	reflected	that	while	‘there	was	a	powerful	case’	for	the	government’s	
‘fair’	incomes	policy,	its	position	at	the	centre	of	domestic	economic	policy	meant	it	‘simply	couldn’t	
carry	that	weight	and	responsibility’,	as	confidence	in	the	government	slumped.33	In	his	travels	
around	the	country	at	that	time,	Goodman	found	that	many	union	officials,	workers	and	managers	
‘distrusted’	the	government,	as	Whitehall	was	perceived	as	distant	from	the	shop	floor	‘and	neither	
side	seemed	capable	of	bridging	the	gulf’.34	Whether	the	government	was	aware	of	the	severity	of	
working	class	cynicism	surrounding	their	economic	policies	is	doubtful.	Whereas	Labour’s	
revisionists	of	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s	had	become	‘engrossed	in	polling	evidence,	
obsessively	tracking	the	polls	whenever	governments	made	major	or	controversial	decisions’,	the	
																																																						
30	Daily	Mirror,	16	December	1969,	p.	2.	
31	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	2,	p.	1003.	
32	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	2,	p.	983.	
33	Goodman,	From	Bevan	to	Blair,	p.	114.	
34	Ibid.,	p.	114.	
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attitude	within	the	Labour	Party	changed	to	the	point	where	opinion	polling	was	subordinated	to	
Wilson’s	‘own	instincts	and	political	gambles’	by	the	end	of	the	1960s.35	
	
The	Mail’s	criticism	of	both	government	and	the	labour	force	provided	further	explanation	for	public	
scepticism	about	the	government’s	wage	policy.		In	1965,	the	Mail	asked	how	long	Britain	could	
‘pursue	profligate	paths	and	expect	to	go	on	prospering?’,	as	it	made	reference	to	‘insidious’	
processes	within	unions	that	caused	wages	to	increase.	36	This	was	indicative	of	an	expectation	that	
the	contemporary	approach	to	wages	was	unsustainable.	Like	the	Mirror,	the	Mail	also	called	for	a	
refreshed	approach	from	all	involved,	with	‘a	new	outlook	and	new	ideas’,	again	in	vague	terms	and	
presumably	rather	different	terms	to	those	alluded	to	by	the	Mirror,	tapping	into	the	popular	
rhetoric	of	modernisation	and	innovation	which	had	been	so	successful	in	propelling	the	Labour	
Party	into	government.	However,	while	it	shared	this	modernising	tone	with	the	Labour	
government,	the	Mail,	was	predictably	enthusiastic	to	scrutinise	the	rhetoric	behind	the	
government’s	income	policy.	Although	encouraged	by	government	measures	to	curb	inflation	and	
frustrated	by	the	refusal	of	workers	to	‘play	the	game’	in	making	pay	claims,	the	Mail	felt	the	
Government	needed	to	admit	that	their	own	‘planned	incomes	growth’	was	no	different	to	the	
Conservative	Party’s	earlier	pay	pause,	the	details	of	which	were	just	as	‘unpalatable’	to	unions.37	
This	was	a	recurring	description	of	the	government’s	wage	policies	as	far	as	the	‘self-righteous’	
unions	were	concerned,	referring	to	such	policies	as	an	‘unpalatable	medicine’	that	was	to	be	
‘administered	by	a	Government	who	depended	so	much	on	trade	union	funds	for	their	election’.38	
There	was	a	deal	of	cynicism	about	the	‘rose-tinted	cloud	of	soothing	words’	from	government	and	
scepticism	surrounding	George	Brown’s	insistence	that	wage	restraint	was	‘transitional’	instead	of	
‘shocking	the	unions	into	a	sense	of	reality’.39	Brown’s	economic	plan	of	1965	was	criticised	for	its	
‘unfounded	optimism’,	based	on	an	apparently	misplaced	‘assumption	that	today’s	conditions	will	
be	repeated	tomorrow’.40	The	Mail	grew	increasingly	frustrated	that	economic	optimism	on	both	
sides	seemed	to	be	leading	to	a	lack	of	communication	between	the	government	and	TUC,	‘each	
party	wrapped	up	in	a	private	day	dream	of	painless	prosperity’.41	
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38	Daily	Mail,	6	September	1965,	p.	1.	
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Media	concern	about	the	implications	of	productivity	
Just	as	they	had	shown	in	the	political	sphere,	the	Mail	demonstrated	a	discomfort	with	the	
apparent	gloss	Labour	applied	to	its	industrial	relations	rhetoric	and	its	attempt	to	more	furtively	
coerce	unions,	despite	similar	motivations	in	policy	to	the	troubled	Conservative	policies	of	the	early	
1960s.	The	Mail’s	cynicism	about	Labour’s	chosen	path	on	wage	policy,	and	its	associated	economic	
rhetoric,	even	came	down	to	a	concern	with	the	very	word	‘productivity’,	described	as	a	‘five-
syllable	horror’,	and	the	buzz	of	studies	and	discussion	surrounding	it.42	It	argued	that	Wilson’s	
Productivity	Conference	in	September	1966	would	amount	to	‘window-dressing’	when	‘top	men	in	
industry’	had	been	considering	the	issue	‘for	years’,	and	simply	illustrated	the	need	for	‘a	more	
purposeful	lead	from	the	top’.43	The	implication	of	an	irritation	with	Labour’s	ability	to	talk	about	a	
wage	policy,	to	commission	studies	and	organise	conferences,	was	rife	amongst	the	Mail’s	columns,	
frustrated	with	a	perceived	lack	of	action	or	direction	–	once	again,	a	dig	at	its	political	opponents.	
This	response	to	the	government’s	productivity	push	in	1966	explains	the	large	spike	in	the	Mail’s	
productivity	articles	referencing	the	government.	
	
With	regards	to	the	frames	employed	more	broadly,	the	Mail	was	sceptical	about	the	way	
prominent	members	of	the	Labour	Party	had	chosen	to	promote	certain	frames	about	the	
productivity	policy	–	either	in	Brown’s	case	as	a	way	to	ground	wages,	as	adopted	by	so	many	
members	of	the	press,	or	in	Frank	Cousins’s	case	as	a	way	to	increase	productivity,	a	more	minority	
view.	It	was	time,	by	1966,	for	the	government	to	‘forget	the	figures	and	the	theories’	and	start	
promoting	a	policy	which	had	‘some	connection	with	the	realities	of	industrial	life’.44	Rather	than	
focusing	on	wages	and	full	employment,	the	Mail	remarked	on	the	failure	of	government	to	address	
the	issue	of	restrictive	practices	and	industrial	resistance	to	modernisation.	In	some	ways,	the	Mail’s	
political	agenda	against	the	policies	of	the	Labour	government	tempered	its	acceptance	of	the	
moralised	and	negative	frames	of	an	incomes	policy	based	on	productivity,	although	it	was	
essentially	negative	about	the	role	of	unions	in	this	issue.		
	
Unusually,	there	were	commonalities	in	the	perspectives	adopted	by	the	Guardian	and	the	Express	
on	the	issue	of	wages,	despite	their	often	antagonistic	editorial	positions.	The	Guardian	opposed	the	
negative	framing	of	wage	rises,	much	as	it	had	it	done	with	Barbara	Castle’s	strike	legislation,	but	it	
was	also	enthusiastic	about	engaging	with	and	encouraging	the	popular	productivity	rhetoric.	The	
paper	certainly	did	not	object	to	the	prospect	of	British	industry	becoming	more	efficient.	In	doing	
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so,	the	Guardian	persistently	argued	for	economic	measures	which	were	‘creative’	and	could	
provide	for	growth,	instead	of		‘destructive	deflation’	based	on	limiting	incomes	and	governmental	
controls.45	Although	it	recognised	the	necessity	of	‘temporary	evils’,	such	as	wage	and	price	freezes,	
the	only	long-term	remedy	to	British	problems	lay	in	sustained	growth,	the	date	for	which	‘could	not	
be	forecast’	under	Wilson’s	measures.46	Rather	than	follow	the	government’s	attempts	to	use	the	
productivity	debate	to	ground	wages,	the	Guardian	argued	that	the	relationship	should	work	in	the	
reverse.	It	described	the	government	as	the	‘victim	of	a	myth’	which	linked	rising	wages	to	economic	
trouble,	the	same	myth	that	had	‘distorted	the	policies	of	successive	Administrations’.	While	many	
were	keen	to	emphasise	the	extent	of	the	“British	disease”,	the	Guardian	suggested	that	the	
situation	was	not	so	severe,	likening	the	coverage	to	exaggerated	British	weather	reports.47	
	
Instead,	the	Guardian	argued,	Britain’s	economic	problems	were	because	‘far	too	much	of	British	
industry	relies	on	using	inadequately	paid	labour	inefficiently	and	wastefully’.48	A	universal	increase	
in	wages	would	encourage	a	more	efficient	use	of	labour,	citing	the	example	of	America’s	higher	
wages,	and	encourage	innovation	in	industrial	machinery.	The	editorial	columns	recognised	that	
automation	had	developed	a	connotation	that	was	‘faintly	inhuman’,	‘blind	to	social	values	or	to	the	
needs	of	ordinary	human	beings’,	which	had	provoked	animosity	from	trade	unions,	but	argued	that	
Britain’s	lack	of	competitiveness	in	world	markets	was	because	of	the	‘slowness	of	technological	
change’	rather	than	too	much	automation.49	Such	reports	represented	a	hesitancy	to	be	absorbed	by	
the	rhetoric	of	immorality	and	irrationality	which	had	motivated	some	of	the	Mirror’s	explanations	
of	the	so-called	British	disease.	Once	again,	the	Guardian,	led	by	John	Cole,	provided	a	minority	
voice	in	rejecting	the	pervading	explanations	for	economic	uncertainty	found	on	rival’s	front	pages,	
although	it	was	technically	in	favour	of	a	voluntary	wage	policy	based	on	improving	British	industry’s	
productivity.	
	
The	Express	went	a	step	further	in	outright	rejection	of	this	strand	of	economic	policy.	The	paper’s	
adoption	of	a	position	coherent	with	its	1920s	campaigns	for	higher	wages	reflected	the	emerging	
limitations	with	a	post-war	consensus.50	The	principal	objection	to	the	government’s	wage	policy	ran	
along	strongly	anti-interventionist	lines	of	argument	and	a	reversion	to	pre-war	conventions.	The	
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Express	argued	that	the	new	wage	policy	was	unfair,	not	because	it	explicitly	opposed	a	productivity-
based	wage	policy,	but	because	the	Chancellor	had	produced	‘an	inflationary	budget’	which	forced	
others	to	ask	‘everyone	to	ignore	its	consequences’.	This	was	as	’the	sinister	combination	Dr	Jekyll	
and	Mr	Hyde’	which	made	‘victims’	of	the	‘innocent	tax	payer’.51	It	later	admitted	that	‘superficially’	
determining	wage	rates	‘may	be	attractive’	but	felt	that	government	controls	on	wage	rates	were	
‘simply	in	the	interest	of	the	present	government’	rather	than	the	much	vaunted	‘national	interest’,	
and	likened	the	TUC’s	potential	‘surrender’	of	authority	to	‘totalitarian	countries’.52	The	erosion	of	
consensus	that	is	typically	associated	with	the	emergence	of	Conservative	neoliberalism	of	the	late	
1970s,	was	already	quite	apparent	in	the	Express’s	dialogue	about	the	wage	policy,	to	the	extent	
that	it	found	itself	buttressing	the	language	of	trade	unionist	solidarity.	When	Wilson	introduced	a	
complete	pay	freeze	at	the	1966	TUC	annual	conference,	the	Express	felt	that	a	majority	of	the	
public	felt	that	the	policy	was	a	‘desperate,	last-minute	attempt’	to	deal	with	Britain’s	problems	and	
ran	‘counter	to	everything	the	trades	unions	stand	for’.53	When	the	TUC	accepted	the	freeze,	the	
Express	asked	if	there	was	anything	more	‘paradoxical’	or	‘misguided’	than	trade	unionists’	‘absurd	
and	destructive’	vote	to	hold	wages	down.54	Although	few	would	have	conventionally	identified	the	
Express	as	guardians	of	trade	unions’	traditional	rights,	the	newspaper’s	opposition	to	a	wage-freeze	
which	‘frustrated	the	exemplary	productivity	agreements’	at	major	firms,	left	the	newspaper	
supporting	union	rights.55	The	Express	provided	an	important	minority	voice	in	this	example	in	
rejecting	the	pervading	assumptions,	something	of	a	consensus,	about	the	need	to	limit	inflation	
through	wage	limits.		
	
The	nature	of	television	coverage	
The	timing	and	strategy	behind	television	coverage	contributed	to	public	perceptions	about	
industrial	relations,	including	the	dominant	frames	of	explanation	for	Britain’s	economic	failure.	This	
marked	an	important	change	since	the	early	post-war	period,	where	influence	was	primarily	limited	
to	newspaper	pages.	A	common	concern	from	industrialists	was	the	sporadic	and	sensational	nature	
of	the	BBC’s	specialist	industrial	relations	coverage,	particularly	where	the	car	industry	was	
concerned.	Prominent	industrialist,	William	Campbell	Adamson,	yet	to	join	the	government’s	
Department	for	Economic	Affairs,	conducted	a	report	and	interview	regarding	the	BBC’s	industrial	
coverage	in	1966.	This	was	intended	to	clarify	the	impacts	of	the	BBC’s	chosen	approach	to	industrial	
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relations	coverage.	Campbell	Adamson	was	concerned	that	the	BBC’s	treatment	seemed	to	‘lack	a	
broad	plan’,	predominantly	dependent	on	news	bulletins,	‘where	a	relatively	small	amount	of	
broadcasting	time	is	concerned	with	the	world	in	which	the	majority	earn	their	living’.56	He	was	in	
favour	of	the	BBC	creating	a	new	‘Head	of	Industrial	Programmes’	in	order	to	better	focus	on	these	
issues	‘in	a	more	interesting	and	entertaining	way’.		
	
In	a	similar	manner,	Oliver	Whitley,	then	Chief	Assistant	to	the	BBC	Director	General,	produced	a	
report	in	1965	which	argued	for	a	‘particular	emphasis	on	radical	analysis	and	re-thinking’	in	
industrial	relations	coverage	which	should	be	‘prepared	to	take	the	spotlight	away	a	bit	from	purely	
political	rethinking’.	57	This	was	important	in	the	context	of	the	parliamentary	sphere’s	deteriorating	
public	image.	According	to	Whitley,	although	the	BBC	produced	‘excellent	documentary	
programmes	on	an	extraordinary	range	of	subjects’,	their	programming	tended	to	‘skip	over	the	
relatively	unattractive,	less	tractable’	issue	of	industrial	relations.	If	the	BBC	poured	its	efforts	into	
documentary	programmes,	Whitley	felt	the	organisation	might	be	able	to	convince	industrial	and	
political	heads,	those	often	hesitant	to	participate	in	industrial	affairs	programmes,	that	the	BBC	was	
enthusiastically	involved	in	industrial	issues,	rather	than	‘as	many	of	them	now	seem	to	think,	just	a	
detached,	rather	cynical,	professionally	adept	reporter	of	other	peoples’	efforts’.58	It	is	clear	that	
some	within	the	BBC	believed	the	apparent	detachment	between	the	BBC	and	industry	was	more	
than	simply	a	symptom	of	top	industrialist’s	‘divided	interests’,	but	rather	a	consequence	of	the	
BBC’s	own	attitude;	they	cited	the	reluctance	of	the	troubled	BMC’s	board	members	to	appear	in	
interviews	as	an	example.59	
	
However,	despite	these	recommendations	for	more	focussed,	documentary-oriented	coverage	of	
industrial	relations,	the	BBC	remained	steadfast	in	its	preference	for	‘fragmentation’	and	
decentralisation	in	its	coverage	of	industrial	relations,	without	a	specific	lead	journalist,	as	this	
approach	promised	a	‘more	lasting	effect	than	the	succés	d’estime	of	full	length	documentaries	with	
smaller	audiences’.60	It	was	felt	that	‘worthy	documentaries’	were	unwise	because	they	had	already	
proven	in	the	past	to	be	‘remarkably	unsuccessful’	in	attracting	viewers.61	In	1961,	the	Guardian	
reported	that	both	ITV	and	the	BBC	had	rejected	for	broadcast	a	‘sane,	intelligent,	and	prize-winning	
																																																						
56	BBC	General	Advisory	Council	Paper	261,	20	December	1966;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T16/564).	
57	BBC	Board	of	Management	Paper	(65)	106,	23	August	1965;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T16/59/3).	
58	BBC	Board	of	Management	Paper	(65)	106,	23	August	1965;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T16/59/3).	
59	BBC	General	Advisory	Council	Paper	261,	20	December	1966;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T16/564).	
60	BBC	General	Advisory	Council	Paper	261,	20	December	1966;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	(T16/564).	
61	BBC	Head	of	Current	Affairs	Group	to	Director	of	Television,	23	August	1965,	;	BBC	Written	Archive	Centre,	
(T16/59/3).	
	
	
137	
film	on	industrial	relations’	which	prompted	the	‘sad	conclusion’	that	British	television	regarded	‘the	
real	detail	of	industrial	relations	as	too	sober	material	for	their	respective	audiences’,	partly	because	
of	its	complexity	compared	to	the	‘werewolf	theory	of	strike	motivation’.62	This	description	alluded	
to	the	mythologised	nature	of	strike	coverage.	The	BBC’s	attitudes	towards	industrial	relations	
coverage	was	part	of	a	wider	debate,	which	culminated	in	speeches	by	Tony	Benn	and	Richard	
Crossman	in	1968,	regarding	the	trivialisation	of	important	political	issues	and	the	‘lack	of	sufficient	
serious	and	penetrating	coverage’.63	Understanding	Britain’s	industrial	problems	in	long-term	and	
broader	structural	terms	through	the	medium	of	television	was	thus	very	difficult.		
	
However,	despite	this	hesitancy	to	invest	time	and	money	in	full-length	programmes,	the	BBC	
Director	General	had	been	‘greatly	interested’	in	a	report	from	the	BBC’s	senior	Industrial	
Correspondent,	Bertram	Mycock,	on	‘Subversion	in	Industry’	in	Spring	1965,	and	felt	a	‘full-scale	
investigation’	of	the	subject	would	make	a	‘valuable	major	long-term	programme	project’.64	There	
was	continued	enthusiasm	from	the	Editor	of	News	and	Current	Affairs	some	two	years	later,	
prompted	by	a	Ray	Gunter	speech,	to	pursue	this	topic	in	depth	but	eventually	Mycock	decided	this	
would	require	too	much	work.65	Although	ultimately	fruitless,	the	BBC’s	protracted	interest	in	
following	this	issue	suggests	that	interest	in	more	focussed	coverage	of	industry		was	reserved	for	
controversial	aspects	of	industry,	deemed	‘newsworthy’.	In	line	with	this,	the	BBC	Head	of	Current	
Affairs,	Paul	Fox,	expressed	an	enthusiasm	to	‘pool	the	best	film	and	programme	makers	and	form	
them	into	an	emergency	team’	in	order	to	make	‘really	splendid	emergency	programmes’.66	This	
enthusiasm	for	‘of	the	moment’	industrial	relations	programming	which	would	be	popular	and	
bolster	audience	numbers,	coupled	with	the	continuance	of	high	profile	strike	coverage	in	BBC	News	
reports,	inevitably	provided	challenges	for	portraying	British	industry	in	a	positive	or	constructive	
light.	Consequently,	it	was	unsurprising	that	the	BBC	continued	to	struggle	to	persuade	industry	
bosses	to	appear	on	its	limited	coverage	to	provide	the	required	‘balance’	to	its	reports,	even	as	
Mycock	noted	deteriorating	BBC	relationships	with	union	leaders.67		
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This	dislocation	between	the	television	media	and	industrial	management	provides	an	important	
context	for	one	of	the	key	concerns	raised	by	Tomlinson	with	regards	to	corporate	attitudes	within	
the	car	industry.	Tomlinson	argues	that	‘the	industry	created	a	culture	of	complaint,	in	which	the	
cause	of	its	difficulties	was	seen	elsewhere’.	68Although	Tomlinson	recognises	that	the	trade	union	
and	government	situation	was	far	from	perfect,	‘the	key	problems	were	matters	of	corporate	
strategy	and	management’	or	‘corporate	culture’.	Although	television	reports	would	often	refer	to	
‘underlying	bitterness’	in	the	relationship	between	managers	and	shop	floor	workers,	the	
transactional	nature	of	such	a	problem	was	never	adequately	explored.69	The	BBC’s	continued	
indifference	towards	covering	a	‘management	angle’	provided	very	little	opportunity	for	the	likes	of	
Robin	Day,	who	had	moved	to	the	BBC	from	ITV	and	was	known	for	his	interrogative	style,	to	truly	
probe	leading	industrialists’	behaviour	during	moments	of	industrial	controversy.	Moreover,	these	
long	term,	structural	issues	of	‘corporate	culture’,	even	if	BBC-management	relations	had	been	
better,	were	unlikely	to	satisfy	the	BBC’s	enthusiasm	for	emergency	programming	or	its	desire	for	
‘newsworthy’	features.	Thus,	as	far	as	television	coverage	of	the	automotive	industry	was	
concerned,	the	management-centred	explanation	was	marginalised,	despite	its	validity.			
	
Absenteeism	and	Redundancy	–	a	contrast	of	industries	
However,	while	coverage	of	‘structural’	issues	was	marginalised,	ITV	did	provide	a	number	of	
extended	news	features	on	the	implications	of	mechanisation	on	mining	communities.	Here,	
‘absenteeism’	became	a	focus	as	‘idle	machinery	is	expensive	machinery’,	although	reports	
recognised	that	in	an	industry	where	‘uncertainty	hangs	over	it	like	a	cloud’,	‘devotion	to	duty’	did	
not	come	easy	to	miners	who	felt	they	were	‘doomed	long-term’.70	Although	with	such	moralised	
references	to	‘duty’	this	coverage	was	very	much	typical	of	the	popular	industrial	relations	narrative,	
there	was	a	difference	in	tone	and	attitude.	In	this	declining	industry,	of	dwindling	significance	to	
Britain’s	economic	performance,	there	was	a	sympathy	about	the	reasons	for	such	extreme	
absenteeism,	a	kind	which	would	have	been	almost	impossible	to	conceive	of	in	relation	to	the	car	
industry.	The	very	fact	that	workers	taking	time	off	work	was	referred	to	consistently	as	
‘absenteeism’	rather	than	‘idleness’	or	‘skiving’,	indicated	the	sensitivity	of	the	subject	and	the	social	
concern	with	which	the	issue	was	dealt	with	by	the	media.	A	Gallup	poll	in	January	1969	which	asked	
those	surveyed	to	consider	the	factors	which	had	influenced	a	rash	of	absenteeism	that	winter,	
revealed	that	39	per	cent	thought	that	it	was	‘very	important’	and	25	per	cent	thought	it	was	‘fairly	
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important’	that	‘workers	are	so	depressed	about	the	future	that	they	just	live	for	the	present’.71	
Overall,	respondents	felt	that	this	was	the	second	most	important	factor,	only	to	income	taxes,	and	
ahead	of	trade	union	leadership	or	government	policy.	From	this,	it	would	appear	that	the	fatalist	
attitude	towards	declining	industries,	albeit	sympathetic,	had	permeated	public	consciousness	so	
much	as	to	override	considerations	of	trade	union	leadership	at	a	time	when	anti-strike	legislation	
was	at	the	top	of	the	political	agenda.	
	
Away	from	the	mining	industry,	in	more	‘high-stakes’	manufacturing	industries	such	as	the	motor	
industry,	where	redundancy	was	perceived	to	mean	temporary	and	fluid,	rather	than	terminal,	
unemployment,	consideration	of	these	issues	was	rather	different.	There	were	key	inconsistencies	
and	incompatibilities	regarding	the	relationship	between	the	rhetoric	of	technological	optimism,	
that	had	been	so	powerful	in	convincing	the	British	public	to	vote	for	the	Labour	Party	in	the	1964	
general	election,	and	the	latent,	long-term	concerns	about	redundancy	that	had	existed	since	the	
popular	discussions	surrounding	the	car	industry	during	the	late	1950s.	It	was	felt	there	was	little	the	
unions	could	do	to	resist	redundancies,	which	became	more	common	as	the	problems	of	1966	
became	more	stark.	ITV	News	argued	that	any	attempt	at	strikes,	regardless	of	whether	they	were	
sanctioned	by	union	leadership,	were	‘pretty	barren	measures’	against	redundancies	that	were	
‘likely	to	continue’	and	the	ever-popular	‘work-sharing	plans’	were	no	longer	deemed	‘practical’	for	
answering	such	problems.72This	kind	of	attitude	to	union	action	against	redundancy	represented	
clear	continuity	from	the	dialogue	of	the	1950s,	where	strikes	against	redundancy	had	been	so	
harshly	judged,	irrespective	of	sympathy	for	the	unemployed.		
	
However,	some	media	coverage	did	show	limited	evidence	of	a	shift	in	attitudes	about	workers’	
rights	and	the	desirability	of	employment.	Despite	concerns	about	high	profile	redundancies	in	the	
car	industry	from	some	sources,	particularly	the	Mirror,	and	the	struggling	economy,	British	
unemployment	rates	were	very	manageable.	By	1965,	unemployment	stood	at	a	mere	one	and	a	
half	per	cent,	not	far	from	a	post-war	low	and,	as	the	Times	pointed	out,	compared	favourably	to	
Britain’s	rivals.73	In	this	context,	then,	and	roused	by	the	rhetoric	of	productivity	and	efficiency,	the	
Times	published	a	number	of	editorials	arguing	for	low	levels	of	temporary	unemployment,	in	what	
it	called	‘labour	mobility’.74	Although	it	conceded	that	‘enforced	idleness’,	such	was	the	strength	of	
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moralised	economic	language,	‘never	solved	anything’,	it	argued	that	the	‘right	measures	to	cure	
Britain’s	payments’	would	‘incidentally	and	temporarily	produce	–	even	encourage	–	some	
unemployment’.75	Earlier	in	the	decade,	it	had	lamented	that	the	working	week	in	the	motor	
industry	was	shortening,	citing	the	influence	of	the	shocking	redundancies	of	1956	on	the	attitudes	
of	management	who	wanted	to	‘avoid	trouble	and	keep	their	labour	force	intact’,	and	this	meant	
the	‘limit	of	idleness	must	be	very	near’.76At	a	time	when	the	prevention	of	unofficial	strikes	was	
high	on	the	public	political	agenda,	it	was	noteworthy	that	the	Times	expressed	confidence	that	such	
redundancy	would	not	have	the	same	inflammatory	impact	as	those	in	1956,	with	car	workers	
appeased	by	their	high	rates	of	pay.	Moreover,	it	remarked	on	the	connection	between	high	rates	of	
employment	and	the	predictability	of		‘a	spate	of	wage	claims’,	which	compromised	the	
government’s	attempt	to	moderate	inflation,	as	shortages	of	labour	encouraged	private	deals	
between	workers	and	employers,	without	the	input	of	union	leaders.77		In	an	economic	climate	
which	was	very	conscious	of	the	need	to	use	work	forces	productively	and	efficiently,	issues	high	on	
the	political	agenda,	the	surplus	of	labour	was	adjudged	as	a	‘waste’	which	required	a	‘good	deal	of	
justification’.78	Although	this	perspective	was	far	from	universal	by	this	point,	it	did	allude	to	a	
mounting	pressure	on	the	position	of	unions	to	defend	their	members’	jobs,	as	consensus	on	the	
ideals	of	full	employment	began	to	erode.	
	
As	significant	as	this	shift	was,	the	likes	of	the	Mirror	continued	to	show	sensitivity	to	working	class	
anxiety	about	redundancy	and	unemployment.	Geoffrey	Goodman	remarked	in	1962	that	it	was	a	
pity	that	there	was	not	a	more	‘sympathetic	phrase’	than	redundancy,	given	its	‘superfluous,	
uncalled-for	and	unwanted’	nature,	and	lamented	the	failure	of	the	Government	‘and	of	the	bulk	of	
employers’	to	provide	a	‘coherent	policy	for	redundancy’.79	Nevertheless,	the	discussion	of	the	
Times	clearly	illustrates	that	there	was	confidence,	or	perhaps,	with	hindsight,	complacency,	in	the	
long-term	continuance	of	high	employment	rates	in	Britain’s	modern	manufacturing	industries.	This	
conviction	lay	in	stark	contrast	to	the	bleak	outlook	for	the	mining	industry.	This	confidence	and	the	
rhetoric	of	productivity	gave	the	likes	of	the	Times	a	platform	on	which	to	suggest	better	ways	to	
deploy	its	work	force	in	more	efficient	ways.	Moreover,	the	case	exemplified	the	power	of	the	media	
to	steer	the	industrial	relations	agenda	so	that	once	again,	although	less	critical	of	unions,	the	focus	
of	reform	debate	was	the	labour	force.	
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Media	scrutiny	of	the	car	industry	
Tim	Claydon’s	study	of	media	coverage	of	the	car	industry,	albeit	focused	specifically	on	the	
coverage	of	the	Times	and	the	Mirror,	established	two	important	trends	in	coverage.	Firstly	it	
corroborated	claims	by	the	GMG	that	the	motor	industry	was	‘more	extensively	covered	than	any	
other	industry’	and	that	other	strikes	were	‘significantly	under-reported’,	in	proportion	to	their	
severity	and	extent.80	From	Claydon’s	quantitative	analysis,	it	is	clear	that	media	interest	in	the	car	
industry,	as	part	of	this	wider	declinist	preoccupation	with	manufacturing,	started	to	intensify	in	the	
late	1960s,	at	a	rate	which	was	disproportionate	to	the	increase	in	the	number	of	disputes	recorded	
by	the	Department	of	Employment.81	Above	all	industries	then,	media	coverage	of	the	car	industry	
was	significant.	When	these	data	are	viewed	in	tandem	with	the	results	of	Gallup’s	1968	opinion	
polls	on	the	car	industry,	the	nature	of	media	concern	with	the	car	industry	is	clear.	While	opinion	
was	fairly	evenly	divided	on	whether	management	was	doing	‘all	it	reasonably	could’	to	avoid	strikes	
in	the	car	industry,	only	23	per	cent	felt	unions	were	doing	all	they	could.	When	asked	who	they	
deemed	responsible	for	the	large	number	of	strikes,	14	per	cent	blamed	management,	29	per	cent	
blamed	unions	and	44	per	cent	blamed	‘groups	of	workers’.	Although	unions	drew	almost	twice	the	
amount	of	‘blame’	as	management,	hardly	surprisingly	given	the	dominant	frames	of	explanation,	it	
is	noteworthy	that	‘groups	of	workers’	were	considered	distinct	from	their	unions	and	much	more	of	
a	‘problem’	as	far	as	industrial	strife	was	concerned.	By	the	time	similar	questions	were	asked	about	
the	car	industry	in	April	1969,	workers	at	Ford	registered	very	limited	public	sympathy	–	only	16	per	
cent,	compared	to	the	39	per	cent	generated	by	the	management.82	
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Figure	4.8:	Total	references	to	‘Unofficial	strikes’	in	British	dailies	(1960-69)	
	
Explaining	why	‘groups	of	workers’	were	thought	to	have	been	such	a	disruptive	influence	on	the	
day-to-day	running	of	the	car	industry	is	complex	but	can	be	attributed	to	a	number	of	key	trends	in	
media	coverage.	Firstly,	as	evidenced	in	Figure	4.8,	unofficial	strikes	were	a	controversial	and	high	
profile	issue	for	newspapers	to	cover.	This	issue	was	not	new,	and	had	featured	to	a	more	limited	
extent	in	the	coverage	of	the	1950s,	but	it	seemed	to	be	the	subject	of	greater	media	interest	
towards	the	end	of	the	1960s.	Inevitably,	by	their	very	nature,	unofficial	action	increased	scrutiny	on	
shop	stewards	as	such	strikes	operated	without	approval	from	their	union	leadership.	However,	as	
Figure	4.8	also	illustrates,	the	true	upsurge	in	interest	only	happened	in	1969,	after	the	first	set	of	
polling	was	conducted.	Of	course	this	may	suggest	that	the	latent	interest	in	unofficial	strikes	had	an	
important	impact	on	public	perception,	but	does	not	entirely	explain	the	phenomenon.		
	
The	Mirror	believed	it	was	‘scandalous’	that	gentleman’s	agreements	with	official	union	
representatives	did	not	hold	water	against	unofficial	‘union	militancy’,	where	the	deterrents	against	
unofficial	industrial	action	so	small	they	could	‘barely	be	discerned’.83	After	a	major	strike	in	1968,	
the	Mirror’s	industrial	editor,	Roland	Hurman,	likened	the	return	to	work	to	‘an	alcoholic	nursing	a	
king-sized	hangover’,	and	attributed	the	year’s	‘unparalleled’	loss	of	production	and	exports	to	
‘wave	after	wave	of	unofficial	strikes’.84	This	provided	further	evidence	of	the	Mirror’s	attempts	to	
link	Britain’s	failing	productivity	with	the	effort	of	trade	union	members	and	their	dubious	political	
motives.	
																																																						
83	Daily	Mirror,	20	March	1969,	p.	6.	
84	Daily	Mirror,	30	September	1968,	p.	16.	
	
	
143	
	
Figure	4.9:	‘This	bloody	mess	in	the	car	industry’,	Daily	Mirror,	30	September	1968,	pp.	16-17.	
	
This	double-page	spread,	Figure	4.9,	highlighted	a	notable	increase	in	the	number	of	days	lost	to	
strikes	in	the	car	industry	and	featured	articles	from	a	number	of	sources,	including	a	leading	trade	
unionist	and	a	Vauxhall	director.	All	elements	of	this	spread	focused	on	issues	such	as	outdated	
collective	bargaining	mechanisms,	strike	militancy	and	union	reform,	rarely	touching	upon	the	
attitudes	of	government	and	employers.	By	1969,	the	Mirror	considered	the	‘most	alarming	
problem’	for	Britain’s	economic	prosperity	was	‘industrial	anarchy’,	which	would	be	seen	by	foreign	
competitors	as	a	‘complication	of	the	“British	malaise”	which	verges	on	lunacy’,	and	threatened	‘the	
economic	equivalent	of	the	shock	of	military	defeat	administered	to	the	Germans	and	the	
Japanese’.85	This	kind	of	narrative	tapped	into	the	insecurity	about	foreign	competition,	a	legacy	of	
the	rhetoric	of	war-time,	and	thus	represented	a	clear	continuity	from	the	1950s.	It	also	pointed	to	
the	emerging	and	complex	relationship	between	perceived	British	exceptionalism	and	economic	
decline.	There	were	very	real	concerns	that	Ford	would	take	its	business	‘to	comparatively	trouble-
free	plants	in	Germany’	resulting	in	redundancy	and	lost	exports.86	Significantly,	these	articles	did	
not	attribute	Britain’s	lack	of	competitiveness	to	its	wage	levels	or	its	inflation,	the	issues	which	had	
been	such	an	important	part	of	the	prevalent	productivity	debate,	but	to	the	behaviour	and	tactics	
of	its	unions.	This	marked	an	important	shift	in	emphasis	and	aligns	with	the	quantitative	analysis	
from	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	which	reflected	the	shift	from	government	scrutiny	to	unions.		
	
The	use	of	the	word	‘wildcat’	to	describe	unofficial	strikes	exploded	in	the	late	1960s	and	illustratec	
the	continued	frustration	and	value-laden	judgements	on	unofficial	groups	to	embark	on	industrial	
action	without	the	approval	of	their	union	leadership	(Figure	4.10).	It	was	particularly	popular	with	
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the	right-wing	Express.	Shop	stewards	were	consistently	referred	to	as	‘wreckers’,	such	was	the	link	
between	shop	stewards	and	so-called	industrial	‘sabotage’.	The	Mail	was	disgusted	that	some	shop	
stewards	had	allegedly	gone	as	far	as	suggesting	secret	ballots	were	‘undemocratic’,	in	contradiction	
of	the	Mail’s	long-held	editorial	line.87	There	were	continued	concerns	about	the	degradation	of	
centralised	control	in	the	TUC,	with	unions	‘too	often	impotent’	against	the	new	power	shop	
stewards,	coining	the	phrase	‘too	many	kooks	spoil	the	broth’.88	Shop	stewards	were	guilty	of	‘half-
baked	schemes’	and	‘class	warfare’,	according	to	the	Mail,	perturbed	by	the	reinforcement	of	such	
divisions	and	the	promotion	of	working	class	politics.89	They	were	more	often	than	not	directly	
implicated	in	these	loathed	wildcat	strikes,	either	by	their	dismissal	prompting	an	angry	reaction	
from	the	shop	floor,	or	by	promoting	‘wild	cat	walk-outs	on	grounds	so	frivolous	that	they	shame	
this	country’.90	They	continued	to	fall	victim	of	the	‘moderates	versus	militants’	rhetoric	of	the	1950s	
but	this	was	now	ensnared	in	the	increasingly	divisive	productivity	rhetoric,	which	provided	further	
evidence	of	the	blurring	of	‘industrial’	and	‘political’	issues.	
	
	
Figure	4.10:	Total	references	to	‘Wildcat’	industrial	action	in	British	dailies	(1958-71)	
	
There	are	important	caveats	to	the	immediate	public	impact	of	this	increased	anxiety	surrounding	
unofficial	or	wildcat	strikes.	Blumler	and	Ewbank’s	1968	survey	of	popular	attitudes	to	unofficial	
strikes	found	that	not	only	were	middle	class	respondents	the	most	worried	about	unofficial	strikes,	
there	was	little	correlation	between	what	kind	of	newspaper	people	read	or	the	political	party	they	
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supported	and	their	levels	of	concern.91	The	readers	of	‘more	Labour-inclined	newspapers’	were	just	
as	concerned	about	unofficial	strikes	as	readers	of	Conservative-supporting	newspapers.	Only	rank	
and	file	trade	unionists	were	likely	to	have	their	opinion	on	unofficial	strikes	affected	by	the	output	
of	the	mass	news	media	but	this	was	from	broadcast	news	media,	rather	than	the	so-called	partisan	
press,	and	this	impact	was	limited	purely	to	the	unofficial	cases,	rather	than	other	issues	facing	the	
trade	union	movement.	Therefore,	it	seems	unlikely	that	in	isolation	this	sort	of	coverage	had	a	
major	impact	on	public	opinion.	However,	such	discussion	would	have	had	an	impact	as	part	of	a	
broader	moralised	narrative	surrounding	productivity	and	the	involvement	of	unions	in	Britain’s	
decline.	
	
The	concern	with	shop	steward	influence	was	primarily	a	symptom	of	a	wider	debate	about	the	
leadership	and	direction	of	the	trade	unions	more	generally.	In	1960,	George	Woodcock	became	the	
TUC’s	General	Secretary.	While	many	obsessed	with	union	and	industrial	relations	structure	(the	
primary	focus	of	the	Donovan	Report)	Woodcock	was	in	a	minority	of	raising	the	issue	of	purpose.	
Discussion	about	structure	was	a	‘pointless	exercise’,	according	to	Woodcock,	without	a	consensus	
on	union	purpose,	where	he	was	particularly	concerned	about	the	‘free-for-all	society’	that	was	
emerging	as	a	result	of	employers’	abuse.92	In	expressing	rising	wages	in	such	terms,	Woodcock	
reflected	a	deference	to	the	dominant	narratives	of	inflation.	During	his	time	as	General	Secretary,	
Woodcock	sought	to	discover	how	trade	union	autonomy	could	be	‘reconciled	with	industrial	
efficiency	and	innovation’,	as	he	wrestled	to	balance	the	‘defence	of	trade	union	custom	and	
practice’	with	the	demand	for	reform	and	increases	in	productivity.93	Woodcock	benefited	from	a	
close	relationship	with	many	journalists,	including	Cole	at	the	Guardian	and	Wigham	at	the	Times	–	
‘his	coterie	of	admirers’	according	to	Robert	Taylor	–	and	initially	their	reception	of	Woodcock	was	
hopeful	about	the	new	direction	Woodcock	may	take	the	TUC	with	regards	to	economic	policy,	
applauding	his	‘reforming	zeal’.94	The	Guardian	praised	Woodcock’s	intention	to	address	the	issue	of	
the	trade	unions’	purpose	as	a	‘good	question	and	a	good	starting	point’	in	order	to	further	
understand	structural	reform,	and	provide	answers	to	questions	that	had	‘mystified	the	public	for	
many	years’.95	
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However,	even	at	the	beginning,	the	Times	was	sceptical	about	Woodcock’s	influence	on	economic	
attitudes	and	that	it	was	on	the	subject	of	‘influencing	wage	movement	that	Mr	Woodcock	was	least	
impressive’.96	The	suspicion	of	ITV	journalists	by	the	time	the	1964	TUC	Congress	arrived	was	that	
‘controversial	issues’	might	be	‘smoothed	over’	because	many	unionists	would	be	hesitant	to	‘rock	
Labour’s	vote’.97	By	mid-decade,	the	optimism	surrounding	Woodcock’s	leadership	soon	dwindled	
and	the	media	attention	on	Woodcock	translated	into	intense	scrutiny,	particularly	in	the	face	of	
these	unofficial	strikes.	Although	the	Times	was	sympathetic	that	the	1966	national	emergency	had	
blown	long-term	TUC	plans	‘to	pieces’,	it	was	clear	that	the	pace	of	TUC	reform	had	‘proved	too	slow	
for	the	politicians’	interpretation	of	the	country’s	needs’,	and	so	too	the	majority	of	the	media.98	On	
the	eve	of	the	TUC	annual	conference	in	1967,	ITV’s	reporter	suggested	that	nothing	said	at	the	
conference	would	‘have	very	much	effect	on	policy’	and	was	an	indication	that	Congress	was	
‘already	a	little	out	of	date’.99	Taylor	suggests	ultimately	it	was	Andrew	Shonfield	of	the	Observer,	in	
his	critique	of	the	Donvovan	Commission’s	recommendations,	who	came	the	closest	to	addressing	
the	issue	of	trade	union	function	with	his	‘one-man	minority	report’	against	voluntarist	bargaining	in	
such	an	interdependent	society,	rather	than	any	trade	union	leader.100	Ultimately,	Woodcock	
struggled	to	turn	the	questions	of	structure	into	questions	of	purpose,	and	it	was	the	continued	
media	interest	in	the	influence	of	shop	stewards,	above	all,	that	signalled	this	failure.	
	
When	a	strike	erupted	after	the	dismissal	of	seventeen	‘trouble-makers’	at	Dagenham,	the	Times	
argued	that	the	‘first	responsibility’	was	on	the	unions	‘to	see	that	their	shop	stewards	and	members	
honour	the	agreements’,	having	shown	themselves	previously	‘incapable	of	carrying	out	this	basic	
and	elementary	obligation’.	Although	the	newspaper	did	concede	that	there	was	‘ham-handed’	
management	at	play,	workers	had	been	‘supine’,	shop	stewards	‘provocative’	and	the	unions	
‘ineffectual’.	This	was	one	of	a	number	of	reports	that	placed	the	emphasis	of	malpractice	on	the	
labour	force	and	union	representation,	taking	the	company’s	claims	of	trouble-making	at	face	value	
and	defending	the	right	of	a	firm	to	dismiss	an	employee	‘who	persistently	breaks	his	contract	and	
induces	others	to	do	so’.101	Certainly,	very	little	of	ITV’s	news	coverage	represented	clear	interest	in	
the	long-term	and	structural	economic	experiences	of	the	British	car	industry,	but	on	the	attitudes	
and	agendas,	political	or	otherwise,	of	strikers.	When	faced	with	a	lengthy	strike	at	Ford’s	plant	in	
Dagenham	in	1962,	ITV’s	correspondent	was	keen	to	point	out	‘interesting	things’	about	the	strike.	
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This	predominantly	centred	on	the	timing	of	the	strike	(just	after	an	annual	holiday),	and	the	
position	of	the	strikers	(right	at	the	end	of	the	assembly	line),	in	order	to	raise	questions	about	the	
validity	of	the	strike.102	Correspondents	even	went	as	far	as	to	ask	workers	if	they	believed	the	strike	
to	be	‘a	communist	plot’.103	From	all	sides,	then,	shop	stewards	were	the	common	denominator	in	
worker	unrest	and	an	undesirable	evolution	in	the	structure	of	contemporary	trade	unionism.	
	
The	media’s	handling	of	shop	stewards	forms	an	example	of	Stanley	Cohen’s	conceptualisation	of	
media	‘symbolization’	–	the	mass	communication	of	stereotypes	where	supposedly	‘neutral	words’	
can	be	made	to	‘symbolize	complex	ideas	and	emotions’.	104	Although	Cohen’s	analysis	focussed	on	a	
different	set	of	symbols,	looking	at	the	likes	of	Mods	and	Teddy	Boys,	where	visual	and	material	
culture	was	important,	the	communication	processes	were	similar	with	shop	stewards.	As	with	the	
Teddy	Boy,	the	shop	steward	‘label’	acquired	its	own	‘descriptive	and	explanatory	potential’,	
indicative	of	an	individual	with	‘a	distinct	type	of	personality’,	where	such	symbolisation	was	
bolstered	through	the	use	of	‘dramatized	and	ritualistic	interviews’.	105	By	the	end	of	the	1960s,	the	
use	of	‘shop	steward’	in	industrial	relations	coverage	was	a	short-cut	to	important	stereotypes	and	
associations	–	impediments	to	national	prosperity,	reckless	self-interest	and	political	extremism.	This	
kind	of	symbolization,	combined	with	the	moralised	language	apparent	in	the	coverage	of	the	Daily	
Mirror,	allowed	industrial	relations	coverage	to	become	increasingly	personalised	and	one-
dimensional,	rather	than	tackle	the	complexities	of	wider	economic	structures.		
	
It	is	difficult	to	reconcile	these	toxic	portrayals	of	shop	stewards	in	newspapers	with	the	realities	of	
their	impact	on	industrial	productivity.	Tomlinson	has	convincingly	argued	that	one	of	the	
‘peculiarities’	of	the	reality	of	factory	life	was	that	‘the	much-abused	shop	steward	found	himself	in	
the	role	of	“progress-chaser”,	trying	to	maintain	his	members’	wages,	thus	effectively	playing	a	
managerial	role	in	keeping	production	going’.106	Considering	the	media’s	near-obsession	with	the	
impact	of	strikes	on	industrial	output,	one	might	think	this	would	have	warranted	praise.	Similarly,	
Tim	Claydon’s	study	of	the	car	industry	highlighted	that	shop	stewards	were	identified	as	‘more	of	a	
lubricant	than	an	irritant’	in	industrial	relations	by	the	government’s	Donovan	Commission.107	
However,	as	has	been	analysed	on	multiple	occasions,	such	a	role	was	incompatible	with	the	
productivity	narrative’s	emphasis	on	grounding	wages.	Shop	stewards,	in	seeking	ways	to	legitimise	
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improvements	for	workers	through	progress	and	productivity,	compromised	such	an	interpretation.	
Moreover,	their	successful	interventions	rarely	warranted	news	coverage	and	perhaps	would	have	
benefitted	from	the	type	of	in-depth	coverage	which	the	BBC	was	so	reluctant	to	provide.	Shop	
stewards	were	only	newsworthy	when	at	the	centre	of	a	strike	or	a	political	controversy,	tapping	
into	Cold	War	political	binaries,	perhaps	more	so	than	any	other	figures.	
	
The	Decade	of	Productivity	
Throughout	the	1960s,	Britain's	culture	of	economic	declinism	framed	the	relationship	between	
wage	increases	and	productivity	in	negative	terms.	Government	policy	and	indeed	the	majority	of	
the	media	narrative	understood	productivity	to	be	a	way	to	ground	wages	as	a	deflationary	
measure,	rather	than,	as	the	Guardian	had	suggested,	a	way	to	stimulate	economic	growth	through	
improved	productivity,	particularly	in	high	profile	manufacturing	industries.	The	moralised	and	
political	language	used	to	chronicle	wage	claims	and	union	conduct	helped	to	buttress	these	
negative	frames	and	assumptions	to	significant	effect,	although	it	was	not	without	its	inconsistencies	
and	problems.	The	emergence	of	such	rhetoric	was	particularly	notable	in	the	Mirror,	having	
previously	been	a	critic	of	the	Conservative’s	wage	pause,	which	also	drew	on	the	unions’	
traditional,	albeit	strained,	relationship	with	the	Labour	Party.	Understandings	of	a	British	post-war	
consensus,	specifically	in	the	industrial	sphere,	became	increasingly	complicated,	illustrated	by	the	
many	criticisms	of	Labour’s	decision	to	use	the	language	of	productivity	to	ground	and	restrict	
wages,	concerned	about	inflation.	Although	these	criticisms	varied	in	their	severity	and	nuances,	and	
not	all	were	as	extreme	as	the	Express’s	outright	rejection	of	a	wage	policy,	they	came	from	both	left	
and	right,	which	illustrated	the	erosion	of	Labour’s	increasingly	precarious	position	and	the	
divergence	of	economic	opinion.		
	
From	the	outset	then,	the	trade	unions,	although	initially	open	to	productivity	based	agreements,	
faced	an	uphill	battle	in	maintaining	a	positive	media	image	because	of	their	desire	to	seek	the	best	
wage	deals	for	their	members,	particularly	in	high-profile,	economically	vital	industries.	This	would	
have	been	the	case	almost	regardless	of	the	frequency	or	methods	of	industrial	action,	although	
strikes	provided	ideal	opportunities	for	'newsworthy'	criticism.	The	drive	for	‘emergency’	
programming	within	television,	now	an	important	part	of	media	coverage,	and	its	reluctance	to	
explore	long-term	structural	issues	through	documentaries,	due	to	the	pressures	of	commerciality	
and	competition	were	certainly	influencing	factors	in	the	focus	on	industrial	strife.	Moreover,	the	
unions’	apparent	failure	to	comply	with	or	consider	government	policy	in	understandings	of	their	
purpose	or	development	of	structure,	along	with	the	continued	erosion	of	centralised	power,	only	
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intensified	such	problems.	Shop	stewards,	in	assuming	a	leading	role	in	wage	bargaining	and	
promoting	industrial	action	where	deemed	necessary	(and	not	always	legally),	were	divisive	figures	
because	of	their	disregard	for	the	dominant	economic	rhetoric.	The	narrow	industrial	relations	
agenda	even	meant	that	less	contentious	issues	of	efficiency	and	productivity	still	revolved	around	
the	experiences	and	attitudes	of	the	labour	force,	as	exemplified	by	the	discussions	in	the	Times	on	
redundancy	and	redeployment.			
	
Increased	scrutiny	of	the	motivations	of	the	labour	force	meant	that	management's	role	in	
workplace	unrest	or	Britain's	faltering	productivity	was	largely	neglected	or	intentionally	deflected,	
as	indicated	by	the	BBC's	experience,	and	likely	contributed	to	the	damaging	and	complacent	
'corporate	culture'	that	Tomlinson	described.	Moreover,	in	many	ways,	the	increasing	focus	on	the	
trade	union	movement	in	scrutinizing	the	British	disease	and	its	productivity	problem,	driven	by	
strikes,	masked	the	growing	public	scepticism	regarding	the	ability	of	a	Labour	government	to	
manage	the	industrial	economy	through	wage	restraint.	If,	as	Tomlinson	described,	1966	was	the	
high	tide	of	the	productivity	debate	in	Whitehall,	the	frames	and	agendas	of	the	media	ensured	that	
the	problem	of	productivity	took	on	a	very	different	image	in	the	years	following.	
	
Although	the	experiences	of	1969,	typified	by	a	peak	in	media	concern	about	unofficial	strikes	and,	
as	explored	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	debate	over	In	Place	of	Strife,	cannot	be	framed	as	a	crisis,	
they	did	represent	an	important	stage	in	the	relationship	between	unions,	media	and	government.	
The	failure	of	Labour	to	answer	public	concerns	about	the	militancy	of	unions,	particularly	shop	
stewards,	through	incentives,	as	exemplified	in	productivity	legislation,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	
punitive	measures	of	In	Place	of	Strife,	led	many	to	doubt	the	party’s	ability	to	arrest	Britain’s	
economic	demise.	By	February	1969,	not	only	did	the	Conservatives	hold	a	lead	in	election	polls,	this	
was	underpinned	by	the	belief	that	the	Conservatives	could	better	maintain	prosperity,	with	a	22	
per	cent	lead	in	this	area,	as	well	as	a	perceived	superiority	in	handling	industrial	disputes,	albeit	
with	a	less	impressive	6	per	cent	lead.108		
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Chapter	Five	–	Public	disillusionment	and	the	Manufactured	Crisis	
Governance	and	Politics,	1970-79	
	
The	relationship	between	government,	unions	and	the	media	experienced	unprecedented	
transformation	during	the	1970s,	as	each	element	wrestled	for	influence	in	an	increasingly	hostile	
atmosphere.	While	this	final	decade	does	not	mark	a	clear	break	from	the	analysis	that	preceded	it,	
this	chapter	assesses	media	coverage	of	a	period	which	has	an	‘orthodox	internal	chronology	of	
escalating	problems’,	with	1978-79’s	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	as	its	finale.1	As	Geoffrey	Goodman	
reflected,	if	1979	was	the	‘watershed	year’	of	post-war	British	politics,	‘the	story	line	effectively	
began	with	Heath’s	victory’	in	1970’s	shock	election	result.2	As	this	chapter	illustrates,	the	story	line	
took	a	clear	turn	after	1974,	which	had	a	dramatic	impact	on	coverage	of	industrial	relations.	
Heath’s	period	as	Prime	Minister	was	characterised	by	intense	public	disillusionment,	particularly	in	
response	to	the	government’s	confrontation	with	major	unions,	and	its	dependence	on	unparalleled	
deployment	of	‘State	of	Emergency’	powers.	The	1974	miners’	strike,	with	the	February	general	
election	as	its	backdrop,	forms	the	first	of	the	political	case	studies	of	this	chapter,	as	Edward	Heath	
went	to	the	country	with	the	campaign	slogan	‘Who	Governs	Britain?’,	in	the	hope	of	consolidating	
his	position	in	a	supposed	battle	with	trade	unionism.	Although	historians	such	as	Jim	Phillips	have	
argued	that	government	authority	was	‘certainly	questioned’	but	‘not	seriously	jeopardised’	by	NUM	
industrial	action,	the	media	narrative	and	public	perception	of	the	strike	lies	relatively	unexplored.	3		
	
1974	and	the	winter	of	1978-79	represent	the	collision	of	trade	unionism	and	high	politics,	almost	
without	parallel	in	British	contemporary	history,	perhaps	with	the	exception	of	1926	and	1984-85.	
This	chapter	seeks	to	assess	the	influence	and	effectiveness	of	the	framing	of	these	case	studies	as	
moments	of	‘crisis’,	rather	than	the	validity	of	such	portrayals,	analysing	their	construction	and	
context.	In	the	case	of	1974,	despite	the	government’s	suggestion	that	the	unions	actively	
challenged	governmental	power,	the	development	of	a	crisis	narrative	in	the	British	media	was	
limited.	The	considered	response	of	unions,	public	perceptions	of	political	leadership	and	the	NUM,	
and	the	influence	of	the	election	agenda	is	examined,	in	order	to	further	explain	1974’s	contained	or	
limited	crisis.	In	the	assessment	of	1979,	the	influence	of	structural	changes	to	the	three	strands	of	
analysis	–	media,	politics	and	union	strategy	–	is	reviewed,	to	contextualise	the	clear	continuities	and	
changes	to	media	coverage.	Through	this	analysis,	this	chapter	explores	how	1979	had	such	radically	
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different	results	to	the	events	of	1974	and	why	it	has	been	considered	a	crisis	in	ways	that	1974	
could	not	fulfil.		
	
1974	and	Britain’s	agonising	drift	
Although	the	events	of	1974	did	not	constitute	a	serious	challenge	to	the	government’s	authority,	
the	media	narrative	depicted	clear	conflict	between	government	and	unions.	The	long-established	
language	of	war	and	conflict	in	the	industrial	context	changed	orientation	around	the	turn	of	the	
decade.	Although	James	Thomas	suggested	that	it	was	the	memory	of	the	poverty	of	the	inter-war	
period	which	established	consistency	in	the	media’s	meta-narratives	until	1970,	in	the	industrial	
example	it	is	clear	that	it	was	memory	of	the	Second	World	War	which	had	crystallised	attitudes.	4	
The	lexicon	of	the	1950s,	which	highlighted	Britain’s	dwindling	position	in	the	international	market	
as	a	deterrent	from	striking,	and	juxtaposed	British	performance	against	a	foreign	‘other’,	gave	way	
to	something	much	more	insular.	Increasingly,	the	‘other’	in	media	narratives	of	industrial	relations	
was	the	trade	unions,	posed	against	the	government	or,	in	the	case	of	the	right-wing	press,	the	
‘national	interest’.	This	had	already	been	evoked	during	the	In	Place	of	Strife	episode	under	Labour	
but	became	more	firmly	entrenched	as	the	unions	faced	conventional	Conservative	adversaries	in	
government.	According	to	the	Mirror,	the	first	of	the	two	miners’	strikes	under	Heath’s	leadership,	
formed	‘a	Blitzkrieg	for	which	Government	and	country	were	totally	ill	prepared’,	as	Heath	had	‘lost	
his	nerve’.5	In	1974,	the	NUM’s	decision	to	take	industrial	action	was	described	by	the	Express	in	a	
front-page	headline	as	the	miners’	intent	to	‘go	for	all-out	war’.6	Much	like	the	narrative	of	the	
Second	World	War,	this	was	understood	to	be	a	challenge	distinctive	to	Britain.	Fittingly,	the	Sun	
consistently	dubbed	the	government’s	confrontation	with	the	NUM,	or	vice	versa,	as	‘the	Battle	of	
Britain’.7	The	narrative	of	the	British	disease	that	had	become	an	entrenched	part	of	the	popular	
industrial	narrative	continued	to	sustain	a	popular	perception	of	a	country	with	unparalleled	
challenges	to	a	unique	national	character,	despite	a	European	context	which	suggested	that	British	
experience	of	striking	was	typical	of	the	period.		
	
1974’s	period	of	industrial	unrest	was	the	first	winter	to	be	dubbed	as	a	‘winter	of	discontent’,	but	
the	prevalence	of	this	styling	was	relatively	limited.8	The	majority	of	newspapers	were	reluctant	to	
describe	the	battle	between	government	and	unions	as	anything	perilous	or	critical.	This	was	despite	
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an	official	State	of	Emergency	and	an	impending	general	election,	both	bound	in	war	motifs.	The	
media	narrative	of	conflict	between	government	and	unions	insulated	these	industrial	issues	from	
the	‘national	interest’	or	the	general	public,	although	the	Conservative’s	‘Who	Governs	Britain?’	
slogan	reflected	attempts	to	widen	public	anxiety	about	these	issues.	The	Express	did	refer	to	‘the	
incredibility	of	our	industrial	crisis’	but	in	an	article	that	was	laced	with	hope	for	the	future	and	a	
sense	of	impermanence.	9	Similarly,	the	Guardian	referred	to	the	winter’s	strike	as	‘the	worst	
industrial	crisis	to	grip	the	country	since	pre-war’	but	conceded	this	was	likely	to	be	resolved	in	
‘good	old	soggy	compromise’.10	Throughout,	although	the	threat	to	the	country’s	governance	was	
recognised,	the	situation	was	rarely	framed	as	something	beyond	the	means	of	mediation	or	
negotiation.		
	
A	much	more	popular	narrative	of	Britain’s	political	and	industrial	situation,	fostered	by	the	most	
popular	tabloids,	was	a	sense	of	‘drifting	into	a	nightmare’	rather	than	the	expectation	of	any	kind	of	
denouement	or	climax.	11	The	Mirror,	although	it	recognised	the	anxiety	surrounding	this	‘drift’,	
denied	that	situation	was	immediately	‘serious’	and	insisted	that	in	thirty	years’	time,	the	supposed	
‘Great	Crisis	of	‘74’	would	be	remembered	for	the	‘ministerial	appeal	to	us	all	to	brush	our	teeth	in	
the	dark’.12	If	there	was	any	suggestion	of	crisis	in	any	transformative	terms,	it	was	pushed	by	left-
wing	newspapers,	for	example	the	Mirror,	which	sought	to	widen	the	political	agenda	beyond	
industrial	strife.	Both	the	Guardian,	under	John	Cole’s	influence,	and	the	Mirror	were	keen	to	
explore	the	‘real	issues’	such	as	‘collapsing	social	services,	‘soaring	rents’	and	‘astronomical	prices’.	13	
Moreover,	the	Mirror	consistently	referred	to	Heath’s	image	problem	as	part	of	a	‘crisis	of	
confidence’	from	both	the	public	and	those	inside	his	own	party.	14	As	far	as	the	industrial	scene	was	
concerned,	although	the	miners’	strike	provoked	anxiety	and	undermined	the	position	of	both	sides,	
the	situation	was	rarely	understood	as	a	crisis	of	governance.			
	
An	important	explanation	for	the	limited	crisis	narrative	of	1974	was	the	lack	of	union	action	which	
might	have	satisfied	right-wing	promises	of	extremism	or	violence	to	indicate	a	threat	to	
government	or	democracy.	The	Express	made	significant	attempts	to	frame	an	influential	minority	of	
trade	unionists	as	militant	aggressors	during	the	early	1970s,	with	foreboding	articles	about	‘the	
shadowy	men	who	thrive	on	strife’,	but	this	gained	very	little	traction	in	1974,	despite	the	popularity	
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of	conflict	themes.15	This	failure	to	convince	was	partly	a	symptom	of	the	paper’s	waning	influence,	
in	the	midst	of	a	succession	of	cover	price	rises	(eleven	between	1970	and	1983)	caused	by	a	surge	
in	running	costs,	and	its	failure	to	widen	its	appeal	beyond	its	aging	readership,	as	58	per	cent	of	its	
readers	were	over	the	age	of	45.16	In	many	ways,	the	Express	was	left	behind	by	the	dominance	of	
the	Mirror,	emergence	of	the	Sun	and	the	Mail’s	shift	to	the	tabloid	format,	something	the	Express	
did	not	follow	until	1977.	However,	these	commercial	issues	aside,	even	the	Express’s	columnist	
conceded	that	the	promise	of	‘rough	sailing’	had	been	denied	by	an	‘unexpectedly	pacific	
campaign’.17	The	conciliatory	campaign	was	partly	as	a	result	of	the	NUM’s	healthy	position	within	
the	wider	trade	union	movement,	as	‘their	political	and	social	clout	extended	far	beyond	their	
memberships’,	which	gave	the	NUM	the	ability	to	convince	and	persuade	in	very	small	numbers.18	
More	significantly,	the	peaceful	strike	and	ensuing	election	demonstrated	acknowledgment	by	both	
miners	and	the	Labour	Party	that	any	untoward	behaviour	at	picket	lines	could	have	damaging	
repercussions	for	Labour’s	performance	at	the	polls.	As	the	Sun	suggested,	‘Mr	Heath’s	Ace	for	an	
election	would	be	confrontation	with	the	unions…	but	it	takes	two	to	make	a	confrontation’.19		
	
Although	the	Sun	referenced	its	established	‘friendship’	with	the	miners,	in	reflecting	on	the	rise	of	
supposed	extremism	in	major	unions,	it	initially	warned	unions	that	‘no	group,	no	union,	no	party’	
could	be	allowed	to	challenge	the	government’s	authority,	the	result	of	which	would	be	‘the	death	
of	democracy’	–	and	this	seems	to	have	been	a	warning	that	the	NUM	was	largely	receptive	to.20	
NUM	members	voted	against	Gormley’s	request	to	delay	a	strike	in	1974	‘in	the	national	interest’	
but	recognised	concern	about	the	flying	pickets	of	1972	at	a	time	when	Britain	was	sensitive	to	the	
physical	threats	posed	by	football	hooliganism.21	NUM	leaders	at	national	and	local	level	employed	a	
'strict	code	of	behaviour',	understood	as	'victory	without	violence',	aware	of	the	potential	damage	to	
the	miners’	well-earned	public	image.22	The	election	‘gave	the	miners	a	very	strong	motive	for	
behaving	so	as	to	dissipate	as	little	support	for	the	Labour	Party	as	possible.’23	The	miners’	media	
awareness,	in	contrast	to	unions	in	other	disputes,	and	their	responsiveness	to	the	election	
campaign	confirmed	the	continuance	of	a	complex	relationship	of	loyalty	to	the	Labour	Party,	
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16	Williams,	Read	All	About	it,	p.	203.	
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18	Andy	Beckett,	When	the	Lights	Went	Out:	Britain	in	the	Seventies	(London,	2009),	p.	64.	
19	Sun,	14	January	1974,	p.	2.	
20	Sun,	24	January	1974,	p.	5.	
21	Martin	Holmes,	Political	Pressure	and	Economic	Policy:	British	Government	1970-74	(Basingstoke,	1987),	p.	
116.	
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despite	the	embittered	experiences	of	1969.	The	Express,	frustrated	by	the	unions’	refusal	to	fulfil	its	
predictions,	suggested	that	because	television	was	the	source	from	which	‘most	of	the	electorate	is	
likely	to	get	its	impressions	of	policies	and	personalities’,	there	was	a	‘determined	effort	on	both	
sides	to	swamp	the	box	with	sweet	reasonableness’.24	This	demonstrated	the	kind	of	awareness	
about	the	influence	of	television	coverage	on	public	opinion,	and	cultivating	media	image,	which	
Edward	Heath	had	consistently	either	overlooked	or	ignored,	having	‘neither	the	time	nor	the	
inclination	to	indulge	in	such	fripperies’.	25	
	
Personalised	Coverage	and	Heath’s	U-turn	
Heath’s	media	conduct	was	significant	for	the	way	1974’s	events	were	understood.	1972	had	
provided	important	warnings	for	Heath	about	media	coverage,	beyond	his	apparent	distaste	for	
television	appearances	and	editorial	pandering.	Although	cases	of	controversy	involving	NUM	
members	were	more	widespread	in	1972,	this	was	often	glossed	over	as	a	response	to	incitement	
from	the	government.	The	Sun	referred	to	miners	as	‘only	playing	at	Ted’s	game’,	which	was	‘tough’	
and	‘unsentimental’,	with	the	suggestion	that	their	response	was	dictated	by	the	pressures	exerted	
on	workers	by	the	government’s	industrial	policy.26	The	Times	described	the	Government’s	response	
to	the	long-term	commercial	difficulties	facing	the	mining	industry	as	‘crude	and	hurtful’.27	The	
moralised	norms	of	the	tabloid	lexicon	were	utilised	to	the	miners’	benefit,	rather	than	the	
government’s,	playing	on	concepts	of	justice,	for	an	underpaid	and	hard-working	group	of	
employees,	and	victimhood,	with	the	miners	framed	as	‘the	unlucky	victims	of	a	national	confusion’	
surrounding	modernisation	and	economic	management.	28	These	were	the	same	sympathetic	
patterns	of	coverage	which	had	typified	the	media’s	response	to	cases	of	absenteeism	in	the	mining	
industry	in	the	1960s	and	reflected	the	public	respect	for	the	miners’	contribution	to	the	nation.	The	
varied	nature	of	the	public	support,	governed	largely	by	affluence	and	class	to	surprising	effect,	and	
the	subsequent	moderation	of	volatile	currents	of	opposition	and	support	by	newspapers,	is	
explored	further	in	the	analysis	which	follows.	However,	at	the	conclusion	of	the	1972	strike,	81	per	
cent	of	those	polled	supported	the	generous	pay	settlement	offered	by	the	independent	Wilberforce	
Report	and	52	per	cent	said	their	sympathies	lay	with	the	miners,	as	opposed	to	20	per	cent	for	
employers.29	Between	1972	and	1974,	the	public	increasingly	saw	the	responsibility	for	Britain’s	
economic	problems	as	a	governmental	one,	as	polls	reflected	an	11	per	cent	rise	in	those	blaming	
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the	government,	while	the	number	apportioning	blame	to	the	unions	dropped	by	8	per	cent.30	
Following	the	first	of	the	national	mining	strikes,	45	per	cent	of	respondents	said	that	their	
impression	of	Heath	had	‘gone	down’	as	a	result	of	his	handling	of	the	dispute.31		
	
With	Heath’s	government	struggling	in	the	polls	after	the	events	of	1972,	Britain	was	said	to	be	at	‘a	
stage	of	disillusionment’,	which	could	only	be	recovered	by	a	‘learning	government’.	32	Heath	
responded	to	such	demands	by	implementing	a	more	interventionist	policy,	a	‘near-sensational	shift	
from	one	end	of	the	political	stage	to	the	other’.	33	Demonstrated	through	the	statutory	incomes	
policy	and	the	nationalisation	of	Rolls	Royce,	this	change	in	policy,	despite	being	a	reversion	to	the	
post-war	norms	that	many	had	demanded,	only	served	to	increase	scrutiny	on	Heath.	The	fraught	
situation	in	the	coal	industry	in	the	winter	of	1973	prompted	the	Sun	to	ask	‘WHERE	IS	OUR	
CHURCHILL?’	in	a	situation	apparently	reminiscent	of	Dunkirk.	34	This	preoccupation	with	
‘Churchillism’	was	indicative	of	Britain’s	long-term	desire	for	a	leader	with	Churchill’s	rhetorical	skills	
and	formed	part	of	the	cult	of	personality	which	had	become	such	a	prominent	part	of	media	
coverage	since	the	war.35	Concern	about	a	lack	of	effective	leadership,	typical	of	earlier	coverage	of	
the	TUC,	albeit	for	different	reasons,	now	applied	to	a	Conservative	government	that	was	
traditionally	tough	on	union	issues.	In	Ana	Ines	Langer’s	post-war	research	of	this	personalisation	
trend	in	British	politics,	quantitative	analysis	showed	Heath	to	be	far	less	prominent	in	the	coverage	
of	the	Times	compared	to	his	predecessors,	as	he	lacked	the	‘leadership	style’	to	inspire	its	
journalists.36	According	to	the	Guardian,	Heath’s	‘cold,	remote	and	unsympathetic’	approach,	
illustrated	by	his	apparent	public	detachment,	‘made	him	an	easy	and	inviting	target	for	criticism’.37	
This	was	particularly	damaging	when	he	embarked	on	such	a	sharp	change	in	policy	direction.	It	was	
clear	from	an	early	stage	then	that	a	positive	outcome	for	Heath	during	any	case	of	perceptible	
national	crisis	in	1974	was	far	from	guaranteed.		
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Figure	5.1:	‘U-Turn’	articles	in	national	dailies	(1945-77)	
	
Figure	5.1,	an	overview	of	the	period,	demonstrates	a	surge	in	the	use	of	‘u-turn’	in	newspaper	
coverage	following	Heath’s	change	in	policy	direction.	Although	the	upturn	in	its	usage	was	most	
distinct	in	the	Guardian’s	reports,	all	three	of	the	newspapers	showed	an	upturn	of	varying	degrees,	
indicative	of	the	near-universal	attention	paid	to	Heath’s	political	changes,	and	the	stigma	
associated	with	them.	The	sustained	coverage	and	political	scrutiny	of	Heath’s	multiple	u-turns,	
defied	expectations	of	a	disproportionate	focus	on	unions	in	order	to	suggest	that	their	activities	
warranted	‘closer	scrutiny	than	those	of	employers	because	their	legitimacy	is	suspect’.38	This	
surprisingly	balanced	coverage	provided	the	Conservatives	with	problems	in	their	single-issue	
campaign,	as	it	did	not	exert	the	pressures	on	unionism	that	would	be	traditionally	expected.	It	is	
also	notable	that	its	use	continued	after	Heath’s	incumbency,	suggestive	of	continued	public	
disillusionment	with	British	political	leadership,	despite	a	change	in	government,	which	established	
an	important	foundation	for	shaping	Margaret	Thatcher’s	conviction	politics.		
	
Narrow	agendas	and	public	disillusionment	
The	narrow	agenda	of	the	election	campaign,	at	the	instigation	of	the	Conservatives,	also	influenced	
the	way	the	debate	swung	in	the	media.	Many	commentators	argued	that	Heath	had	been	
outmanoeuvred	on	the	central	campaign	issue,	as	he	had	been	‘forced	to	fight	on	ground	that	in	
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many	ways	favours	his	opponents’.39	This	perspective	suggested	that,	although	the	Conservative	
campaign	suggested	otherwise,	a	narrow	media	agenda	focused	on	the	industrial	situation,	contrary	
to	conventional	expectations,	put	the	government	at	a	strategic	disadvantage	in	fighting	the	
election.	This	was	despite	the	fact	Sydney	Jacobson	from	the	Mirror	had	‘advised	Heath	strongly’	
that	the	single	issue	of	trade	unions	would	fail	him	in	a	general	election.40	On	the	other	hand,	Alistair	
Hetherington,	Guardian	editor,	recalled	that	even	the	Labour	‘stalwarts’	amongst	the	Guardian’s	
staff	had	been	‘notably	reserved	in	their	view	of	the	Labour	alternative’,	without	‘real	confidence’	in	
Wilson,	and	suggested	that	had	it	not	been	for	the	Conservative’s	tax	policies,	‘the	Guardian	might	
well	have	supported	Heath’.41	More	than	simply	illustrating	the	severity	of	popular	political	
scepticism,	the	Guardian’s	support	for	Wilson	after	consideration	of	the	wider	political	agenda	
alluded	to	Heath’s	problem	had	he	chosen	to	fight	something	broader	than	a	single	issue	campaign	
based	on	the	threat	of	trade	unionism.	The	Express’s	frustration	with	the	fact	state-ownership	had	
turned	the	miners	case	into	a	‘political	football’	hinted	at	the	continued	divisiveness	of	strikes	in	
public	sector	industries.42	
	
Both	sides	of	the	so-called	battle	struggled	to	convince	their	traditional	support,	indicated	by	the	
lack	of	endorsements	in	the	build	up	to	the	general	election.	The	Guardian	described	the	recent	
transition	in	public	mood	as	‘scepticism’	to	‘political	cynicism’.43	There	was	clear	evidence	that	public	
disillusionment	had	begun	to	reach	beyond	the	government	and	towards	the	trade	unions,	with	the	
conflict	perceived	to	be	focussed	on	‘not	really	principle	so	much	as	politics,	conducted	above	the	
heads	of	the	people’.	44	Although	this	assessment	alluded	to	the	lack	of	threat	posed	by	miners	to	
the	national	interest,	it	also	reflected	the	continued	attempts	of	the	press	to	separate	industrial	
matters	from	political	ones,	as	a	means	of	delegitimising	industrial	action.	John	Cole	felt	that	by	this	
point	‘the	Zeitgeist’	was	beginning	to	turn	against	the	union	movement,	despite	the	lack	of	effective	
resolutions	from	the	Conservatives.45	Despite	public	anxiety	about	the	rise	of	militancy,	a	consistent	
theme	across	the	period	of	research,	there	was	a	concern	about	the	inability	of	either	side	to	
effectively	counter	such	issues,	which	were	allowed	to	slip	between	the	cracks	of	political	policy.	The	
Guardian	believed	the	Conservatives	thought	it	was	‘up	to	Labour	to	expose	and	counter	left-wing	
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subversion	of	unions,	and	Labour	politicians	hesitate	to	say	anything	which	may	embarrass	the	
unions’.46		
	
The	difference	in	political	perspectives	between	the	country’s	leading	newspapers,	or	more	precisely	
the	Sun’s	lack	of	a	clear	political	position,	had	a	decisive	impact	on	the	outcomes	of	1974.	Although	
1974	is	often	emphasized	because	it	was	the	first	time	Murdoch’s	Sun	endorsed	a	Conservative	
campaign,	this	was	a	very	tepid	recommendation,	which	referred	to	the	decision	for	the	electorate	
as	between	‘the	Devil	and	the	Deep	Blue	Sea’,	with	Labour	perceived	to	be	‘even	less	likely	to	have	
the	answers’	to	Britain’s	economic	problems.47	In	the	lead	up	to	1974’s	election	campaign,	the	Sun’s	
emphasis	on	the	likes	of	Page	Three,	lifestyle	columns	and	other	cultural	endeavours,	had	further	
reflected	and	responded	to	the	country’s	political	disengagement.	When	required	to	take	a	political	
position	in	the	electoral	context,	the	tenuousness	of	the	Sun’s	support	for	the	Conservatives	was	
summed	up	by	the	presence	of	columns	in	that	same	pre-election	issue	which	fell	on	the	side	of	
Labour	because	Wilson	would	‘just	have	to	do’	for	Britain.48	Moreover,	earlier	in	the	campaign,	the	
Sun	had	adjudged	that	the	election	had	been	‘fought	in	the	no-man’s	land	between	aspiration	and	
belief’	where	the	Labour	manifesto	was	‘marginally	more	believable’.49	This	disparity	also	referenced	
an	emerging	trend	in	media	coverage	which	consistently	saw	a	much	higher	proportion	of	editors	
back	the	Conservatives	than	the	public	or	journalists	more	widely.	According	to	1977’s	Royal	
Commission	on	the	Press,	there	was	only	a	three	per	cent	disparity	in	voting	trends	between	
journalists	and	the	public,	compared	to	a	12	per	cent	disparity	between	editors	and	the	public.50	This	
kind	of	discrepancy	highlighted	the	state	of	flux	that	existed	between	editorial	opinion	and	public	
opinion,	along	with	the	success	of	the	Sun	in	gaining	popularity	via	cultural	interests,	rather	than	
traditional	political	allegiances.	Whether	this	flux	was	a	symptom	of	editors’	unconvincing	and	
reluctant	approval	for	the	government,	or	a	signal	of	editors	pulling	their	readerships	in	new	political	
directions,	it	is	difficult	to	say.	However,	it	did	raise	questions	about	the	influence	of	editors	over	
both	journalists	and	the	public,	despite	the	lack	of	compelling	political	choices.	
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Figure	5.2:	‘For	all	our	tomorrows’,	Daily	Mirror,	28	February	1974,	p.	1.	
	
In	contrast	to	the	Sun’s	tepid	response	to	the	political	stalemate	which	confronted	Britain	at	the	first	
of	Britain’s	1974	general	elections,	the	Mirror	adopted	a	committed	position	in	Labour’s	favour.	Its	
front	page	on	election	day,	absorbed	entirely	by	the	slogan	‘For	All	Our	Tomorrows,	Vote	Labour	
Today’	(Figure	5.2),	which	only	offered	an	editorial	explanation	of	‘the	way	ahead’	on	the	following	
page.51	This,	according	to	Goodman,	had	an	‘astonishing	impact’	on	the	election,	used	as	a	poster	by	
many	Labour	supporters,	with	‘more	impact	on	voters	than	any	other	national	newspaper	on	polling	
day’.52	Such	a	suggestion	that	one	headline	could	decisively	influence	the	general	election	pointed	to	
the	prevalence	of	floating	voters	at	that	time	and	the	volatility	of	public	opinion.	While	there	are	
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questions	about	the	neutrality	of	the	source	in	this	case,	the	paper’s	confidence	in	the	message	was	
demonstrated	by	the	duplication	of	that	poster	headline	for	October’s	general	election.	
	
Heath’s	snap	election	was	regarded	by	many	as	an	act	of	brinkmanship	but	the	single	issue,	‘Who	
Governs	Britain?’,	was	perhaps	Heath’s	greatest	problem.	While	the	Royal	Commission	on	the	Press	
adjudged	that	the	coverage	of	the	period	was	‘usually	disapproving	of	industrial	action’	and	
‘supportive	of	the	Government’,	facets	of	1974’s	media	response	certainly	brought	into	question	
such	judgements.53	In	order	for	the	narrow	agenda	of	the	campaign	to	be	beneficial	for	the	
government’s	electoral	aspirations,	it	seems	probable	that	Heath	needed	to	be	campaigning	from	a	
much	stronger	position,	particularly	in	terms	of	public	impressions	of	his	leadership	style,	against	a	
union	movement	which	failed,	from	Heath’s	point	of	view,	to	provide	a	more	physical,	foreboding	
threat	to	principles	of	democracy	and	governance.		
	
The	fact	public	support	for	strikes	showed	very	limited	change	between	1966	and	1974,	despite	
concern	about	the	extent	of	union	power,	suggested	that	little	had	changed	to	tip	the	delicate	
balance.54	Residual	sympathy	and	solidarity	with	miners,	based	on	a	persuasive	media	narrative	of	
victimhood	and	struggle,	also	undercut	Heath’s	attempts	to	frame	unions	as	a	threat	to	national	
governance.	As	the	Guardian	aptly	assessed,	any	Conservative	attempt	to	portray	the	miners	as	
against	‘the	people’	or	the	national	interest	was	perceived	‘as	the	miners	against	the	Government’,	
where	the	public	‘did	not	see	much	between	them’.55	This	was	exemplified	in	the	election	results.	
The	language	of	conflict	did	not	translate	into	a	threat	against	the	national	interest,	like	earlier	
conceptions	of	‘war’	in	an	industrial	context	had,	and	instead	simply	illustrated	the	lack	of	
compromise	between	government	and	unions.	If	1969	raised	serious	questions	about	Labour’s	
ability	to	assert	government	power	in	the	face	of	union	pressure,	1974	had	a	similar	impact	on	
perceptions	of	Conservative	trade	union	policy.	As	the	Guardian	said,	neither	party	had	‘produced	
an	answer	to	the	unlimited	power	to	disrupt	life	and	ultimately	paralyse	government’	but	
simultaneously	the	country	would	‘not	lightly	forgive’	the	party	‘unwilling	to	make	a	reasonable	
compromise’.56		
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The	Winter	of	Discontent:	New	Contexts	and	Debates	
The	final	politically-orientated	case	study	of	this	research	is	markedly	different	from	those	that	have	
preceded	it.	The	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	described	a	series	of	public	sector	strikes	in	a	number	of	
essential	services,	including	ambulance	workers	and	grave-diggers,	during	the	winter	of	1978-79,	
one	of	Britain’s	coldest	since	the	war.	Whereas	much	of	industrial	relations	coverage	before	1978-79	
is	relatively	unexplored,	as	this	research	has	shown,	James	Thomas	has	reflected	on	the	way	1979	
has	formed	the	‘centrepiece’	of	contemporary	mythology	which	views	the	1970s	as	‘a	period	of	
backwardness,	anarchy	and	industrial	militancy’.57	Contemporary	politicians	have	found	this	
mythology	to	be	immensely	profitable	for	their	own	agendas.	Outside	politics,	the	winter	of	1978-79	
has	been	the	focus	of	a	number	of	interesting	historical	monographs	which	seek	to	‘move	beyond	
the	provocative	and	one-dimensional	representations	in	order	to	understand	the	underlying	
complexity	of	the	forces	that	shaped	these	events’.58	However,	as	Colin	Hay	argues,	there	is	a	good	
case	that	this	mythologizing	process	was	not	‘chronologically	subsequent	to,	but	simultaneous	with,	
the	events’	and	shaped	they	were	lived	and	experienced.59	Although	these	strikes	were	not	
essentially	co-ordinated	between	different	services	and	were	far	from	nationwide,	these	strikes	
were	‘packaged’	by	the	media	as	symptomatic	of	a	crisis	of	government.	In	this	case,	the	question	is	
‘not	just	the	accuracy	of	that	construction’	but	‘how	the	events	were	understood	at	the	time’.60	This	
section	explores	the	structural	changes	to	the	media	sphere,	with	a	specific	focus	on	the	new	
political	influence	of	the	Sun,	which	transformed	the	forms	and	reception	of	industrial	relations	
coverage,	despite	notable	continuities.	Beyond	this,	it	analyses	and	reflects	on	the	responses	and	
behaviours	of	political	leaders	and	union	chiefs	to	these	changes	and	their	impact	on	the	national	
response	to	the	crisis.		
	
In	September	1978,	five	per	cent	of	those	polled	felt	that	strikes	were	Britain’s	‘most	urgent	
problem’	but	by	January	1979,	53	per	cent	believed	it	to	be	the	most	urgent	issue,	which	provided	a	
clear	indication	of	the	anxiety	surrounding	the	industrial	situation.61	Figure	5.3	indicates	how	
conceptions	of	some	kind	of	nationally	peculiar	illness	–	endemic	and	contagious	in	nature	–	had	
become	increasingly	popular	in	the	build	up	to	the	Winter	of	Discontent,	as	media	concern	grew.	
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Although,	the	roots	of	this	economic	and	industrial	declinism	were	established	during	the	1960s,	it	
was	after	Wilson’s	1975	election	success	that	this	conceptualisation	became	part	of	mainstream	
coverage.	The	influence	of	the	IMF	crisis	of	1976,	as	Callaghan’s	government	was	forced	to	borrow	
an	unprecedented	sum	of	money	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	should	also	not	be	
underestimated	in	intensifying	such	anxieties.	Although	it	was	‘less	traumatic’	than	the	Winter	of	
Discontent,	it	too	formed	an	important	watershed	in	economic	terms,	as	the	‘post-war	consensus	on	
how	the	economy	should	be	managed	broke	down’.	62	This	context	is	crucially	important	for	
understanding	the	events	of	1978-79,	as	well	as	the	economic	aspect	of	industrial	relations	more	
widely.	
	
	
Figure	5.3:	‘British	Illness’	and	‘British	Disease’	in	British	Dailies	(1960-80)	
	
Whilst	sceptical	of	the	impact	of	the	press	on	day-to-day	public	opinion,	Larry	Lamb,	editor	of	the	
Sun,	believed	it	was	‘distinctly	possible’	that	the	Sun	played	an	important	part	in	deposing	the	
Callaghan	government	in	1979	as	the	Sun	‘was	probably	talking	to	most	of	the	people	who	could	be	
persuaded	to	switch	political	allegiance’	rather	than	its	competitors	who	were	‘preaching	to	the	
converted’.63	Although	Lamb	has	proudly	reflected	on	the	success	of	the	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	
branding,	this	was	not	the	first	time	journalists	had	attempted	to	frame	industrial	action	in	this	
way.64	In	fact,	this	was	the	third	‘Winter	of	Discontent’	of	the	decade,	with	the	phrase	used	during	
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Albert	‘Larry’	Lamb	(1929-2002)	was	the	Sun’s	editor	for	two	spells	from	1969	to	1972	and	from	1975-1981.	
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1972’s	miners	strike	and	the	three-day	weeks	of	1974,	when	the	impact	of	strikes	was	more	
widespread.	Why	did	this	label	become	so	widely	used	and	central	to	popular	understanding	of	that	
winter,	where	it	had	failed	to	gain	traction	before?	In	previous	cases	cited	by	Dave	Lyddon	from	the	
late	1960s	and	early	1970s,	‘instances	of	mountains	of	rubbish	and	unburied	corpses	did	not	attract	
much	opprobrium’,	which	indicates	that	the	mythology	of	1978-79	was	‘contingent	on	a	particular	
set	of	economic	and	political	circumstances’.65	In	light	of	these	exceptional	circumstances,	it	is	
important	that	this	research	seeks	to	situate	this	‘myth’	and	the	ensuing	crisis	within	the	wider	
media	context,	in	order	to	appreciate	not	just	how	the	nature	of	industrial	relations	coverage	
changed	to	provide	such	a	compelling	construction,	but	also	the	threads	of	continuity	and	stylistic	
legacies	that	it	built	upon.	In	light	of	this,	rather	than	covering	primary	sources	already	addressed	by	
the	likes	of	Colin	Hay	and	James	Thomas,	the	bulk	of	this	section	reflects	on	the	relationship	
between	the	analysis	from	the	vast	collection	of	secondary	material	related	to	the	Winter	of	
Discontent	and	the	trends	and	patterns	of	coverage	that	this	research	has	already	established.	This	
case	study	concludes	by	assessing	the	TUC’s	response	to	changes	in	the	media	immediately	before	
the	events	of	1978-9.	
	
Media	Change:	The	emergence	of	the	Sun		
The	media	context	played	a	significant	part	in	defining	the	Winter	of	Discontent	from	the	confined	
chaos	of	1974,	specifically	with	regards	to	the	new	competition	to	the	Mirror’s	dominance,	provided	
by	Rupert	Murdoch’s	Sun.	For	James	Curran	and	Jean	Seaton,	the	period	after	1974’s	general	
election	marks	the	transition	to	a	new	period	in	newspaper	history.	Between	the	two	winters	
analysed,	the	newspaper	industry	‘increased	partisanship	and	centralised	control’,	as	a	response	to	
the	‘growing	polarization	of	British	politics’	and	‘interventionist	proprietors’,	with	Murdoch	as	
perhaps	the	most	infamous	example.66	Following	its	re-launch,	the	Sun	found	great	success	in	
targeting	younger	audiences,	while	pushing	a	‘disrespectful,	anti-establishment,	entertainment-
driven	agenda’	which	‘dropped	the	serious	ambition	of	the	Daily	Mirror’.67	By	1978,	the	Sun’s	
cultural	popularity	of	the	early	1970s	had	provided	platform	and	audience	for	a	‘new	articulation	of	
the	sentiment	and	policies	of	the	right’	and	the	Mirror,	finally	beaten	in	the	circulation	stakes	that	
year,	found	it	increasingly	difficult	to	resist	the	Sun’s	right-wing	narratives.68	Whereas	the	Sun	had	
been	‘solidly	resistant	to	attempted	Conservative	Central	Office	manipulation’	and	had	only	
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provided	a	‘grudging’	endorsement	of	Heath	in	1974,	their	position	was	much	more	transparent	by	
1978.69	The	Sun’s	decision	to	‘preach	right-wing	economics,	day	after	day,	week	after	week’	would	
have	or	should	have,	in	Lamb’s	words,	driven	customers	‘back	into	the	arms	of	the	Mirror’.	70	
However,	the	opposite	happened	because	the	Sun	was	interested	‘not	only	in	politics,	but	in	beer	
and	skittles’.71	The	success	of	the	Sun’s	political	message,	seizing	upon	the	potential	for	political	
alternatives	provided	by	Thatcher,	was,	at	least	initially,	secondary	to	its	cultural	popularity.	
	
It	is	significant	that,	for	many	readers	of	the	Sun,	this	shift	in	political	allegiance	was	not	immediately	
discerned.	According	to	polling	from	1979,	only	seven	per	cent	of	its	readers	perceived	its	editorial	
line	to	be	‘Pro-Conservative’,	while	48	per	cent	of	Sun’s	readers	thought	of	the	paper	as	‘Pro-
Labour’.	72	Significantly,	45	per	cent	believed	the	paper	had	no	political	allegiance,	which	was	a	
significantly	higher	figure	than	the	readers	of	the	Mirror,	Express	and	Mail.73	This	perception	of	the	
paper	reflected	the	Sun’s	powerful	potential	to	convey	influential	partisan	messages	beyond	
conventional	political	boundaries	under	the	sheen	of	popular	consumerism.	
	
Under	commercial	pressure	from	the	Sun,	the	Mirror	was	frequently	‘indistinguishable	from	the	Tory	
press	in	its	partiality’,	to	the	point	where	many	readers	were	confused	about	the	paper’s	political	
allegiances.74	Goodman	remembered	Hugh	Cudlipp’s	1974	resignation	from	the	Mirror	as	‘a	trumpet	
call	to	a	Fleet	Street	revolution’.75	If	this	was	the	case,	by	the	late	1970s	that	revolution	was	well	
under	way.	The	language	of	trade	union	solidarity	no	longer	found	a	footing	within	the	Mirror’s	
lexicon,	as	they	argued	that	Moss	Evans,	the	new	TGWU	General	Secretary	was	not	a	‘crusader’	but	
instead	a	‘pied	piper’,	who	lead	members	down	a	path	to	‘destruction’.76		Once	again,	the	presence	
of	a	Labour	government	appeared	to	decisively	shape	the	paper’s	approach	to	union	coverage.	In	
that	same	front-page	article,	the	emphasis	was	placed	from	the	outset	on	Callaghan’s	trip	to	‘sunny	
Guadeloupe	tackling	the	world’s	problems’	and	the	implication	of	his	ignorance	to	the	problems	of	
‘Bleakest	Britain’,	where	the	Mirror	too	created	a	list	of	seemingly	interconnected	public	sector	
strikes.	The	Mirror	announced	that	Evans	had	‘declared	war	on	British	industry’,	where	‘the	effect	
will	be	devastating’,	as	it	declined	to	frame	the	strike	as	an	issue	between	the	TGWU	and	
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government.77	As	far	as	concepts	of	‘the	public’	were	concerned,	the	Mirror	sought	to	widen	the	
perceived	target	of	industrial	action,	to	more	than	an	internalised	difference	of	interests	between	
the	industrial	and	political	branches	of	the	labour	movement.		
	
Geoffrey	Goodman	recalled	the	Mirror’s	task,	the	‘only	voice’	presenting	a	‘reasoned,	balanced	
picture	of	an	appalling	state	of	affairs’,	as	an	‘impossible’	one,	which	took	all	of	the	skills	the	Mirror’s	
journalists	possessed,	and	‘many	[they]	didn’t’.78	The	Mirror’s	attempts	to	mediate	and	moderate	
trade	unionist’s	responses,	as	seen	in	the	mining	strikes,	became	increasingly	desperate,	as	they	
sought	to	protect	Labour’s	electoral	interests.	In	late	1978,	Mike	Molloy,	then	Mirror	editor,	was	
asked	by	Callaghan	to	have	a	conversation	with	Moss	Evans	about	the	avoidance	of	pay	claims	over	
the	coming	winter	but	Molloy	found	this	task	to	be	a	‘hopeless’	cause,	as	Evans	declined	to	make	
any	promises.79	Although	Molloy	recalled	a	warm	relationship	between	the	Mirror	and	Callaghan,	he	
conceded	that	by	1979	the	paper	was	‘loathed	by	the	far	left’,	including	the	IRA,	and	was	nicknamed	
‘the	Running	Dogs	of	Capitalism’	which	was,	according	to	Molloy,	‘perfectly	true’.80	Given	the	
increasing	militancy	of	trade	unions	during	this	time,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	columns	of	the	Mirror	
had	waning	influence	over	industrial	action.	Whereas	the	likes	of	Goodman	had	felt	the	Mirror	had	
played	a	pivotal	role	in	determining	Britain’s	political	direction	in	1974,	it	was	forced	to	defer	to	the	
Sun	by	1979,	conceding	its	political	agenda	in	the	process.	
	
Even	the	BBC	was	criticised	for	the	way	it	was	perceived	to	adopt	the	frames	and	lines	of	
investigation	which	had	been	popular	in	the	partisan	press.	This	was	despite	the	BBC’s	establishment	
of	a	long-term	consultative	group	on	the	subject,	after	an	initial	trial	of	two	years,	which	took	
opinion	from	a	broad	range	of	unionists	and	industrial	journalists.	Norman	Willis,	then	TUC	Assistant	
General	Secretary,	at	a	meeting	of	the	BBC’s	Consultative	Group	on	Industrial	and	Business	Affairs,	
‘expressed	unease’	with	the	way	the	BBC	had	chosen	to	cover	the	winter’s	events,	particularly	the	
way	it	had	accepted	the	narrative	of	‘crisis’,	as	framing	it	as	one	‘was	to	take	up	an	attitude	towards	
it’.81	Hugh	Williams,	editor	of	the	BBC’s	Nationwide	Programme,	‘acknowledged	the	validity	of	some	
of	the	points’	made	by	Willis,	but	did	not	think	the	use	of	crisis	was	‘necessarily	a	misjudgement’	
because	many	‘ordinary	people’	used	the	word	and	Nationwide	was	a	‘popular	programme	which	
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had	to	grab	the	viewer’s	attention’.82	John	Cole,	who	also	sat	on	this	group,	accepted	that	the	media	
often	‘took	in	each	other’s	washing’,	with	the	events	of	1978-79	being	no	exception,	but	that	both	
major	television	networks	were	influenced	more	by	‘the	serious	press	than	by	mass	circulation	
papers’,	in	order	to	‘take	a	good	look	at	serious	issues’.83		
	
In	a	later	meeting	of	the	group,	Andrew	Taussig,	Special	Assistant	to	the	BBC	Director	of	News	and	
Current	Affairs,	expressed	a	comparable	matter	to	those	raised	against	the	unions’	enthusiasm	for	
documentaries	during	the	1960s.	Taussig	said	that	‘audiences	very	often	did	not	want	background	
features	and	analytical	pieces’	but	preferred	‘specific	stories’	about	ongoing	strikes.84	It	appeared	
that	while	the	BBC	had	clearly	made	an	effort	to	make	sure	it	maintained	its	commitments	to	
neutrality,	it	often,	by	the	very	nature	of	British	media	dynamics,	absorbed	many	of	the	frames	of	
reference	utilised	by	the	national	media.	In	order	for	coverage	to	appeal	to	audiences	and	engage	
with	their	primary	concerns,	the	BBC’s	coverage	of	the	winter	of	discontent	was	forced	to	at	least	
mention	the	predominant	frames	of	reference.	
	
Beyond	the	Sun’s	emerging	popularity,	strikes	within	the	newspaper	industry	also	had	a	significant	
impact	on	the	attitude	of	journalists	and,	more	importantly,	editors.	In	1978,	strikes	by	printers	at	
the	Times	forced	the	newspaper	to	close	for	almost	a	year,	while	strikes	at	the	BBC	were	only	
avoided	through	a	generous	pay	deal	negotiated	shortly	before	the	events	of	the	Winter	of	
Discontent.	John	Cole	had	already	developed	concerns	about	the	impact	of	strike	action	on	the	
Guardian’s	1974	election	coverage,	convinced	that	the	union’s	‘follies	washed	off	on	the	papers’	
attitudes	to	trade	unionism	as	a	whole’.85	Reflecting	on	the	impact	of	industrial	action	in	newspaper	
production,	Larry	Lamb	concluded	that:		
Anyone	who	had	suffered	as	we	had,	physically,	financially	and	emotionally,	at	the	hands	of	the	
politically	motivated	thugs	who,	though	few	in	number,	had	dominated	so	many	Fleet	Street	
branches	for	so	long,	could	hardly	be	expected	to	support	a	political	party	which	more	and	more	
seemed	dedicated	to	the	proposition	that	the	trade	unions	were	themselves	an	arm	of	
government.86		
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This	sort	of	attitude	confirmed	the	significance	of	the	newspaper	editors’	experience	as	consumers	
and	employers,	actively	enduring	industrial	action,	rather	than	purely	as	mediators	and	reporters	of	
strikes.	As	print	unions	had	become	more	militant,	editorial	attitudes	had	hardened.	Moreover,	this	
quotation	provided	clear	evidence	of	the	longevity	of	the	binary	perceptions	of	political	and	
industrial	picketing,	and	the	supposed	boundary	between	them,	as	a	means	of	legitimation.	
Whereas	newspapers	of	the	1950s	could	criticise	the	busmen’s	political	strikes	as	a	worrying	
exception,	strikes	with	political	motivations,	whether	by	miners,	gravediggers	or	printing	
technicians,	were	increasingly	understood	as	the	norm.	Strikes	were	perceived	as	inherently	
political,	even	when	they	had	‘economic’	motivations	such	as	the	rejection	of	pay	restraint.	
	
The	TUC	response:	‘Strikes	are	more	appealing	than	sex’	
In	stark	contrast	to	the	dynamic	media	landscape,	the	TUC’s	response	to	this	rapidly	shifting	media	
atmosphere	was	ponderous.	The	TUC	hierarchy	clearly	recognised	the	tabloid	preoccupation	with	
covering	strikes,	as	evidenced	in	an	article	written	by	the	TUC’s	Press	and	Publications	Department	
in	1970	for	the	National	Graphical	Association’s	journal,	in	which	it	was	adjudged	that	‘to	some	of	
the	papers,	strikes	are	more	appealing	than	sex’.87	The	General	Secretary	of	the	National	Society	of	
Operative	Printers	Graphical	and	Media	Personnel	(NATSOPA),	Dick	Briginshaw,	wrote	to	Vic	Feather	
warning	him	of	the	‘illusion	to	believe	that	because	Press	reporters	are	often	good	trade	unionists	
this	is	a	safeguard’	and	the	second	‘illusion’	of	editorial	freedom	because	of	the	influence	of	
‘controlling	witch-doctors’,	newspaper	owners.88	However,	although	the	problem	was	highlighted	
attention	at	the	1971	Congress	and	resolutions	were	passed	at	the	1974	and	1975	regarding	the	
issue,	relatively	little	progress	was	made	until	the	late	1970s,	despite	TUC	awareness	of	the	GMG’s	
research.89		The	TUC’s	monitoring	group	eventually	met	in	December	1978	and	the	first	serious	
output	from	TUC	monitoring	was	a	critical	and	well-argued	report	on	the	coverage	of	the	Winter	of	
Discontent,	although	the	increasingly	complicated	loyalty	of	the	TUC	to	the	incumbent	Labour	
government	discouraged	members	from	publishing	the	report	before	the	1979	election.	According	
to	meeting	minutes	from	March	1979,	both	Geoffrey	Goodman	and	Terrence	Lancaster	had	advised	
that	while	the	report	was	worthy	of	publication,	doing	so	before	the	election	would	‘merely	draw	
attention	to	the	difficulties	experienced	this	winter	and	would	not	serve	the	purpose	the	Group	
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intended’.90	Unsurprisingly,	this	blunted	the	impact	of	the	TUC’s	research	but	illustrated	the	complex	
and	compromised	political	position	which	hindered	the	TUC’s	approach.		
	
Moreover,	this	emphasis	on	research,	part	of	what	Paul	Manning	describes	as	‘media	pressure	
politics’	and	a	common	strategy	for	trade	unions	worldwide,	was	underpinned	by	a	number	of	
hurdles	for	the	TUC	in	pursuing	the	media	more	directly.91	One	company	wrote	to	the	TUC	to	offer	
‘television	acclimatisation	courses’	for	unionists,	in	order	to	help	unionists	present	their	‘cases	
effectively	and	authoritatively’	during	television	interviews.92	Once	this	letter	was	forwarded	to	the	
TUC	General	Secretary,	he	suggested	that	only	a	‘small	pilot	scheme	might	be	worth	considering’	
and	preferred	‘some	quiet	enquiries’	to	be	made	to	the	BBC	about	assistance	in	this	regard.93	When	
the	company’s	proposal	was	discussed	amongst	TUC	staff,	it	recognised	the	problem	of	‘noisy,	
aggressive	shop	stewards	all	talking	at	once’	on	television	but	felt	this	would	have	to	be	‘put	up	with	
from	time	to	time’.	In	another	case,	a	former	employee	of	the	BBC	wrote	to	Jack	Jones,	then	General	
Secretary	of	the	TGWU,	convinced	that	the	trade	union	movement	was	in	‘desperate	need’	of	‘able	
publicity’	for	its	‘much	misrepresented	cause’,	a	need	which	he	was	willing	to	support,	given	that	the	
BBC	in	particular	were	not	‘willing	to	tackle	the	subject	of	industrial	relations	in	the	proper	analytical	
manner’.94	Although	Jack	Jones	forwarded	Glyn	Jones’s	offer	onto	Len	Murray,	TUC	General	
Secretary,	Murray’s	response	lacked	urgency,	offering	to	have	a	chat	with	Jones	‘if	at	some	time	you	
are	in	the	vicinity	with	some	time	to	spare’.95		
	
These	two	examples,	amongst	many	similar	ones,	provide	a	clear	illustration	of	both	the	TUC’s	
hesitancy	to	confront	such	problems,	along	with	the	organisation’s	apparent	dependence	on	long-
established	links	with	the	BBC.	This	relationship,	which	bordered	on	deference	at	times,	persisted	
despite	concerns	from	its	own	former	employees	about	the	BBC’s	ability	to	represent	the	union	
movement’s	case	appropriately	and	effectively.	To	compound	this	problem,	the	TUC	continued	to	
push	a	media	agenda	to	the	BBC	that	was	of	diminishing	attraction	to	the	increasingly	competitive,	
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ratings-driven	television	sphere.	In	drafting	questions	for	a	meeting	with	BBC	representatives,	
intended	to	‘explore	ways	in	which	closer	contact	can	be	established’,	the	TUC	asked	the	BBC	to	
consider	‘more	programmes	in	which	trade	union	spokesmen	give	information	broadcasts	on	
matters	of	trade	union	concern’,	with	topics	such	as	‘the	Employment	Protection	Act’,	‘Health	and	
Safety	at	work’	and	‘Industrial	Democracy’.96	Although	this	sort	of	accommodation	and	collaboration	
was	perhaps	the	best	strategy	for	the	TUC	to	employ	in	such	a	toxic	media	atmosphere,	it	showed	
little	awareness	of	broader	public	interests	or	the	commercial	pressure	on	BBC	directors.	
	
Explaining	the	trade	union	movement’s	hesitancy	to	tackle	these	problems	is	more	difficult	and	was	
likely	about	more	than	limited	financial	resources.	Although	finance	would	have	influenced	the	
TUC’s	ability	to	counter	negative	coverage	through	a	nationwide	advertising	campaign,	it	does	not	
explain	the	reluctance	to	engage	with	the	issues	through	other,	less	demanding,	means.	In	a	1977	
statement	at	a	special	TUC	conference	on	the	media,	Len	Murray	hit	on	a	central	problem	for	trade	
union	media	coverage	which	was	that	union	members	continued	to	‘obtain	their	impressions	of	the	
Movement	and	information	about	it	from	the	media	first	and	from	their	own	official	sources	later’,	
despite	good	internal	communications.97	Murray	urged	that	the	TUC	could	no	longer	regard	itself	as	
‘a	club	or	a	secret	society	whose	affairs	are	closed	to	the	outside	world’	but	that	did	not	mean	it	had	
to	‘accept	passively’	the	way	unions	were	reported	in	the	press	and	urged	the	need	for	training.98	
Whether	Murray	could	have	expected	to	have	a	considerable	impact	on	such	attitudes	is	certainly	
dubious,	given	the	erosion	of	centralised	TUC	authority	since	the	late	1950s.	However,	Murray’s	
statement	suggested	that	there	was	growing	concern	amongst	the	TUC’s	hierarchy	that	union	
communications	had	been	too	insular	or	introspective	as	a	result	of	an	underlying	scepticism	and	
animosity	towards	the	mainstream	media,	referring	to	those	in	the	wider	movement	who	felt	there	
was	a	‘conscious	conspiracy’	by	the	media	against	the	labour	movement.		
	
Callaghan’s	role	in	perceptions	of	crisis	
The	political	climate	changed	significantly	in	the	period	between	1974’s	strikes	and	the	unrest	of	
1978-79.	1974	ushered	in	another	Labour	government	confident	that	it	could	resolve	industrial	
tension	through	the	heralded	Social	Contract,	and	provide	the	leadership	that	Heath	had	lacked	in	
an	increasingly	fraught	economic	situation.	By	1978-79,	economic	policy	change	prompted	by	the	
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IMF	crisis	had	‘both	intellectually	and	practically	demolished	consensus	politics’,	as	the	government	
wrestled	with	inflation	and	internal	division	through	public	sector	cuts.99	The	relationship	between	
Labour	government	and	the	unions	steadily	broke	down	as	the	compulsory	incomes	policy	triggered	
an	‘ultimate	disintegration	which	was	damaging	both	in	terms	of	individual	strike	action	and	
consensus	politics’,	a	process	for	which	1978-79	symbolised	the	previously	‘unthinkable’	and	final	
straw.100	The	contrast	between	these	two	periods	of	industrial	unrest	was	significant,	not	for	a	
change	in	government,	but	a	radical	change	in	Labour’s	policy	approach.	
	
However,	just	as	in	1974,	the	significance	of	personality	politics	in	defining	the	coverage	of	the	
Winter	of	Discontent	should	not	be	underestimated.	As	Hay	highlighted,	the	tabloid	media	
juxtaposed	‘the	activity	and	decisiveness	of	Thatcher	with	the	complacency,	arrogance	and	
indecision	of	the	Prime	Minister’,	including	the	false	attribution	of	the	‘Crisis?	What	Crisis?’	response	
to	Callaghan,	a	phrase	which	became	part	of	the	‘new	political	lexicon’.101	The	Mail	devoted	an	
entire	page	to	unpicking	‘the	quotes	of	the	crisis’	from	union	leaders	and	Labour	politicians,	
described	as	‘the	mad,	sad	things	they	said	while	Britain	went	mad’,	and	included	four	less-than-
complimentary	pictures	of	Callaghan	across	the	page.102	Similarly,	the	Express	published	a	full-length	
Cummings	caricature	of	an	emaciated	and	cowering	Callaghan,	accompanied	by	the	accusatory	
headline	‘NOTHING	UP	HIS	SLEEVE’	(Figure	5.4).103	As	this	research	has	shown,	the	personalisation	of	
politics	was	of	increasing	and	long-established	significance	to	industrial	relations	coverage,	having	a	
decisive	impact	on	public	perceptions	on	the	likes	of	Frank	Cousins,	Barbara	Castle,	and	Edward	
Heath.	In	this	regard,	the	focus	on	personality	was	nothing	particularly	new.	However,	this	did	not	
mean	that	Margaret	Thatcher’s	emergence	as	a	forceful	political	personality	was	any	less	significant,	
as	she	capitalised	on	the	media’s	preoccupation	and	increasing	public	concern.		
	
																																																						
99	Martin	Holmes,	The	Labour	Government,	1974-79:	Political	Aims	and	Economic	Reality	(Basingstoke,	1985),	
p.	182.	
100	Ibid.,	p.	186.	
101	Hay,	‘Narrating	the	Crisis’,	pp.	270-271.	
102	Daily	Mail,	31	January	1979,	p.	6.	
103	Daily	Express,	19	January	1979,	p.	1.	
	
	
171	
	
Figure	5.4:	‘Nothing	up	his	sleeve!’,	Daily	Express,	19	January	1979,	p.	1.	
	
Aside	from	emphasising	Callaghan’s	geographical	detachment	in	Barbados,	the	Mail	sought	to	
isolate	‘the	ostrich	Prime	Minister’	from	the	public	in	terms	of	perception	and	mentality,	as	‘the	only	
man	in	Britain	who	does	not	see	a	crisis’,	as	he	had	‘petulantly’	dismissed	the	crisis	as	‘parochial	
hysteria’.104	The	Mail	intensified	criticism	of	Callaghan’s	leadership	by	contrasting	him	against	his	
own	‘iron-fisted’	Chancellor,	Denis	Healey,	who	‘barged	into	the	union-Government	furore	last	
night’.105	The	determination	to	isolate	Callaghan	from	the	industrial	situation	extended	to	his	
relationship	with	his	own	colleagues,	seemingly	disconnected	from	the	priorities	of	his	political	
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allies.	A	common	complaint	or	inference	during	1974’s	general	election	was	a	lack	of	democratic	
alternatives,	that	few	could	see	the	advantage	of	one	party	over	another	in	dealing	with	the	‘trade	
union	problem’.	In	such	a	context,	Thatcher’s	commitment	to	the	conviction	politics	which	Heath	
had	deserted	in	1972,	to	much	ridicule,	was	powerful	in	remoulding	the	media	landscape.	In	
February	1979,	in	the	midst	of	the	supposed	crisis,	Thatcher	enjoyed	a	10	point	surge	in	approval	
ratings	as	leader	of	the	Opposition	to	a	height	which	Heath	had	not	experienced	in	that	role	since	
1966,	while	Callaghan	endured	dissatisfaction	from	58	per	cent	of	respondents,	not	suffered	by	a	
Prime	Minister	since	Heath	in	1971.106	Although	personal	approval	levels	returned	to	normal	after	
the	strikes,	it	appeared	that	this	episode	had	an	important	impact	on	the	way	the	public	perceived	
Callaghan’s	strength	of	leadership.	
	
Newspaper	content	and	the	balance	of	coverage	
With	the	structural	influences	established,	which	partially	account	for	the	Winter	of	Discontent’s	
exceptional	influence,	it	is	important	to	further	illuminate	the	patterns	of	coverage	of	the	Winter	of	
Discontent.	There	were	important	continuities	in	the	approaches	employed	in	reporting	industrial	
news,	although	exogenous	pressures	intensified	the	communication	and	perception	of	these	
conventional	features.	The	cumulative	influence	of	focussed	coverage	over	the	previous	decade	
should	not	be	underestimated	in	contributing	to	this	climax	of	political	tensions.		
	
The	specific	sectors	where	industrial	action	took	place	made	media	coverage	in	1979	particularly	
powerful.	The	strikes	primarily	took	place	in	industries	with	a	long	history	of	public	and	press	
preoccupation.	As	the	GMG	reflected	in	1976,	television	and	tabloid	coverage,	as	opposed	to	the	
‘quality	papers’,	had	developed	a	‘highly	specific	focus	upon	chosen	disputes	within	some	sectors’	
which	meant	that	there	was	a	‘tendency	to	overstate	contextually	the	significance	of	disputes	
isolated	in	this	way’.107	This	was	particularly	true	when	the	popular	press	failed	to	provide	updates	
on	dispute	progress	or	its	resolution.	Moreover,	the	effect	of	this	narrow	focus	was	intensified	by	
the	disproportionate	front-page	coverage	provided	to	the	1978-79	strikes.	Between	the	beginning	of	
December	1978	and	the	end	of	February	1979	(the	peak	of	industrial	hostility),	the	Express,	Mail	and	
Mirror	devoted	between	43	per	cent	and	46	per	cent	of	their	front-page	lead	stories	to	either	
industrial	action	itself	or	issues	directly	related	to	strikes,	such	as	pay	claims.	In	January	1979	
specifically,	this	percentage	was	much	higher,	with	more	than	two	thirds	of	the	Mirror’s	front-page	
headlines	devoted	to	these	issues.	This	represented	a	kind	of	intense	scrutiny	which	the	industrial	
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sphere	had	rarely	experienced	before.	Even	where	strikes	were	not	the	focus	of	front	pages,	lead	
stories	were	primarily	focussed	on	the	IRA	bomb	threat	or	the	winter’s	infamous	blizzards,	
enhancing	narratives	of	assault	and	confrontation.		
	
Although	explaining	the	imbalance	of	industrial	focus	was	complex,	the	GMG	suggested	that	much	
of	the	focus	on	transport,	communications	and	public	services,	as	opposed	to	their	long-established	
interest	in	the	car	industry,	was	derived	from	a	‘concern	for	the	inconvenienced	consumer	of	goods	
and	services’	which	provided	problems	for	the	production	of	coverage	which	did	not	‘implicitly,	at	
least,	blame	those	groups	who	precipitate	action	that,	in	one	way	or	another,	is	defined	as	
“disruptive”.’108	Essentially,	labour	interference	in	patterns	of	consumerism	was	established	as	a	
driving	force	behind	the	media’s	industrial	agenda	long	before	1978.	This	interest	was	hardly	
surprising	given	the	tabloids’	status	as	vehicles	for	consumption:	the	Sun	regularly	placed	material	
encouraging	consumption	‘at	the	centre	of	its	editorial	agenda’	and	both	the	Mirror	and	the	Sun	
encouraged	its	readers	to	‘define	themselves	by	what	they	consumed’.109	As	Lyddon	has	already	
established,	industrial	strife	in	the	sectors	under	scrutiny	during	the	Winter	of	Discontent	was	
nothing	new.	In	the	case	of	grave	diggers,	strikes	had	‘always	happened’,	including	the	pre-war	
years,	and	the	‘dirty	jobs’	strike	in	1970	posed	a	much	greater	threat	to	public	health	than	1978-79,	
in	the	absence	of	arctic	conditions.110	As	this	research	has	shown,	the	1958	bus	strike,	although	
coordinated	in	a	very	different	political	climate,	was	also	principally	covered	as	an	issue	of	
widespread	public	inconvenience,	indicative	of	a	thread	of	continuity	to	media	attention.	In	many	
ways	then,	the	Winter	of	Discontent	built	on	these	preoccupations,	at	a	time	when	threats	to	
consumerism	were	high	on	the	media	agenda.	The	specific	conditions	and	circumstances	gave	the	
focus	of	the	industrial	agenda	new	significance.		
	
Beyond	the	specific	focuses	of	coverage,	there	were	key	similarities	in	the	emphases	of	reporting	
between	1978-9	and	the	industrial	coverage	which	had	preceded	it.	In	the	case	of	1975’s	Glasgow	
Rubbish	Strike,	‘the	framework	used	concentrated	on	issues	other	than	the	conflict	between	
Glasgow	Corporation	and	their	employees’	with	a	clear	focus	on	its	status	as	a	health	hazard,	which	
was	‘established	as	the	initial	focus	of	the	coverage,	even	before	the	dumps	had	been	created’.111	
BBC1	made	use	of	library	film	of	rubbish	dumps	from	a	previous	strike,	seven	weeks	before	the	
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Corporation	announced	a	health	hazard	existed.112	The	media’s	tendency	to	make	predictions	in	
order	to	reinforce	‘moral	panics’	has	been	underlined	by	Stanley	Cohen,	who	contended	that	these	
predictions	are	commonly	fulfilled	by	media	reports,	even	if	it	means	coverage	of	‘non-events’,	as	
‘discrepancies	between	expectations	and	reality	are	resolved	by	emphasizing	those	new	elements	
which	confirm	expectations’.113	Despite	1978-79’s	record	cold	temperatures	curbing	any	real	threat,	
ITV	reporting	of	the	dustmen’s	strike	shared	the	same	emphasis.	Rather	than	providing	any	detail	of	
the	grievances,	and	while	accepting	‘officially	there	is	no	health	hazard’,	ITV	reports	from	February	
broadcast	shots	of	rubbish	cluttering	parks	and	noted	that	health	officers	had	laid	rat	bait.	ITV	
highlighted	‘the	many	pavements	that	are	already	partly	blocked,	not	only	with	more	hygienic	plastic	
bags	but	also	with	cardboard	boxes	dripping	with	food	scraps’,	showing	close-ups	of	the	most	
unpleasant	cases.114		
	
Similarly,	a	focus	on	‘voxpops’	and	assimilating	the	public’s	thoughts	on	strikes	was	nothing	new	to	
television	coverage.	During	the	winter	of	1978-79,	voxpops	were	collated	to	reflect	public	distaste	
for	the	inconvenience	caused	by	the	rail	strike,	with	a	focus	purely	on	their	challenges	in	getting	to	
work	than	on	the	strike	itself.115	A	few	days	later,	ITN	also	provided	voxpops	to	punctuate	their	
report	on	‘panic	buying’,	again	reflecting	a	focus	on	the	inconvenience	to	consumers,	despite	the	
fact	supermarket	business	had	not	risen	‘as	much	as	they	had	expected’.116	Early	research	found	this	
was	common	thread	of	coverage	as	early	as	the	1950s,	and	it	was	certainly	commonplace	by	the	
1970s.	The	GMG’s	study	found	that	the	majority	of	voxpops	on	television	news	occurred	in	the	
industrial	relations	field,	with	the	use	of	experts	below	average,	along	with	a	‘tendency	to	seek	
“photogenic	discord”	which	characterises	industrial	coverage’,	as	opposed	to	business	news	where	
experts	were	used	‘with	relatively	frequency’	and	spokesmen	for	management	outnumbered	labour	
spokesmen.117	In	terms	of	both	patterns	and	focuses	of	coverage,	the	Winter	of	Discontent	showed	
considerable	continuity	from	previous	cases,	which	capitalised	on	public	interest	and	expectation.	
	
Stylistically	and	linguistically	there	were	other	important	continuities,	in	both	press	and	television,	
but	the	political	context	and	controversial	nature	of	public	sector	strikes	gave	these	linguistic	
conventions	new	meaning.	As	the	research	on	the	1960s	in	particular	reflected,	morality	had	
become	an	important	part	in	delegitimising	strike	action	and	this	aspect	intensified	in	the	coverage	
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of	1978-79.	However,	although	concepts	of	conscience	and	greed	were	already	well	established,	
these	absorbed	new	meaning	in	the	face	of	strikes	amongst	hospital	workers	and	ambulancemen.	
This	language	was	particularly	pertinent	during	industrial	action	on	Britain’s	children’s	wards	as	the	
Mirror	published	a	front	page	plea,	‘Don’t	let	the	children	suffer’,	evoking	the	themes	of	victimhood	
which	had	been	utilised	by	the	same	newspaper	in	favour	of,	rather	than	against,	strikers	in	1974.118	
The	Mail	depicted	the	same	strikes	as	reflective	of	the	‘callowness	shown	towards	patients	by	
pickets’.119	One	nurse	interviewed	by	ITN	at	Great	Ormond	Street	hospital	explained	that	she	had	
torn	up	her	NUPE	membership	card	because	she	did	not	feel	she	could	do	her	job	‘in	all	conscience’	
while	she	belonged	to	a	union	which	was	‘trying	to	disrupt	care’.120	The	prominence	of	her	interview,	
compared	to	striking	unionists	who	were	merely	quoted,	reflected	an	imbalance	to	the	coverage,	
while	her	use	of	language	illustrated	the	pervasiveness	of	such	moralised	motifs	during	the	strike.	In	
the	case	of	the	ambulance	strike,	ITV	commentary	suggested	that	such	a	strike,	‘born	out	of	anger’,	
was	‘something	that	their	consciences	had	never	allowed	before’.121	This	coverage	further	
demonstrated	a	trend	apparent	in	the	tabloids	that	the	traditional	allegiances	and	loyalties	of	the	
British	public	for	brave	nurses,	a	similar	one	to	the	respect	for	the	miners	that	was	present	in	1974,	
could	now	be	utilised	to	buttress	criticism	for	industrial	action.	
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Figure	5.5:	‘The	Sick	Men	at	the	Gate’,	Daily	Mail,	7	December	1978,	p.	1.		
	
Along	with	gravediggers,	this	rash	of	hospital	strikes	meant	that	issues	of	morality	could	be	shaped	
into	powerful	issues	of	life	and	death,	with	trade	unions	as	the	greatest	threat.		The	Mail	even	drew	
parallels	between	union	‘bully-boys’	and	‘Hitler’s	brown	shirts’	(Figure	5.5),	in	reference	to	their	
attitude	towards	strike-affected	cancer	patients.122	This	not	only	reflected	the	merciless	attitude	of	
strikers	but	also	anxiety	about	the	authoritarian	and	anti-democratic	power	exerted	by	unions	at	
picket	lines.		
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Black	and	Pemberton	have	rightly	highlighted	that	Stanley	Cohen’s	theory	of	moral	panics,	given	its	
focus	on	groups	that	are	considered	a	threat	to	societal	values,	has,	despite	its	problems,	a	‘broader	
relevance’	to	studies	of	the	1970s,	beyond	Cohen’s	purely	cultural	emphasis.123	This	is	clear	in	a	
number	of	aspects,	beyond	the	simple	creation	of	ominous	predictions.	Cohen	theorised	that	‘the	
very	reporting	of	certain	“facts”	can	be	sufficient	to	generate	concern,	anxiety,	indignation	or	
panic’.124		When	this	analysis	is	juxtaposed	against	the	research	conducted	by	James	Thomas	to	
highlight	the	deliberately	exaggerated	or	oversimplified	the	reports	of	the	Winter	of	Discontent,	it	is	
clear	what	an	important	impact	this	may	well	have	had	on	the	situation.	Thomas	has	highlighted	
how	only	a	sixth	of	lorry	drivers	went	on	strike,	only	two	and	a	half	per	cent	of	schools	were	closed	
in	the	UK	due	to	the	caretakers’	action,	and	the	number	of	days	lost	in	strikes	was	relatively	minor,	
far	exceeded	by	previous	episodes	and	the	engineering	strikes	under	the	new	Conservative	
government	later	that	year.125	Again,	this	was	not	particularly	novel,	as	exaggeration	and	
simplification	were	rising	trends	in	the	new	tabloid	scene,	but	the	boundaries	were	pushed	to	a	new	
level	in	the	way	strikes	were	now	applied	to	matters	of	life	and	death.	Even	the	reporting	of	
verifiable	facts	were	problematic,	such	as	the	50	cancer	patients	sent	home	due	to	hospital	strikes,	
as	they	were	framed	under	controversial	headlines	such	as	‘Life	or	Death	Picket’,	alongside	
interviews	with	infuriated	doctors	who	insisted	it	was	‘inevitable’	that	short-term	absences	would	
mean	‘some	people	will	lose	their	lives’.126	Similarly,	the	links	drawn	between	strikes	in	disconnected	
areas	were	already	apparent	in	1975,	as	the	dustmen’s	dispute	was	linked	to	the	ambulance	
controllers’	dispute	as	early	as	the	second	day,	and	this	trend	to	continued.127	ITN	used	their	
coverage	to	place	strikes	in	different	sectors	together	in	one	report,	starting	with	schools,	moving	
through	to	strikes	in	care	homes	and	ending	with	cemeteries,	playing	on	the	moralised	‘life	and	
death’	narratives	already	established	in	the	press.128	This	integration	of	separate	strikes	into	a	wider	
union	‘conspiracy’	was	a	central	principle	to	the	crisis	narrative.	
	
In	the	same	vein,	the	media’s	evocation	of	conflict	motifs	was	nothing	new,	particularly	through	
introspective	language	which	reoriented	the	position	of	‘the	other’	from	foreign	competitors	to	the	
‘enemy	within’,	as	was	evident	during	the	1974	miners’	strikes.	The	Royal	Commission	on	the	Press	
concurred	that	by	1977	there	was	a	clear	tendency	for	‘conflict	themes	to	be	more	frequently	
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126	Daily	Express,	25	January	1979,	p.	1.	
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invoked	than	others’.129	However,	while	many	had	commented	on	the	miners’	discipline	regarding	
physical	violence	in	1974,	there	were	now	new	concerns	about	the	physical	threat	posed	by	large-
scale	industrial	action.	The	attendance	of	miners	at	the	year-long	Grunwick	strike	in	1977,	described	
by	Margaret	Thatcher	as	the	‘Ascot	of	the	Left’,	crystallised	concerns	about	trade	union	respect	for	
law	and	order,	as	industrial	action	at	a	film-processing	works	attracted	media	attention	for	violent	
confrontations.130	The	Times	argued	that	an	assault	on	a	police	officer	at	Grunwick	illustrated	a	lack	
of	respect	for	police	authority	and	threatened	Britain’s	‘social	equilibrium’.	131	More	broadly,	as	
Richard	Clutterbuck	analysed,	the	‘major	lessons’	from	the	Grunwick	episode	concerned	the	law,	
particularly	the	‘strong	public	reaction	against	the	interference	of	students	and	other	politically	
motivated	demonstrators’	in	industrial	conflict.132	Clutterbuck’s	research	on	the	‘growth	of	political	
violence’	in	1977	encapsulated	the	sense	of	public	anxiety	about	such	trends	in	popular	culture,	not	
just	in	industrial	relations.		
	
The	influence	of	other	issues,	most	notably	football	hooliganism	and	the	punk	movement,	
intensified	public	concern	about	violence.	Although	the	TGWU	attempted	to	exert	pressure	to	get	
The	Sex	Pistols	dropped	from	their	record	label,	the	punk	movement	was	associated	with	the	same	
phenomenon	as	trade	unionists,	when	‘the	punk	message	of	anarchy,	pop	and	violence	occasionally	
seemed	very	literal	due	to	the	few	incidents	where	anarchy	and	violence	were	made	explicit’.133	
Stuart	Hall	noted	how	the	British	media	at	that	time	simplified	and	stigmatised	the	explanations	for	
football	hooliganism,	in	order	to	‘whip	up	public	feeling	about	it’,	and	legitimise	strict	law	and	order	
agendas.134	The	threat	posed	by	industrial	action	in	1979	applied	to	law	breaking	beyond	basic	
violence.	Following	Arthur	Scargill’s	public	endorsement	of	out-lawed	secondary	picketing,	the	
Mirror	declared	this	as	approval	for	‘the	rule	of	the	mob’,	as	Scargill’s	comments	made	frontpage	
news	under	the	headline	‘Defy	the	Law’.135	Industrial	action	was	not	commonly	violent	during	the	
Winter	of	Discontent	but	the	right-wing	press,	evidenced	by	the	Express’s	coverage	of	a	lorry	union	
‘terror	squad’	who	assaulted	a	van	driver,	capitalised	upon	those	infrequent	examples.136	In	this	
context,	the	language	of	war	and	confrontation	absorbed	new	significance.	Headlines	which	referred	
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to	the	lorry	drivers’	‘stranglehold	on	Britain’s	ports’	were	purely	metaphorical	but	the	violent	
connotations	of	such	phrasing	made	the	threat	of	lorry	drivers	against	the	national	interest	all	the	
more	foreboding	and	antidemocratic.	137		
	
The	national	interest	and	audience	positioning	
In	1978-79,	strikes	were	understood	to	be	targeted	at	the	national	interest.	This	was	unlike	1974,	
where	the	language	of	war	was	used	to	refer	to	a	conflict	between	unions	and	government	and	
generally	resisted	application	to	conceptions	of	the	wider	public.	Hay	has	commented	on	the	
noteworthy	positioning	of	the	public,	apparent	in	the	likes	of	the	ITV	coverage	and	in	headlines.	An	
important	part	of	the	readership’s	decoding	of	media	texts,	particularly	apparent	on	this	occasion,	is	
the	tendency	to	‘actively	position	ourselves	as	subjects	within	the	narrative’.138	Hay	cites	the	
potential	for	readers	to	identify	with	the	‘we’	or	‘us’	in	stories,	positioned	against	an	other,	‘a	
collectivity	of	potential	victims	threatened	by	the	irresponsible,	macabre	and	self-serving	actions	of	
a	homogenous	band	of	militant	activists’.139	Even	the	Mirror,	from	its	left-leaning	perspective,	
utilised	such	a	device	to	argue	that	pickets	had	‘got	a	stranglehold	on	our	industrial	life	and	they	are	
tightening	it	every	hour’.140	This	sort	of	phraseology	positioned	the	unions	against	the	public	by	
referring	to	its	violent	threat	against	a	collective	interest.	Further	on,	the	same	article	argued	that	
winning	the	dispute	was	all	that	mattered	to	the	transport	workers,	‘nothing	else’,	including	‘the	
wage-packets	of	fellow	workers’	or	‘the	country’	and	‘certainly	not	the	Labour	government’.141	This	
was	further	evidence	of	the	attempts	to	expand	the	strike’s	threat,	beyond	conventional	political	
antagonisms.	The	Mirror’s	loyalty	to	supporting	the	interests	of	the	Labour	Party,	combined	with	the	
rapidly	declining	position	of	the	trade	unions	in	face	of	such	media	criticism,	ensured	that	the	paper	
was	forced	to	isolate	the	unions	from	its	own	interests	or	those	of	its	readership.	The	extrication	of	
Labour	interests	from	the	plight	of	James	Callaghan	was	perhaps	impossible	for	the	Mirror	but	the	
toxicity	of	union	action	made	the	simpler	isolation	of	the	union	movement,	despite	the	complex	
loyalty	between	both	sides,	almost	imperative	to	in	order	to	defend	the	Mirror’s	political	agenda.	
	
The	significance	of	this	kind	of	audience	positioning	filtered	into	television	reports	as	well.	ITN’s	
report	of	strikes	in	Southwark	in	mid-January	argued	that,	in	bad	weather	conditions,	‘the	last	thing	
the	people	of	Southwark	needed	was	this	strike’,	separating	the	unions’	decision	to	strike	from	‘the	
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people	of	Southwark’	more	generally.142	Although	this	was	a	much	less	obvious	example	of	
prejudicial	audience	positioning	than	the	kind	found	in	the	press,	with	the	television	industry	legally	
bound	to	a	more	neutral	agenda,	it	nevertheless	reflected	the	continued	isolation	of	unions	from	the	
public.	Although	Hay	rightly	recognised	potential	resistance	to	such	subject	positioning	from	
readerships	(and	by	extension,	audiences),	there	is	a	good	deal	of	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	
resistance	may	not	have	been	as	strong	in	1979	as	it	commonly	would	have	been	in,	for	example,	
1958.		
	
As	a	whole,	this	research	has	indicated	the	slow	dislocation	of	trade	union	members	from	the	
‘public’,	generally	associated	with	‘the	national	interest’.	Such	a	process	referred	to	both	the	
apparent	political	gap	between	the	two	as	well	as	the	quantity	of	union	members	isolated,	as	
extremist	minorities	were	increasingly	seen	to	be	more	dominant	within	the	trade	union	movement.	
Moreover,	there	was	a	growing	concern	about	the	breakdown	of	conventional	class	ties	to	political	
parties,	or	the	‘traditional	class-party	nexus’.143	Parties	could	no	longer	assume	support	for	their	
policies	based	on	the	socio-economic	background	of	the	electorate,	as	class	issues	became	less	
influential	on	party	loyalties	which,	by	the	mid-1970s,	were	in	discernible	flux.	In	1978-79,	this	
disconnection	had	become	something	of	a	rupture,	allowing	the	media	to	frame	strikes	in	
particularly	powerful	ways,	as	well	as	politicians.	For	example,	the	Mail	devoted	a	page	to	publishing	
the	script	of	a	televised	speech	by	Margaret	Thatcher	which	had	insisted	that	the	country	should	be	
‘one	nation	or	no	nation’,	but	reserved	judgement	for	the	industrial	action	by	‘the	wreckers	amongst	
us	who	don’t	believe	in	this’,	‘directed	at	the	public	to	make	you	suffer’.144	
	
In	conclusion,	the	events	of	the	winter	of	1978-79	not	only	symbolised	the	crisis	of	an	over-reaching	
Labour	government,	shown	once	again	to	provide	ineffective	relief	against	powerful	unions,	but	also	
the	intense	power	and	influence	of	the	national	media.	Undoubtedly,	in	the	five	years	between	the	
two	case	studies	analysed	here,	a	great	deal	changed	in	order	for	industrial	strife	in	public	services,	
which	had	strong	historical	precedent,	to	have	such	a	clear	impact	on	public	perceptions	of	
governance	and	power.	Although	it	is	clear	that	trade	union	militancy	and	combativeness	played	an	
important	part	in	this	transformation	of	attitudes,	with	the	rank	and	file	less	committed	to	
defending	Labour’s	reputation,	the	changes	to	the	media	landscape	during	the	interim	should	not	be	
underestimated.	The	Mirror	went	from	a	key	role	in	the	outcome	of	the	1974	election	to	the	
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challenges	of	a	peripheral	role	in	the	Winter	of	Discontent,	where	it	became	difficult	for	the	paper	to	
mediate	union	action	or	resist	the	language	and	frames	utilised	by	the	increasingly	popular	Sun.	The	
majority	of	this	powerful	coverage	built	on	the	legacies	of	media	coverage	from	as	early	as	the	
1950s.		
	
However,	common	patterns	of	coverage,	as	evidenced	through	the	use	of	conflict	motifs	and	
moralised	language,	either	acquired	fresh	meaning	thanks	to	the	evolving	political	context	or	were	
taken	to	greater	extremes	than	had	previously	been	the	case.	The	dislocation	of	trade	unionists,	
understood	in	broad	terms	despite	the	minority	of	extremist	influence,	from	wider	conceptions	of	
the	British	public	or	the	national	interest	only	allowed	criticism	to	be	more	distinct	and	hyperbole	
more	widely	accepted.	The	wider	trade	union	movement’s	refusal	to	show	the	same	restraint	as	in	
1974,	further	exemplified	the	fractured	nature	of	left-wing	politics.	Meanwhile,	the	TUC	wrestled	
with	its	own	insecurities	and	cynicisms	regarding	the	national	press,	and	only	began	to	formulate	a	
clear	strategy	for	media	research,	rather	than	positive	engagement,	on	the	eve	of	the	Winter	of	
Discontent.	In	such	a	context,	the	provision	of	new	political	alternatives	by	Margaret	Thatcher,	
following	a	period	of	political	stalemate	under	Heath,	was	particularly	attractive.		
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Chapter	Six	–	Britain’s	‘bureaucratic	Imposition’	and	new	economic	priorities			
Economic	Futures,	1970-79	
	
Aside	from	the	‘headline-grabbing	events’	of	the	Winter	of	Discontent	and	the	miners’	strikes,	
contemporary	commentators	‘never	had	the	feeling	of	writing	in	the	midst	of	panic’	but	saw	‘people	
groping	with	the	novelty	of	the	situation	and	searching	for	new	understandings’.1	While	there	is	
plenty	of	value	in	research	which	questions	the	reality	of	the	1970s	as	a	decade	of	decline,	the	
purpose	of	this	research	is	not	to	evaluate	economic	facts	but	public	perceptions	of	the	economy	
and	their	cultural	impacts.	Despite	the	rise	of	post-materialist	social	movements,	Mark	Abrams’s	
1974	polling	research	found	that	the	key	change	in	the	values	of	British	society	was	‘a	greater	
emphasis	on	the	terminal	value	of	a	comfortable	life,	and	on	the	instrumental	value	of	more	money’,	
across	all	age	groups,	while	maintaining	an	egalitarianism	which	was	‘both	tinged	by	envy	and	held	
in	check	by	deference	towards	their	traditional	“betters”’.2	The	continued	emphasis	on	living	
standards	and	economic	prosperity	increased	the	pressure	on	the	position	of	trade	unions.	Figure	
6.1	represents	the	degree	of	public	pessimism	that	surrounded	the	economy	under	Labour,	despite	
a	brief	recovery	in	the	18-month	period	prior	to	the	‘Winter	of	Discontent’.	Aside	from	that	period,	
nearly	every	poll	found	that	more	people	expected	a	deterioration	in	Britain’s	economic	fortunes	
than	an	improvement.	
	
																																																						
1	James	E	Alt,	‘The	Politics	of	Economic	Decline	in	the	1970s’,	in	Lawrence	Black,	Hugh	Pemberton	and	Pat	
Thane	(eds),	Reassessing	1970s	Britain	(Manchester,	2013),	p.	27.	
2	Mark	Abrams,	‘Changing	Values:	A	Report	on	Britain	Today’,	Encounter	43	(1974),	pp.	32,	38.	
	
	
183	
	
Figure	6.1:	British	Economic	Optimism	
Source:	Wybrow	and	King,	British	Political	Opinion,	p.	312-314.	The	‘Optimism	Factor’	is	based	on	the	
deduction	of	‘Deteriorate’	responses	from	‘Improve’	responses,	to	the	Gallup	Poll	question	‘Do	you	consider	
that	the	general	economic	situation	in	the	next	twelve	months	is	likely	to	improve?’	
	
The	repeated	cases	of	industrial	strife	at	Ford	and	newly	nationalised	British	Leyland	automotive	
companies,	along	with	the	two	miners’	strikes	of	the	early	1970s,	provide	key	examples	through	
which	to	explore	perceptions	of	the	relationship	between	trade	unionism	and	the	economy.	Both	
Ford	and	British	Leyland	experienced	intense	and	persistent	industrial	strife	during	the	1970s	which	
threatened	these	companies’	fortunes	in	an	increasingly	competitive	market.	In	1975	British	Leyland,	
a	largely	unsuccessful	merger	of	multiple	companies	including	BMC,	was	nationalised	by	the	Labour	
government,	following	the	advice	of	the	Ryder	Report.	This	represented	a	final	attempt	to	rescue	it	
from	bankruptcy	and	stabilise	the	future	of	British	car	manufacturing.	Meanwhile,	Ford	continued	to	
deal	with	the	problems	of	strikes	from	the	late	1960s,	and	in	the	latter	part	of	the	decade	showed	a	
willingness	to	contravene	the	government’s	wage	policy	in	order	to	pacify	trade	unions	and	maintain	
levels	of	production.	Through	these	contrasting	case	studies,	this	research	explores	the	burdens	on	
government	to	intervene	in	industry	to	control	inflation	and	unemployment,	and	the	responses	of	
the	media	to	this	intervention.		
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The	primary	motivation	for	economic	anxiety	was	inflation.	In	1973,	as	Britain	wrestled	with	
economic	recession,	the	Guardian	described	inflation	as	‘an	obsession	for	the	1970s’.3	Just	as	
commentary	about	British	productivity	had	exerted	pressures	on	the	position	of	trade	unions	during	
the	1960s,	this	new	preoccupation	with	inflation	encouraged	further	scrutiny	of	the	labour	
movement.	According	to	Tomlinson,	the	press	of	the	early	1970s	not	only	shaped	the	media	agenda	
around	inflation	but	also	supported	a	perspective	which	linked	this	inflation	problem	with	the	
‘peculiar	recalcitrance	of	British	union	behaviour,	however	difficult	this	focus	on	a	national	cause	
was	to	reconcile	with	the	international	scope	of	the	problem’.4	This	chapter	seeks	to	understand	the	
tensions	this	intervention	caused	for	the	relationship	between	the	media	and	the	government,	as	
well	as	media	perceptions	of	the	relationship	between	government	and	trade	unions.	It	reflects	on	
how	changing	priorities	in	economic	outlook	influenced	perceptions	of	government	involvement	in	
industry,	as	widespread	unemployment	became	a	reality	of	British	life.	Moreover,	this	chapter	
explores	the	broader	themes	of	this	research	established	so	far,	from	understandings	of	British	
exceptionalism	and	its	declining	status	in	world	trade,	to	the	boundaries	between	the	‘political’	and	
the	‘industrial’	which	now	encompassed	industrial	policy-making.	Finally,	this	section	of	the	research	
reflects	on	the	pressures	that	these	themes	and	issues	placed	on	concepts	of	working	class	solidarity	
and	ideas	of	‘social	conscience’,	at	a	time	when	industrial	action	was	seen	to	have	greater	impact	on	
day-to-day	life,	beyond	simple	headlines	in	newspapers.	It	also	assesses	attempts	by	the	press	to	
mediate	these	relationships,	as	they	sought	to	buttress	their	political	agendas.	
	
Inflation	and	Public	Perception	
The	following	three	figures	(6.2,	6.3	and	6.4)	indicate	a	number	of	important	trends	which	illuminate	
perceptions	of	inflation	and	the	cost	of	living.	The	first,	depicting	public	perceptions	of	the	
government’s	most	important	problems,	as	indicated	by	Gallup	Polls,	reflects	the	strength	of	public	
concern	about	the	cost	of	living,	driven	by	inflation.	At	the	beginning	of	the	1970s,	there	was	a	great	
deal	of	flux	in	perceptions	of	the	country’s	problems.	From	the	end	of	1973,	as	Edward	Heath	
wrestled	with	the	problems	of	inflation	and	struggled	to	convince	the	country	of	his	leadership,	the	
cost	of	living	was	consistently	perceived	as	the	country’s	greatest	priority,	only	surpassed	by	other	
concerns	during	periods	of	intense	industrial	crisis,	as	clear	from	the	miners’	strikes	and	the	winter	
of	discontent.		
	
																																																						
3	Guardian,	1	October	1973,	p.	23.	
4	Jim	Tomlinson,	The	Politics	of	Decline:	Understanding	Postwar	Britain	(Abingdon,	2000),	p.	86.	
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Figure	6.2:	Government	problems	according	to	Gallup	polling	(1970-79)	
Source:	Wybrow	and	King,	British	Political	Opinion,	pp.	264-267.	
	
Figure	6.3:	Perceptions	of	the	cost	of	living	problem	and	the	Retail	Price	Index	(1970-79)	
Source:	Wybrow	and	King,	British	Political	Opinion,	pp.	264-267.	RPI	data	from	the	Office	of	National	Statistics	
website,	https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/czbh/mm23	-	[Accessed	1	
December	2017]	
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Figure	6.4:	Perceptions	of	the	cost	of	living	problem	and	press	coverage	of	inflation		
	
The	latter	two	graphs	(6.3	and	6.4)	compare	this	polling	data	on	the	cost	of	living	to,	firstly,	the	
Retail	Price	Index	(RPI)	as	an	indication	of	the	actual	‘reality’	of	inflation	problems,	and,	secondly,	
the	Guardian’s	coverage	of	inflation,	as	determined	by	total	article	mentions	of	‘inflation’	each	
month.	The	first	of	these	figures	indicates	the	way	public	concern	about	inflation	and	the	cost	of	
living	rose	much	more	quickly	in	the	first	part	of	the	1970s	than	actual	increases	in	RPI.	Although	
both	peaked	at	a	similar	time,	in	the	summer	of	1975,	concern	about	inflation	soared	in	1973	before	
RPI	showed	considerable	change,	and	spiked	again	in	1974,	despite	no	sudden	crisis	in	rates	of	
inflation.	Conversely,	comparing	these	spikes	in	public	concern	to	the	Guardian’s	coverage,	as	a	
broader	indicator	of	press	coverage,	there	is	a	much	clearer	correlation.	As	Tomlinson	noted,	the	
‘deployment	of	apocalyptic	notions	about	the	effects	of	inflation	was	widespread	in	the	1970s’,	and	
began	‘well	before	its	peak	in	1975/76’.5	In	November	1974,	64	per	cent	of	those	polled	were	
'dissatisfied'	with	the	future	facing	their	family.		By	1975,	95	per	cent	of	those	polled	by	Gallup	
expected	a	year	of	rising	prices	and	85	per	cent	expected	a	year	of	'economic	difficulty'	for	the	
																																																						
5	Jim	Tomlinson,	‘The	politics	of	declinism’,	in	Lawrence	Black,	Hugh	Pemberton	and	Pat	Thane	(eds),	
Reassessing	1970s	Britain	(Manchester,	2013),	p.	45.	
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country.6	While	panic	about	the	economy	was	an	episodic	phenomenon,	generalised	anxiety	about	
the	future	of	the	British	economy	was	a	constant	issue,	as	narratives	of	economic	decline	were	
normalised.	The	correlation	is	apparent	in	the	relative	volatility	of	both	coverage	and	public	concern,	
including	the	increase	in	interest	between	the	two	miners’	strikes,	despite	the	relative	stability	in	
RPI,	as	well	as	the	spikes	in	concern	in	1974	and	1975.		
	
While	this	data	does	not	on	its	own	provide	information	on	the	nature	or	intent	of	industrial	
relations	coverage,	it	does	provide	important	context	for	understanding	the	influence	of	the	British	
press.	The	data	are	indicative	of	the	media’s	power	to	mediate	and	generate	public	concern.	In	their	
analysis	of	the	declining	popularity	of	trade	unions	during	the	1970s,	P.K.	Edwards	and	George	
Sayers	Bain	adjudged	that	‘regardless	of	how	far	unions	cause	inflation,	of	how	far	they	are	solely	
responsible	for	strikes,	and	of	how	far	strikes	really	damage	the	economy’,	there	were	‘strong	
grounds’	to	conclude	‘inflation	and	strikes	are	associated	with	union	power,	and	union	popularity	
declines	as	a	result’.7	This	chapter	explores	the	media’s	role	in	the	development	of	these	
associations	between	inflation	and	union	activity.	
	
The	continued	emphasis	on	responsibility	
The	language	of	responsibility	which	had	been	a	constant	feature	of	newspaper	coverage	of	trade	
union	action	began	to	change	in	emphasis,	as	expectations	of	the	centralised	leadership	of	trade	
unions	continued	to	decline.	There	was	a	growing	feeling	amongst	the	press	that	while	some	groups	
of	workers	might	have	had	‘reasonable	cases	in	normal	times’,	they	had	failed	to	appreciate	that	
these	were	not	normal	times,	and	disputes	that	the	economy	‘could	once	take	in	its	stride	may	now	
be	the	straws	that	break	its	back’.	8	This	kind	of	judgement,	evoking	concepts	of	justice	and	common	
interest,	linked	closely	to	the	patterns	of	moralised	language	which	had	been	established	under	the	
Labour	government	of	the	1960s	but	the	language	now	had	more	apocalyptic	undertones.	However,	
the	commentary	of	newspapers,	particularly	the	Times,	increasingly	suggested	that	unions	could	not	
be	deterred	from	strikes,	and	was	indicative	of	the	perceived	futility	of	union	reform	and	
government	intervention.	This	placed	greater	demand	on	the	role	of	the	public	in	resisting	union	
demands.	Initially,	the	Times	commended	a	perceived	‘improvement	in	psychology’	in	1970	which	
forced	managers	to	‘rein	in	the	demoralized	pressure	which	had	made	this	year	so	dangerously	
inflationary’	and	claims	beyond	the	‘bounds	of	respectability’	had	meant	there	was	‘nothing	
																																																						
6	Neeltje	Wiedemayer,	‘Do	People	Worry	About	the	Future?’,	The	Public	Opinion	Quarterly	40	(1976),	p.	388.	
7	P.K.	Edwards	and	George	Sayers	Bain,	‘Why	are	Trade	Unions	Becoming	More	Popular?	Unions	and	Public	
Opinion	in	Britain’,	British	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations	26	(1988),	p.	323.	
8	Daily	Mirror,	6	January	1975,	p.	2.	
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unnatural	about	resisting	them’.9	It	believed	that	the	‘endless	slippage	of	petty	concessions’	could	
only	be	halted	by	an	appeal	to	the	country’s	determination,	even	if	that	meant	Ford	had	to	take	a	
‘multimillion	pound	loss’	or	enduring	a	prolonged	fuel	strike	because	there	was	‘no	discouragement	
to	strikes	like	the	knowledge	that	people	are	determined	to	see	the	matter	through.’10	This	framing	
once	again	separated	writer	and	reader	from	the	position	of	the	unions	and	suggested	that	the	
language	of	‘responsibility’	had	shifted,	as	a	result	of	the	severity	of	the	economic	situation	and	
disappointment	with	the	response	of	both	unions	and	government.	Such	determination	was	the	only	
way	to	restore	‘the	balance	between	strikes	and	the	national	interest’	and	failure	to	do	so	would	be	
spell	the	country’s	acceptance	of	inflation’.11		
	
Fatalist	Warnings:	‘Remember	Weimar’	
Rather	than	the	German	example	being	used	as	a	contemporary	motivation	for	industrial	
improvement,	as	had	been	the	case	in	earlier	industrial	coverage,	its	dictatorial	past	was	now	used	
as	a	threat	to	strike-prone	Britain.	The	Mail	used	several	pieces	in	1972	to	warn	against	the	perils	of	
wage	increases	and	their	relationship	with	inflation,	directly	addressing	‘those	who	persist	in	asking	
for	more	than	they	have	earned’,	who	were	told	to	‘Remember	Weimar’.	12	The	Mail	even	led	with	
an	opinion	article	entitled	‘Do	we	want	a	return	ticket	to	Weimar?’13	Whereas	Japan	and	Germany	
were	once	seen	as	healthy	competitors,	Britain’s	relationship	with	these	two	countries	was	now	
framed	in	defeatist	and	fatalistic	terms,	primarily	as	a	result	of	Britain’s	propensity	to	strike.	The	
Times,	in	the	following	year,	attempted	a	more	optimistic	framing,	as	it	cited	Britain’s	‘healthy	
export	performance’,	‘heavy	home	demand’	and	the	devaluation	of	the	pound	which	had	provided	
Britain	with	‘a	greater	competitive	price	edge	over	foreign	manufacturers’,	but	its	coverage	
fundamentally	focussed	on	a	‘golden	opportunity	for	the	industry’	which	was	slipping	away	
‘ungrasped’.	14	This	kind	of	framing	placed	industrial	relations	and	the	production	line	as	the	primary	
factor	in	Britain’s	possibly	terminal	decline	on	the	world	stage.		
	
The	Mirror	made	attempts	to	query	the	prevalence	of	the	perception	that	Britain	was	uniquely	
challenged	by	its	strike	record,	despite	the	scrutiny	prompted	by	British	Leyland’s	largely	
unsuccessful	nationalisation.	Initially,	the	Mirror	made	significant	attempts	to	reject	the	‘strikes	kill	
the	car	industry’	narrative,	as	it	highlighted	the	industry’s	inherent	insecurity	of	‘slump,	boom,	
																																																						
9	The	Times,	20	November	1970,	p.	13.		
10	The	Times,	10	February	1973,	p.	17.	
11	The	Times,	20	October	1975,	p.	19.	
12	Daily	Mail,	19	June	1972,	p.	6.	
13	Daily	Mail,	15	May	1972,	p.	6.	
14	The	Times,	21	September	1973,	p.	17.	
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slump,	boom,	loping	each	other	like	the	Blackpool	“Big	Dipper”’	but	this	argument	waned	as	scrutiny	
on	the	industry	increased.	15	Instead,	it	increasingly	sought	to	undermine	the	suggestion	that	the	
British	car	industry’s	strike	record	was	anything	exceptional.	Geoffrey	Goodman,	leading	criticism	of	
the	dominant	frames	of	explanation,	queried	if	the	image	of	the	British	car	worker	as	a	strike-happy,	
unproductive,	overpaid	worker’	was	a	‘fair	one’,	given	that	productivity	levels	in	America,	Japan	and	
Germany	were	‘coming	closer	to	the	British	level’,	where	absenteeism	was	a	particular	problem.	16	
Goodman,	whose	new	eponymous	opinion	column	illustrated	the	centrality	of	industrial	relations	to	
the	media	agenda,	reflected	on	this	criticism	of	industrial	relations	as	a	symptom	of	Britain	adjusting	
to	a	new	position	in	international	trade.	He	argued	that	Britain	had	been	‘slow	to	recognise	that	we	
are	no	longer	at	the	centre	of	the	Industrial	universe’	and,	contrary	to	public	perception,	there	was	
‘nothing	unique	about	Britain’s	so	called	“industrial	sickness”’,	which	would	‘eventually,	spread	to	
every	industrialised	country’.17	The	Guardian	even	went	as	far	as	to	describe	inflation	as	‘a	disease	of	
prosperity	as	much	as	of	poverty,	and	the	more	people	have	to	lose	the	more	frightened	they	are	of	
losing	it’,	as	it	attempted	to	stress	Britain’s	relative	and	continued	affluence.18	
	
However,	given	the	entrenchment	of	British	exceptionalism,	a	constant	feature	of	media	self-
assessment,	this	sense	of	perspective	on	Britain’s	position	in	the	world	was	difficult	to	establish	
more	broadly.	Even	though	the	Times	recognised	labour	problems	for	Britain’s	competitors	at	
Renault,	‘torn	apart	by	a	major	strike’,	Citroen	and	Fiat,	troubled	by	‘continuous	labour	difficulties’	-	
the	kind	of	trends	that	Goodman	had	been	keen	to	raise	in	the	Mirror	–	it	still	offered	‘fuller	
cooperation	of	the	labour	unions’	as	British	Leyland’s	best	chance	for	survival.19	
	
This	belief	in	British	exceptionalism,	despite	waning	pride	in	British	industry,	also	provided	further	
hurdles	to	explaining	Britain’s	declining	fortunes	in	international	manufacturing.	Despite	dwindling	
sales,	a	significant	proportion	of	the	right-wing	press	struggled	to	accept	criticisms	of	the	quality	of	
British	cars	which,	as	has	already	been	discussed,	had	existed	since	the	Second	World	War,	and	only	
seemed	to	be	intensifying	in	nature.	The	Mail	claimed	that	Britain	made	‘brilliant	cars’	but	
associated	problems	with	‘reliability,	durability	and	availability’	solely	with	the	lines	of	production,	
labour	and	unions,	rather	than	design	or	resources.20	The	Express,	as	it	confronted	the	‘humiliating	
fact	that	over	half	the	vehicles	sold	here	are	made	abroad’,	argued	in	1977	that	there	was	‘nothing	
																																																						
15	Daily	Mirror,	6	March	1970,	p.	7.	
16	Daily	Mirror,	15	June	1973,	p.	11.	
17	Daily	Mirror,	16	March	1971,	p.	8.	
18	Guardian,	14	January	1973,	p.	8.	
19	The	Times,	3	June	1971,	p	23.	
20	Daily	Mail,	20	October	1976,	p.	6.	
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wrong	with	British	cars’	compared	with	rivals	and	cited	supply	as	the	‘crunch	of	the	British	problem’.	
What	caused	the	supply	shortages	which	rendered	British	car	companies	uncompetitive?	‘The	
reason	boils	down	to	one	word.	Strikes.’21		
	
	
Figure	6.5:	‘Can	our	cars	ever	catch	up?’,	Daily	Express,	1	October	1977,	p.	10.	
	
The	prevalence	of	this	perception	was	remarkable	given	the	fact	that,	in	the	case	of	British	Leyland	
before	its	fateful	nationalisation	project,	‘if	productivity	had	improved,	strikes	had	been	eliminated,	
investment	guaranteed,	marketing	rationalised	and	overmanning	reduced,	the	problem	would	still	
have	remained	while	the	product	range	remained	so	inadequate’	but	this	issue	with	Leyland’s	
product	range	was	‘not	deemed	worthy	for	public	comment’,	by	either	government,	or	as	it	appears	
from	research	of	coverage,	the	majority	of	the	media.22	The	Sun	did	recognise	the	problem	of	‘wrong	
and	shoddily	finished	models’	from	British	Leyland	but	placed	emphasis	on	the	problem	of	‘over-
manning	and	feather-bedding’	as	the	most	‘fatal’	of	mistakes.23	It	seems	clear	that	when	the	influx	of	
investment	was	unsuccessful,	the	persistence	of	industrial	strife	and	over-manning	at	British	Leyland	
became	the	media’s	primary	frame	of	explanation	for	Leyland’s	decline.	
	
Shallow	coverage	and	the	problems	of	public	image	
The	Mirror’s	response	to	criticisms	of	the	performance	of	the	workforce	also	took	on	a	psychological	
element.	The	modernisation	of	assembly	lines	which	had	prompted	anxiety	about	unemployment	in	
the	1950s,	was	now	viewed	by	some	as	potentially	problematic	for	those	now	in	employment,	
around	newly	optimised	assembly	lines.	The	Mirror	reflected	on	the	frustrations	that	arose	from	the	
boredom	of	an	automated	production	line,	which	was	seen	as	particularly	problematic	for	the	car	
																																																						
21	Daily	Express,	1	October	1977,	p.	10.	
22	Holmes,	The	Labour	Government	1974-79,	pp.	49-50.	
23	Sun,	25	April	1975,	p.	2.	
	
	
	
	
Image	redacted	due	to	copyright	restrictions	
	
	
191	
industry,	under	the	same	kind	of	threatening	headlines	which	had	typified	1950s	coverage	of	
automation	–	‘The	day	of	the	robot…’.	Geoffrey	Goodman	pondered	if	there	was	a	manual	job	in	
modern	industry	‘as	back-breaking,	monotonous,	spiritually	and	mentally	unrewarding	as	a	job	on	a	
car	assembly	line’.	24	Significantly,	this	concern	about	the	welfare	of	workers	was	driven	by	the	
search	for	explanations	for	industrial	strife	in	the	industry.	The	Mirror	suggested	the	‘real	villain’	of	
car	strikes	was	such	problems,	and	asked	if	the	assembly	line	system	‘ought	to	continue	unchanged	
much	longer’,	despite	the	paper’s	recognition	of	the	fact	that	abandonment	of	assembly	line	
methods	by	any	one	company	would	render	it	‘uncompetitive’.25	The	persistence	of	scepticism	
about	automation	and	shaken	confidence	in	Britain’s	industrial	future	amongst	the	left-wing	press	
resulted	in	this	issue	being	reshaped	to	explain	one	of	the	great	problems	of	modern	British	
industry.		
	
Notably,	this	sympathetic	perspective	on	the	pressures	on	workforces	in	automated	assembly	lines	
remained	fairly	marginal,	unlike	the	widespread	sympathy	that	miners	had	benefitted	from	during	
the	strikes	and	absenteeism	of	the	1960s.	While	the	language	of	sympathy	for	miners	had	drawn	on	
mining’s	ties	to	Britain’s	glorified	industrial	past,	workers	in	the	car	industry	struggled	to	gain	such	
status	and	respect.	This	was	partly	because	of	the	industry’s	inextricable	link	to	industrial	strife,	that	
there	was	‘something	about	the	British	motor	industry…	which	drives	otherwise	sane	and	
responsible	people	to	the	most	ludicrous	and	suicidal	confrontations’,	and	also	because	their	work	
was	not	considered	either	brave	or	essential	in	the	way	mining	had	once	been	considered	–	and	
1973’s	oil	crisis	had	reminded.26	In	a	period	where	employment	itself	was	seen	by	many	
commentators	as	reward	enough,	and	moralised	rhetoric	made	maximum	productivity	essential	at	
all	costs,	it	is	easy	to	see	why	such	a	deep	understanding	of	the	psychological	motivations	behind	
industrial	discontent	failed	to	gain	traction	beyond	the	commentators	sympathetic	to	the	labour	
movement.	Even	the	miners,	after	two	nationwide	strikes,	found	a	much	less	responsive	and	
sympathetic	media	atmosphere.	In	the	judgement	of	Milton	Shulman,	writing	for	the	Express,	there	
was	still	a	‘surprising	amount	of	sympathy’	but	this	was	‘trickling	away	fast’.27	
	
According	to	evidence	from	the	TUC	archives,	the	trade	union	movement	was	well	aware	of	the	
image	problems	workers	in	the	car	industry	suffered,	although	this	was	a	difficult	issue	to	tackle.	The	
TUC	recognised	in	its	report	of	media	coverage	of	the	Winter	of	Discontent	that	some	professions	
																																																						
24	Daily	Mirror,	15	June	1973,	p.	11.	
25	Daily	Mirror,	15	June	1973,	p.	11.	
26	Daily	Express,	20	October	1978,	p.	8.	
27	Daily	Express,	21	February	1974,	p.	8.	
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received	‘more	sympathetic	coverage	than	others’.	It	adjudged	that,	while	some	popular	groups	of	
workers	such	as	nurses	enjoyed	coverage	which	was	sensitive	to	their	financial	concerns,	others	
could	expect	coverage	to	focus	on	‘an	average	pay	figure	and	a	percentage	claim,	which	in	
journalistic	terms	is	far	less	likely	to	arouse	sympathy	than	a	“human	interest”	story	showing	an	
individual	worker’.28	Car	workers	most	certainly	fell	into	the	latter	category,	as	the	press	kept	a	
constant	check	of	each	round	of	negotiations	in	percentage	terms	and	personal	stories	were	few	and	
far	between.	This	kind	of	archival	evidence	suggests	that,	consistent	with	other	patterns	of	media	
engagement,	the	TUC	struggled	to	come	to	terms	with	and	contest	the	representation	of	workers	
and	failed	to	mobilise	any	kind	of	serious	response	to	such	image	issues	on	behalf	of	those	working	
in	the	car	industry.		
	
Industrial	strife	and	‘The	British	in	Looneyland’	
As	the	British	economy	struggled,	themes	surrounding	pride	in	British	industry	shifted	in	industrial	
relations	coverage,	as	Britain	confronted	its	changing	position	in	the	international	economy.	If,	as	
Tomlinson	has	argued,	‘allegations	of	economic	decline	have	been	given	much	greater	force	by	their	
linkage	to	declining	world	status’,	a	narrative	which	naturally	fits	the	‘cultural	and	political	
pessimism	for	the	right',	media	coverage	of	the	car	industry	contributed	to	such	a	representation	
and,	in	the	process,	directly	implicated	trade	unions	in	decline.29	ITV’s	reporters	asked	workers	at	
British	Leyland	if	they	would	be	‘slightly	bothered	that	a	Japanese	company	would	get	a	foothold	
into	the	British	car	industry,	an	even	bigger	one	than	they	have	already’,	indicative	of	past	attitudes	
towards	the	maintenance	of	British	manufacturing,	but	the	message	‘from	the	shop	floor’	was	
summarised	as	‘if	the	money’s	right,	they’ll	do	it’.30	Such	questioning	reflected	media	concern	with	
attitudes	towards	British	industry	amongst	its	workers,	although	the	response	was	a	reminder	of	the	
public	concern	about	rising	wages	and	the	cost	of	living.	The	Mail	was	now	forced	to	concede,	that	
although	ten	years	previously	the	idea	of	Japanese	cars	being	assembled	in	Britain	would	have	
meant	‘all	patriotic	hell’	would	have	broken	loose,	‘feelings	of	relief’	were	now	prevalent.	The	Mail	
insistent	that	the	public	should	‘thank	heavens	somebody	from	abroad	finds	it	worthwhile	to	shack	
up	with	a	company	like	Leyland’.31		
	
																																																						
28	TUC	Report	–	Media	Coverage	of	Industrial	Disputes	January-February	1979,	24	April	1979;	TUC	Archive,	
Modern	Records	Centre,	University	of	Warwick	(MSS.292D/786/4)	
29	Tomlinson,	‘Thrice	Denied’,	p.	248.	
30	ITV	Evening	News,	3	April	1979.		
31	Daily	Mail,	18	May	1979,	p.	6.	
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The	nationalisation	of	British	Leyland	in	1975	placed	pressure	on	the	relationship	between	
government,	media	and	trade	unions.	While	both	Ford	and	Leyland	struggled	with	ongoing	industrial	
conflict,	this	was	framed	in	very	different	ways,	largely	as	a	result	of	their	differences	in	ownership.	
On	the	part	of	the	labour	force,	there	were	concerns	amongst	the	press,	across	the	political	
spectrum,	that	workers	had	a	more	relaxed	attitude	towards	taking	industrial	action	because	of	the	
government’s	involvement	in	the	enterprise.	British	Leyland	was	regarded	by	the	Mail	to	be	the	
victim	of	a	deliberate	‘Sting’	by	the	unions,	which	involved	waiting	for	public	funding	before	
descending	into	‘carefree	anarchy’.32	The	moralised	implication	of	industrial	blackmail	directed	at	a	
publicly	funded	company	was	a	key	component	of	the	Mail’s	criticism	of	Leyland’s	nationalisation,	as	
‘no	temporary	adverse	factor’	could	‘disguise	the	endemic	unwillingness	of	Leyland	workers	to	make	
significant	and	sustained	improvements’.33	Although	the	Mail	conceded	that	some	workers	at	
Leyland	may	have	had	‘plausible	grievance’,	unions	had	failed	to	appreciate	that	‘transcending	
sectional	demands	for	distributive	justice	is	the	common	interest	of	survival’,	and	strikes	could	‘only	
hasten	the	day	of	reckoning’.34	Leyland’s	nationalised	background	this	sort	of	near-apocalyptic	
framing	placed	the	unions	sectional	interests	against	those	of	the	country.	This	further	illustrated	
the	vulnerability	of	unions	in	nationalised	industry	to	public	scrutiny	and	criticism.	The	Times	argued	
that	the	‘chief	reason’	for	industrial	unrest	at	Leyland	was	that	the	‘disputants	know	perfectly	well	
that	they	do	not	put	Leyland	future	in	jeopardy’	because	of	the	Government’s	commitment	to	‘keep	
the	place	open,	whether	there	are	disputes	or	not,	and	for	that	matter	whether	anybody	in	this	or	
any	other	country	wants	to	buy	the	goods	they	produce’.35	Such	coverage	framed	the	government’s	
unpopular	policy	decision	as	the	inspiration	of	industrial	action	amongst	the	workers	of	an	industry	
that	was	allegedly	naturally	predisposed	to	shop	floor	militancy.		
	
The	Mirror	recognised	the	problematic	relationship	between	the	government’s	determination	to	
save	Leyland	and	the	attitude	of	workers	in	the	car	industry,	although	it	phrased	it	in	less	sinister	
terms.	It	accepted	that	Leyland	would	not	be	allowed	to	‘sink	without	trace’	but	that	was	‘precisely	
the	point	which	some	–	though	not	all	–	British	Leyland	workers,	shop	stewards	and	even	some	of	
the	management	are	counting	on’.36	This	sort	of	assessment	alluded	to	the	Mirror’s	doubts	about	
government	policy	in	this	field,	despite	its	wider	political	commitment	to	Labour.	Although	the	
Mirror	phrased	its	anxiety	with	qualifications	about	the	diversity	of	attitudes	to	strikes	inside	car	
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factories,	this	concern	about	the	attitudes	of	workers	to	public	ownership	permeated	discussions	of	
other	struggling	companies.	In	coverage	of	Chrysler’s	1975	‘suicide	strike’,	long	before	the	climax	of	
tensions	at	Leyland,	the	Mirror	insisted	that	if	strikers	at	Chrysler	were	‘banking	on	the	Government	
to	bail	them	out	they	had	better	think	again	because	one	nationalised	motor	company	was	the	‘very	
most	that	Britain	can	afford’.37	There	was	a	clear	fear,	even	amongst	those	sympathetic	to	trade	
union	concerns	that	unions	may	try	to	trap	the	government	into	making	further	unpopular	
interventionist	policy	decisions.	This	illustrated	the	complexity	in	navigating	the	relationship	
between	a	Labour	government,	which	the	newspaper	supported,	and	the	trade	unions,	which	still	
accounted	for	a	significant	proportion	of	the	Mirror’s	readership.	
	
Figure	6.6:	‘Jim	Reads	the	Riot	Act’	(The	British	in	Looneyland),	Sun,	2	March	1977,	p.	2.	
	
The	significant	expense	of	Leyland’s	nationalisation	directly	tied	the	public	interest	with	the	future	of	
Leyland.	This	was	used	to	significant	effect	by	the	right-wing	press.	According	to	the	Sun,	industrial	
strife	which	put	the	‘British	in	Looneyland’	was	not	only	problematic	for	the	government	but	also	
‘humiliating’	for	the	taxpayer	(Figure	6.6).38	This	kind	of	emotive	reference	placed	the	case	at	
Leyland	close	to	the	public’s	damaged	pride	in	British	industry	and,	more	significantly,	the	cost	of	
living.	At	the	climax	of	tensions	at	Leyland,	it	framed	the	choice	as	an	issue	of	‘your	money	or	your	
Leyland’,	a	‘monstrosity’	that	was	‘constantly	fed	with	more	and	more	of	the	working	man	and	
woman’s	money’.39	This	article	placed	the	future	prospects	of	Leyland	as	directly	at	odds	with	the	
prosperity	of	working	people,	despite	the	major	role	that	Leyland	played	as	an	employer	–	a	primary	
motivation	for	the	government’s	investment	in	Leyland.	This	coverage	was	indicative	of	the	
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Image	redacted	due	to	copyright	restrictions	
	
	
195	
increasing	tendency	for	the	press	to	oversimplify	the	tensions	in	complex	industrial	issues.	More	
significantly,	the	right	wing	press’s	coverage	of	British	Leyland’s	management	and	the	government’s	
interventionist	economic	strategies	provided	evidence	of	what	Stuart	Hall	terms	as	the	perceived	
‘contradiction	between	“the	people”,	popular	needs,	feelings	and	aspirations	–	on	the	one	hand	–	
and	the	imposed	structures	of	an	interventionist	capitalist	state’,	or	a	‘bureaucratic	imposition’.40		
This	tension	in	public	understanding	had	strong	links	to	rising	anti-collectivism.	This	framing	of	
government’s	interests	against	those	of	the	people,	was	a	consistent	feature	in	media	coverage	of	
trade	unionism,	and	was	also	evoked	in	coverage	of	industrial	relations	at	Ford.	
	
ITN	coverage	of	events	at	Leyland	provided	a	more	nuanced	perspective	but	it	also	tapped	into	
these	themes	of	governmental	mismanagement	and	union	sabotage.	Perceptions	of	waste	and	
mismanagement	were	only	intensified	by	ITN’s	focus	on	surplus,	depicted	in	the	many	lines	of	cars	
being	stored	on	former	airfields.	Early	news	coverage	of	the	situation	at	Leyland	had	placed	
emphasis	on	motivations	of	strikers,	which	had	prompted	reporters	to	ask	Scanlon	if	‘there	was	
some	kind	of	union	conspiracy	to	wreck	British	Leyland’.	41		This	provided	evidence	of	a	background	
to	the	union	‘sting’	accusations	which	arose	after	nationalisation.	However,	as	these	shots	of	surplus	
cars	appeared	on	television	screens	in	1978,	the	reporter	suggested	that	this	quantity	of	cars	meant	
Leyland	could	no	longer	blame	production	and	posed	that	if	these	could	not	be	sold	they	would	‘only	
serve	as	a	monument	to	a	national	disaster’.42	This	coverage	framed	the	situation	at	Leyland	as	an	
issue	of	national	importance	and,	more	significantly,	illustrated	a	shift	in	media	scrutiny	from	issues	
of	production,	which	had	directly	implicated	the	labour	force,	onto	Leyland’s	management,	under	
nationalisation.			
	
As	this	research	has	established,	the	press	continued	to	be	critical	of	what	it	believed	to	be	political	
motivations	behind	strikes,	as	opposed	to	industrial	ones.	The	Guardian,	increasingly	critical	in	its	
assessment	of	the	labour	movement,	condemned	the	strikes	at	Leyland,	putting	them	down	to	a	
matter	of	principle,	which	‘like	drugs,	are	occasionally	needed	but…	the	car	industry	has	an	
overdose,	and	that	can	be	fatal’.43	However,	the	cynicism	about	the	motivations	of	workers	also	
extended	to	the	role	of	the	government,	allowing	industrial	policy	to	be	delegitimised	in	similar	ways	
to	union	action.	This	trend	tied	to	growing	discomfort	about	Labour’s	relationship	with	the	labour	
movement,	in	particular	the	TUC.	The	Express	summed	up	the	intent	of	British	Leyland,	dubbed	
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‘British	Lossmaker’,	as	a	company	which	operated	on	‘political	rather	than	managerial	principles’,	
where	the	government’s	apprehension	about	plant	closures	and	company	restructuring	would	‘have	
no	place	under	competent	management’.44	The	criticism	that	government	was	using	public	money	
to	further	its	own	political	interests,	rather	than	the	commercial	interests	of	the	company,	bore	
interesting	parallels	with	the	well-established	distinction	made	between	the	political	and	industrial	
strikes	and	illustrated	further	anxiety	about	the	political	significance	of	industrial	relations	in	
contemporary	Britain.	Political	interference	in	the	industrial	sphere	was	no	longer	a	criticism	
reserved	for	trade	unions	and	this	had	important	economic	implications.	
	
Economic	Priorities:	Employment	versus	Inflation	
In	the	media’s	discomfort	with	the	government’s	protection	of	jobs,	there	was	further	evidence	of	
the	implications	of	changing	attitudes	towards	employment.	This	research	has	already	established	
the	significance	of,	and	the	media’s	preoccupation	with,	soaring	inflation	but	this	had	a	knock	on	
effect	on	attitudes	towards	unemployment.	Peter	Hall	has	highlighted	a	shift	in	economic	policy,	or	
policy	‘paradigm’,	initiated	in	the	early	1970s,	where	‘inflation	replaced	unemployment	as	the	
preeminent	concern	for	policy	makers’,	particularly	after	a	string	of	Labour	policy	failures	
undermined	the	government’s	authority.45	While	Margaret	Thatcher’s	election	is	seen	as	the	
greatest	symbol	of	the	shift,	the	industrial	context	of	the	1970s	provided	an	important	platform	for	
these	ideas,	illustrated	through	the	media’s	grudging	acceptance	of	unemployment	in	the	
contemporary	economic	climate	and	the	public’s	increasing	prioritisation	of	anti-inflationary	
measures.	In	September	1975,	respondents	to	a	Gallup	Poll	were	asked	which	issue	the	Government	
should	give	greater	attention	to	–	curbing	inflation	or	reducing	unemployment	–	61	per	cent	
believed	the	former	should	be	the	government’s	policy	priority.46	The	fact	that	the	same	set	of	
polling	data	suggested	that	unemployment	should	be	the	trade	unions’	‘most	urgent	problem’	
illustrated	the	problems	for	the	trade	union	movement	in	fulfilling	public	expectations	of	its	role	in	
the	British	economy.47	
	
The	Mail	hoped	that	the	time	was	approaching	when	‘every	other	consideration	–	of	jobs,	of	wishing	
to	have	a	purely	British	stake	in	the	motor	industry,	of	votes	even	–	will	be	brushed	aside	in	view	of	
																																																						
44	Daily	Express,	23	January	1978,	p.	10.	
45	Peter	Hall,	‘Policy	Paradigms,	Social	Learning,	and	the	State:	The	Case	of	Economic	Policymaking	in	Britain’,	
Comparative	Politics	25	(April	1993),	p.	284.	
46	Gallup,	Gallup	Polls:	Volume	2,	p.	1449.	
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the	mounting	cost’.48	The	first	of	these	points,	jobs,	appeared	to	be	the	overriding	concern	for	the	
government	in	the	case	at	Leyland	and	underpinned	another	important	debate	in	British	economics	
at	the	time,	as	unemployment	soared.	The	Times	recognised	that	closures	of	Leyland’s	problematic	
car	division	would	turn	‘the	West	Midlands	with	its	marginal	seats	into	an	industrial	disaster	area’,	
which	rendered	the	‘political	and	practical	arguments	of	letting	things	drift	on	downwards’,	‘only	too	
obvious’	to	the	government.49	The	Times	coverage	of	the	situation	at	British	Leyland	suggested	a	lack	
of	bravery	from	government	which	had	‘shrunk	from	the	political	and	psychological	consequences’	
of	allowing	Leyland	to	run	down	‘until	there	was	a	better	balance	between	demand	and	capacity’,	
largely	because	of	the	social	impact	of	such	a	decline.50	While	this	emphasis	on	over-manning	did	
not	explicitly	target	the	policy	of	trade	unions,	being	principally	an	issue	of	nationalisation	and	
government	policy,	it	did	have	implications	on	the	position	of	the	labour	force	more	generally	and	
issues	with	management	continued	to	be	marginal.		
	
In	the	face	of	continued	problems	at	Leyland,	the	Mail	pondered	if	Britain	could	‘do	without	a	motor	
industry	altogether’,	in	order	to	return	to	‘what	we	are	good	at	–	being	a	nation	of	shopkeepers’.51	
This	sort	of	question	underlined	popular	disillusionment	and	frustration	with	the	car	industry,	and	
hinted	at	a	change	in	attitudes	towards	the	significance	of	manufacturing	for	British	prestige.	Under	
the	headline	‘learning	to	live	with	unemployment’,	the	Mail	warned	against	the	creation	of	‘artificial	
jobs’	which	could	take	Britain	‘from	crisis	to	crash’,	as	‘economic	realism’	compelled	Britain	to	
confront	the	fact	it	could	not	keep	its	young	people	in	‘worthwhile’	employment.52	This	position	on	
the	maintenance	of	employment	also	began	to	spread	across	the	media	spectrum,	as	the	Guardian,	
in	its	criticism	for	the	government’s	involvement	at	Leyland,	warned	against	‘setting	out	to	protect	
existing	jobs	in	existing	firms	at	all	costs’	because	mass	market	car	production	was	‘probably	an	
industry	with	a	limited	future	in	the	industrial	world’.53	Such	concerns	about	‘artificial’	employment	
underlined	anxiety	about	the	distorting	impact	of	government	intervention	in	industry	and	its	
political	intentions.		
	
The	Times	exacted	its	criticism	on	the	role	of	trade	unions	in	causing	unemployment,	as	it	suggested	
that	‘many	good	trade	unionists	have	gone	on	strike	this	year	in	order	to	get	themselves	the	sack’	
which	was	part	of	‘the	process	of	destroying	the	full	employment	policy	which	has	been	maintained	
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since	the	war’.54	The	Express	described	the	unions	as	‘great	machines	for	the	production	of	
unemployment	through	pricing	their	members	out	of	jobs’,	the	kind	of	framing	which	directly	linked	
unions	to	unemployment,	not	just	lost	production	and	failing	industry.55	The	paper	even	went	as	far	
as	to	link	the	two	issues	in	the	simplest	terms	–	‘one	man’s	excessive	wage	rise	is	another	man’s	
unemployment’.56	According	to	this	perspective,	not	only	was	employment	drifting	from	the	centre	
of	economic	policy	concern,	this	was	at	least	partly	a	result	of	the	attitude	of	unions	and	their	
apparent	willingness	to	strike.	
	
	
Wage	restraint	at	Ford	and	the	realities	of	policy	
The	other	prominent	case	study	for	analysing	the	nature	of	media	coverage	of	trade	unions	in	the	
motor	industry	is	Ford.	Consistent	with	their	experience	of	the	1960s,	Ford	continued	to	deal	with	
industrial	unrest,	which	was	alleged	in	front	page	headlines	to	have	‘cost	Britain	the	chance	of	
having	a	new	£30	million	Ford	factory’.57	As	a	private	company,	its	relationship	with	the	government	
was	very	different	and	this	had	important	implications	for	the	way	industrial	relations	at	Ford	were	
treated	by	the	media.	When	Ford	granted	a	17	per	cent	pay	increase	to	workers,	which	contravened	
the	government’s	rigid	five	per	cent	pay	policy,	this	decision	was	framed	in	diverse	ways,	as	a	
consequence	of	contrasting	political	agendas.	The	Express	felt	that	efforts	to	‘compel	Ford	to	
observe	a	mystical	figure	of	five	per	cent’	was	like	‘ordering	water	to	run	uphill’,	which	indicated	the	
perceived	futility	of	the	government’s	attempts	to	curb	wages.58	According	to	the	Express,	in	
granting	a	wage	increase	which	treated	government	policy	with	‘blatant	contempt’,	Ford	had	been	
forced	to	‘choose	between	satisfying	its	workers	or	satisfying	the	government’.	59	The	Sun	
empathised	with	the	frustration	of	workers,	branding	their	demand	for	more	wages	as	‘entirely	
understandable’,	as	the	paper	directed	criticism	at	the	‘morale-sapping	rigidity’	of	the	pay	policy	
which	meant	that	‘regardless	of	effort	or	special	skills	–	virtually	every	worker	gets	the	same	
increase’.60	This	coverage	framed	Ford’s	action	as	a	matter	of	satisfying	working	class	interests	
against	government	interests,	rather	than,	as	had	been	conventional	for	coverage	of	wage	
settlements,	the	interests	of	unions	against	those	of	the	nation.	Conservative	criticism	of	the	
government’s	interventionism	dictated	the	right-wing	press’s	position	on	industrial	settlements.		
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The	extent	of	this	support	for	the	interests	of	the	British	car	worker	hit	such	heights	that	the	Sun	
even	went	out	of	its	way	to	emphasise	groups	of	workers	who	had	made	a	settlement	under	the	
terms	of	the	government’s	policy.	At	the	peak	of	tensions	at	Ford	and	Leyland,	Vauxhall	workers	
decided	not	to	strike	against	their	company’s	four	and	a	half	per	cent	pay	offer	which	the	Sun	
branded	as	a	famous	victory	for	‘common	sense’,	as	the	company	could	not	afford	any	more.	Aside	
from	using	this	wage	agreement	as	a	way	to	show	shop	stewards,	proponents	of	the	strike,	as	‘out	of	
touch’,	the	Sun	suggested	that	such	a	rejection	of	strike	measures	had	shown	that	‘if	you	tell	the	
British	worker	the	truth	there	is	a	good	chance	that	he	will	react	in	a	responsible	way’.61	Such	an	
article	illustrated	the	willingness	of	the	working-class	Sun	to	highlight	success	stories	in	its	opinion	
columns,	in	a	way	which	was	less	comfortable	for	the	middle-class	papers,	in	order	to	encourage	
scrutiny	of	the	government’s	pay	policy.	The	agreement	at	Vauxhall	could	be	used	to	undermine	the	
supposed	necessity	of	a	statutory	wage	policy.	Given	the	confidence	of	such	articles,	it	is	no	
coincidence	that	this	was	the	year	that	Sun	established	itself	as	the	forerunner	of	the	British	tabloids	
and	firmly	nailed	its	colours	to	the	Conservative’s	mast,	much	to	the	delight	of	Conservative	
strategists.62	
	
According	to	the	Mail,	as	Ford	had	endured	a	strike	allegedly	inflicted	by	previous	attempts	to	abide	
by	the	government’s	rigid	pay	policy,	Ford	had	‘suffered	enough’.63	The	government’s	threat	of	
sanctions	against	Ford	was	the	‘unacceptable	face	of	economic	fascism’,	which	handicapped	‘the	go-
getters’,	in	Ford,	and	cossetted	the	‘dead-lossers’,	British	Leyland.64	Along	similar	lines,	the	Sun	used	
the	language	of	victimhood	which	had	previously	been	to	support	the	miners’	case	in	favour	of	Ford.	
In	a	front	page	article,	it	described	Ford	as	the	‘victim’	of	the	government’s	‘hypocritical	and	absurd	
charade’,	and	a	punishment	which	was	‘about	as	logical	as	putting	an	old	lady	in	charge	for	being	
mugged’.65	This	same	opinion	article	on	the	sanctions	against	Ford,	entitled	‘Big	Jim’s	Cop	Out’,	was	
consistent	with	the	Sun’s	continued	personalisation	of	the	failures	of	the	government	and	its	desire	
to	pit	Margaret	Thatcher	against	ailing	‘Big	Jim’.	More	significantly,	this	article	highlighted	great	
frustration	with	the	discriminatory	application	of	the	policy	and	this	was	used	by	the	right-wing	
press	to	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	government’s	authority.	Callaghan’s	sanctions	policy	was	
referred	to	as	having	the	‘morality	of	Mussolini’	where	the	principle	of	‘selective	enforcement	of	
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Callaghan’s	code’	was	deemed	repulsive	and	unlikely	to	be	applied	to	pay	claims	in	nationalised	
companies	or	the	trade	unions	–	‘Will	the	TUC	be	made	to	answer	for	allowing	huge	code-busting	
increases	for	its	officers?	Not	on	your	life!’.66	The	suggestion	that	the	government	was	using	its	own	
pay	codes,	without	the	backing	of	democratic	legislation,	to	further	its	relationship	with	its	allies	but	
to	the	detriment	of	successful	private	companies,	directly	undermined	its	social	democratic	values.	
	
	
	
Figure	6.7:	‘Surrender!’,	Sun,	10	October	1978,	p.	1.	
	
However,	despite	other	articles	by	the	Sun	that	alleged	that	the	strike	at	Ford	had	‘demolished’	
impressions	of	a	special	relationship	between	government	and	unions,	this	was	part	of	a	wider	trend	
of	clashes	surrounding	the	government’s	pay	policy	(Figure	6.7).	67		Coverage	illustrated	a	continued	
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discomfort	about	the	government’s	soft	attitude	towards	unions,	in	its	failure	to	punish	unions	for	
the	contravention	of	the	pay	policy.	The	case	at	Ford	was	likened	to	a	mugging	and	it	was	clear	who	
the	‘mugger’	was	in	this	analogy	–	the	unpunished	unions.	This	discomfort	also	tied	to	widespread	
frustration	with	the	government’s	expectation	that	profitable	companies	should	endure	strikes	to	
suit	the	government’s	political	agenda.	Anxiety	of	this	kind	had	also	been	apparent	at	Leyland,	
where	it	had	been	suggested	that	the	government’s	involvement	had	nullified	the	deterrence	
against	trade	union	action,	with	the	company	virtually	assured	of	survival.	Both	cases	helped	to	
contribute	to	a	perception	that	the	government’s	intervention	let	unions	get	off	scot-free,	whilst	the	
taxpayer	and	profitable	companies	shared	the	burden.	This	scrutiny	of	government	policy	fed	into	
the	press’s	own	business	matters,	with	many	newspapers	dealing	with	varying	degrees	of	industrial	
strife,	either	with	printers	or	the	National	Union	of	Journalists	(NUJ).	After	the	Sun	had	been	forced	
into	a	short-term	closure	due	to	a	dispute	with	the	NUJ,	it	lamented	that	the	paper’s	‘room	for	
manoeuvre	was	severely	limited	by	the	provisions	of	the	Government	Pay	Policy’,	and	declined	to	
place	emphasis	on	the	nature	of	the	dispute	with	the	NUJ	or	the	wider	motives	for	the	strike.68		
	
In	this	context,	the	response	of	the	Mirror	to	Ford’s	actions	was	predictable,	as	it	attempted	to	
bolster	the	position	of	the	government,	despite	some	reservations	about	the	sustainability	of	the	
pay	policy’s	rigidity.	Rather	than	this	being	a	matter	of	workers	against	the	government,	the	Mirror	
concluded	that	Ford	had	chosen	to	‘put	their	interests	before	the	country’s’	and	had	‘left	the	
Cabinet	little	choice	but	to	invoke	sanctions	against	them’	because	‘to	continue	to	buy	the	
company’s	cars	as	though	nothing	had	happened	–	will	look	like	complete	surrender’.69	The	
Guardian	framed	the	settlement	in	very	similar	terms	as	it	declared	that	what	was	in	Ford’s	interest	
‘was	not	necessarily	good	for	Britain’,	and	warned	readers	of	a	‘national	mood	of	complacency	
about	inflation’,	striving	to	convince	them	that	the	social	contract	was	still	Britain’s	‘best	hope’.70	
The	kind	of	deal	at	Ford	underlined	the	‘paradox	of	free	collective	bargaining’	which	took	‘no	notice	
of	the	wider	national	interest’	and	was	‘underlined	by	the	decision	of	the	transport	workers’	
executive	council	to	vote	£150,000	to	the	election	funds	of	a	Government	and	simultaneously	arm	
up	to	torpedo	the	principal	policy	–	control	of	inflation	–	on	which	that	Government	seeks	re-
election.’71	The	implication	of	the	Guardian’s	line	of	argument	was	that	the	relationship	between	the	
TUC	and	a	Labour	government	would	always	be	under	strain	unless	the	labour	movement	showed	
greater	respect	for	the	government’s	attempts	to	control	inflation.	In	contrast,	the	Guardian	had	
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initially	suggested	that	the	Heath	government	should	be	‘less	obsessed	with	inflation’	so	it	could	‘at	
last	go	for	economic	growth	and	with	it	expansion	of	the	social	services’,	indicative	of	the	way	the	
press’s	attitudes	to	inflation	and	wage	bargaining	were	shaped	by	their	support	for	the	incumbent	
government.	72	
	
Social	tension	and	the	fissiparous	society	
With	increasingly	attitudes	towards	the	prevalence	of	unemployment	and	most	outlets	focussed	on	
the	impact	of	wage	increases	on	inflation,	heightened	social	tension	was	a	prominent	theme	to	
media	coverage,	albeit	not	always	along	traditional	fault	lines.	As	Claydon	has	explored,	the	
preoccupation	with	political	motivations	inside	the	trade	union	movement	did	not	change.	In	many	
ways	they	intensified,	particularly	with	the	personalised	coverage	of	militant	shop	stewards	such	as	
British	Leyland’s	Derek	Robinson,	known	in	media	circles	as	‘Red	Robbo’.	Coverage	of	events	at	
Leyland,	including	unofficial	protests	against	the	dismissal	of	‘Red	Robbo’,	showed	how	the	
‘narrative	of	political	extremism	and	irresponsible	militancy	among	shop	stewards’	continued	into	
the	1970s,	despite	frequently	incoherent	argument.73	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	personalisation	of	
trade	union	coverage	was	reshaped	around	the	‘militants’	on	the	shop	floor,	rather	than	the	likes	of	
Frank	Cousins	and	prominent	union	leaders,	as	had	been	the	case	in	the	1950s.	However,	while	this	
continuity	of	political	divisions	was	important	for	understandings	of	power	inside	the	trade	union	
movement,	broader	social	fracturing,	which	had	an	impact	on	notions	of	class	and	collectivism	
became	more	significant.	
	
Traditional	class	division,	contrary	to	earlier	predictions,	remained	a	prominent	issue	in	industrial	
relations	coverage.	The	Mail,	in	keeping	with	its	traditional	allegiances,	was	concerned	with	the	
situation	of	the	middle	classes.	It	felt	the	middle	classes’	‘only	reward	for	accepting	responsibility	is	
an	ulcer	and	an	increased	tax	demand’,	and	queried	why	they	should	‘back	British	industry	when	
their	money	could	be	more	profitably	spent	on	an	antique	snuff	box’.74	In	demanding	action	from	
the	government	against	the	TUC,	the	Mail	insisted	that	‘no	anti-inflation	strategy	will	work	unless	
most	of	us	–	not	just	the	middle	classes	–	are	prepared	to	take	a	real	drop	in	living	standards’,	which	
alluded	to	the	belief	that	the	middle	classes	had	experienced	greater	sacrifices	than	the	unionised	
working	classes.	This	sentiment	of	middle	class	injustice	fed	into	the	broader	narrative	about	the	
negative	impact	of	industrial	strife	on	patterns	of	consumption.		
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In	response	to	such	narratives,	the	Guardian	warned	against	the	perceived	tendency	of	government	
to	‘bash	unions’	in	its	attempts	to	counter	inflation.75	It	became	concerned	that	a	‘new	sense	of	
social	or	national	purpose’	was	significant,	in	order	to	avert	‘class	war’.	76	Alistair	Hetherington	
recalled	that	John	Cole	had	‘objected	to	the	implication	that	we	were	simply	trying	to	pick	the	most	
reliable	team	of	economic	managers’	because	‘the	social	purposes	and	power	base	of	each	party	
were	as	important’,	as	far	as	he	was	concerned.77	The	fact	Cole	felt	the	need	to	challenge	such	
assumptions	in	political	decision	making	reflected	the	dominance	of	economic	policy,	and	the	
preoccupation	with	inflation,	over	social	policy,	which	linked	to	the	increasing	acceptance	of	
unemployment	as	a	necessary	evil	of	economic	recovery.	His	columns	reflected	concern	that	Britain	
was	succumbing	to	‘a	mood	which	rejects	a	national	solution	to	anything	and	places	greater	
emphasis	on	personal	economic	salvation’.78	The	Mirror	warned	of	the	possible	impact	of	a	‘poverty	
boom’,	as	the	gap	‘between	the	“haves”	and	“have	nots”’	began	to	increase.	79	It	is	clear	then	that	
class	issues	were	very	much	on	the	public	agenda	as	increases	in	living	standards	began	to	decline.	
	
However,	while	the	persistence	of	traditional	class	tensions	should	not	be	ignored,	pressures	on	
Britain’s	affluence	and	economic	prosperity	caused	much	more	complex	divisions	which	concepts	of	
‘class’	or	divisions	on	party	political	grounds	did	not	address,	particularly	with	regards	to	working	
class	identity.	Social	division	in	this	period	with	all	its	nuances,	including	cases	of	unconventional	
solidarity	or	cohesion,	was	conceptualised	by	the	Guardian	as	the	‘fissiparous	society’:	‘as	class	
divisions	crumble	–	more	slowly	in	Britain	than	anywhere	else	in	Europe	–	new	divisions	open	up	to	
take	their	place.	There	may	have	been	two	nations	in	Disraeli’s	day.	There	are	more	than	two	now.’80	
This	fracturing	process,	beyond	the	breakdown	of	the	‘class-party	nexus’,	placed	new	pressures	on	
the	position	of	unions,	as	media	coverage	further	isolated	them	from	their	conventional	allies,	which	
formed	part	of	a	wider	trend	of	detachment	from	conceptions	of	the	public	or	the	nation.		
	
While	the	Mail	sought	to	highlight	the	negative	experiences	of	the	middle	classes	as	a	result	of	
industrial	insecurity,	this	was	not	the	whole	story.	Although	Tomlinson	has	highlighted	the	
‘apocalyptic’	tone	to	public	discussion	of	the	economic	situation	and	the	advocacy	of	‘extreme’	
solutions,	he	noted	that	the	‘chattering	classes	in	the	mid-1970s	embraced	with	great	enthusiasm	
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the	notion	of	Britain’s	decline’.	81	This	is	clear	from	coverage	of	the	Guardian	which	referred	to	
people	enjoying	a	‘camaraderie	of	adversity’	which	was	‘nostalgic	and	fun’.	82	The	‘end	of	the	
hyperrazmataz’	had	prompted	Britain	to	be	more	thoughtful	about	its	use	of	resources.83	According	
to	this	social	commentary,	often	scathing	in	tone,	the	British	middle	class	had	a	‘peculiar	passion	for	
austerity’	and	the	experiences	of	industrial	unrest	had	‘aroused	a	strange	sort	of	masochistic	
delight’,	indicative	of	a	broader	discomfort	with	patterns	of	affluence	and	consumerism.	The	
moralised	language	of	productivity	and	wage	restraint	had	also	permeated	attitudes	towards	
consumerism	and	affluence,	indicative	of	the	irregularity	to	public	attitudes.	Of	course,	this	did	not	
necessitate	open	approval	for	the	miners’	strike	but	indicated	a	certain	degree	of	tolerance,	clear	
from	opinion	polls,	which	perhaps	would	not	have	been	clear	from	the	likes	of	the	Mail’s	claims	of	
middle	class	injustice.		
	
As	Lawrence	Black	has	suggested,	and	this	evidence	on	middle	class	attitudes	supports,	the	1970s	
need	to	be	‘understood	as	more	than	just	a	shift	to	a	more	individualistic	market	society’	because,	
while	the	economic	context	was	significant,	‘it	did	not	determine	its	politics	or	culture’.84	However,	it	
is	important	to	understand	why	this	period	has	often	been	understood	in	such	terms	and	the	
coverage	of	industrial	relations	provides	some	indication	of	the	strains	placed	on	notions	of	
collectivism	and	working	class	solidarity.	The	Guardian	theorised	that	it	was	‘fun’	for	affluent	middle	
class	Britain	to	endure	the	pressures	of	a	three-day	week	when	they	were	guaranteed	a	five-day	
income.85	Although	there	was	enjoyment	in	the	conditions	of	austerity,	this	was	partly	as	a	result	of	
its	impermanence	and	insulation	from	genuine	poverty.	When	it	came	to	the	lower	paid,	
relationships	with	striking	workers	and	attitudes	towards	events	such	as	the	three-day	week	were	
much	more	problematic.	According	to	media	commentary,	some	of	these	fault	lines	emerged,	or	
threatened	to	emerge,	between	the	strongly	unionised	and	the	lower	paid,	between	public	sector	
workers	and	those	working	for	private	companies,	and,	in	the	context	of	supposed	economic	
decline,	between	the	employed	and	unemployed.	Such	tensions	were	narrated	and	analysed	in	
contrasting	ways	by	the	media,	as	they	attempted	to	shape	public	opinion.	
	
The	contrasting	media	responses	between	the	cases	of	industrial	unrest	at	Ford	and	those	at	British	
Leyland,	already	analysed,	generated	tensions	in	the	perceptions	of	what	public	workers	should	
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expect,	in	contrast	to	their	private	company	counterparts.	The	government	appeared	to	find	it	
increasingly	difficult	to	manage	the	expectations	and	settlements	in	industries	outside	the	public	
sector	and	newly	nationalised	companies.	On	the	one	hand,	the	likes	of	the	Guardian	argued	that	a	
major	motivation	for	the	miners’	strike	had	been	the	bitterness	amongst	public	sector	workers	
created	by	watching	car	workers	in	private	companies	‘racing	ahead	of	them’.	86	The	Times	conceded	
that	industrial	workers	in	public	service	who	had	‘fared	comparatively	badly’	would	feel	‘particularly	
sardonic	about	the	consequences	of	Mr	Henry	Ford’s	personal	odyssey	of	criticizing	Britain’	and	the	
settlement	at	Ford	would	intensify	public	service	suspicion	that	‘private	industry	can	always	in	the	
end	opt	out	of	the	Government	pay	policy	by	exhortation’.87	These	kinds	of	perceptions	were	not	
without	merit	as	low-paid	public	sector	workers	were	the	most	squeezed	section	of	the	working	
classes	during	the	1970s,	as	inflation	had	an	impact	on	both	wages	and	welfare.88	Such	bitterness	
may	well	have	been	intensified	by	the	kind	of	agendas	advanced	by	the	Mail	which,	in	its	criticism	of	
public	sector	spending,	argued	that	the	government	had	to	‘hold	down	pay	awards	in	the	public	
sector,	where	it	is	effectively	the	paymaster’,	while	it	adopted	a	much	more	relaxed	attitude	to	wage	
rises	in	productive	private	companies.	89	
	
Union	representation	and	concepts	of	morality	
The	moralised	language	which	had	been	used	to	great	effect	for	the	miners’	cause,	was	also	used	to	
address	the	supposedly	damaging	influence	large	unions	were	having	on	the	fortunes	of	
underrepresented	groups	of	workers,	which	also	undermined	notions	of	working	class	solidarity.	
Despite	the	strength	of	public	opinion	in	the	miners’	favour,	which	ultimately	helped	their	battle	
against	the	Heath	government,	there	was	anxiety	that,	particularly	in	the	case	of	the	1973-74	strike,	
the	miners	were	excessively	demanding	in	their	claims.	The	Sun,	self-professed	allies	of	the	miners,	
questioned	Britain’s	‘equality	of	sacrifice’	when	an	overtime	ban	meant	the	basic	pay	packet	of	
miners	lay	‘untouched’	despite	the	fact	they	were	the	people	who	‘brought	Britain	face-to-face	with	
doom’.	90	Although	Goodman	used	his	column	in	the	Mirror	to	insist	that	several	recent	claimants	
had	done	‘rather	better	than	the	miners’	and	the	largest	increases	would	apply	to	a	small	minority,	
there	was	a	common	suggestion	that	the	NUM	might	disregard	the	implications	of	their	action.91	
Criticisms	of	sectional	interests	were	not	reserved	purely	for	the	NUM	but	were	applied	to	the	more	
powerful	unions	in	general.	In	its	attacks	on	hospital	strikes	in	March	1973,	the	Mail	said	weaker	
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unions	that	hospital	workers	belonged	to	could	not	‘win	anything	worthwhile	by	continuing	to	
strike’,	despite	the	fact	‘many	hospital	workers	are	not	being	paid	a	living	wage’,	because	‘strong	
unions’,	citing	miners	and	car	workers,	who	‘usually	pave	the	runway	for	inflation	to	take	off	are	
running	a	slow	bicycle	race’.92	This	reflected	the	fact	that	criticism	of	the	sectional	interests	of	strong	
unions	was	not	just	reserved	for	the	peak	of	national	wage	claims,	at	a	time	when	the	Mail	
supported	Heath’s	interventionist	policies,	but	was	a	criticism	of	the	power	of	unions	to	dictate	the	
wage	market	at	all	times.	The	Guardian	was	critical	that	the	TUC	had	failed	to	reflect	the	
movement’s	‘social	conscience’,	as	‘undiluted	competitiveness’	had	jeopardised	the	futures	of	the	
lower	paid	and	elderly	which	the	unions	had	‘traditionally	stood	to	defend’.	93	This	kind	of	account	
used	moralised	language	of	union	solidarity	and	tradition	in	criticism	of	the	unions,	despite	common	
complaint	that	the	unions	had	failed	to	adapt	to	modern	industrial	conditions.	The	Mirror	also	took	a	
moral	approach	to	arguing	against	free	collective	bargaining,	concerned	that	the	lower	paid	had	
become	‘worse	off	compared	to	highly	paid	workers’,	who	‘like	the	upper	classes,	have	gained	and	
held	advantages	through	better	education,	better	housing	and	better	social	conditions’.	94	This	kind	
of	framing	played	on	conventional	class	animosities	to	emphasise	the	disparity	between	union	
members	and	the	division	of	interests	inside	the	labour	movement.	Such	perceptions	of	power	and	
influence	of	large	unions	in	determining	the	economic	prospects	of	its	members	may	go	some	way	
to	explaining	that,	despite	negative	media	coverage,	trade	union	membership	continued	to	rise	until	
the	turn	of	the	decade.	
	
Rather	than	purely	an	issue	of	‘differentials’	and	‘equalities	of	sacrifice’,	increased	unemployment	
meant	that	the	impact	of	wage	disputes	on	companies	could	be	placed	in	much	starker	terms,	as	
Callaghan	did	in	pursuit	of	buttressing	his	wage	policy	–	a	point	not	lost	on	the	Mirror.	During	a	
period	of	intense	scrutiny	on	events	at	British	Leyland,	the	Mirror	encouraged	worker	co-operation	
by	repeating	Callaghan’s	implicit	threat	that	‘the	real	differential	now	has	become	the	difference	
between	having	a	job	–	and	being	in	the	unemployed	queue’.	95	A	return	to	‘straightforward	jungle	
warfare’,	the	Mirror’s	chosen	framing	of	free	collective	wage	bargaining,	would	not	only	lead	to	a	
wider	gap	in	wage	differentials	but	would	prompt	the	creation	of	a	‘third	group’	which	would	get	
‘nowt	but	employment	pay’.96	There	was	an	important	implication,	indicative	of	the	negative	
portrayals	of	Britain’s	economic	future,	that	other	strong	striking	unions	should	be	grateful	for	the	
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work	they	received,	with	a	lack	of	guarantees	about	the	future	of	those	jobs,	particularly	in	the	
miners’	case.	Just	had	been	the	case	in	the	1950s,	under	the	influence	of	Walter	Reuther,	the	press	
continued	to	insist	that	unions	should	change	their	priorities	during	negotiations,	‘to	put	greater	
emphasis	on	claims	for	more	leisure	(longer	holidays	and	shorter	working	time);	for	better	fringe	
benefits	such	as	pensions,	and	welfare	schemes’,	and	insisted	that	this	was	not	‘pie-in-the-sky	
stuff’.97	However,	with	inflation	so	high	on	the	media	agenda	and	people	concerned,	above	all,	
about	the	cost	of	living,	the	encouragement	of	this	kind	of	reorientation,	which	had	been	argued	
during	Britain’s	period	of	affluence,	became	even	more	difficult.	
	
Media	Moderation	
It	is	clear	that	left	wing	press	appeals	for	moderation	from	unions,	the	NUM	and	more	widely,	had	a	
political	agenda	behind	it.	Geoffrey	Goodman	warned	that	the	miners	were	at	risk	of	‘overplaying	
their	hand’	by	sending	the	government	to	the	polls	‘with	the	probable	result	of	a	substantial	Tory	
victory’	and	a	‘much	more	entrenched	Conservative	government	in	power’.98	Nevertheless,	there	
were	concerns	that	the	miners’	strikes	went	beyond	‘political	point-scoring’,	as	the	paper	urged	the	
miners	to	make	a	deal	with	the	government	which	would	‘show	that	the	miners	are	not	indifferent	
to	the	fact	that	nearly	a	million	of	their	fellow	workers	are	out	of	a	job’.99	Two	days	later,	they	were	
urged	to	‘Grasp	the	Olive	Branch’,	as	the	newspaper	commended	Heath’s	willingness	to	meet	with	
the	TUC	and	ask	for	‘precise	guarantees’.100	In	a	similar	vein,	the	Guardian’s	concerns	about	the	
plight	of	the	lower	paid	was	frequently	used	to	buttress	their	case	for	supporting	the	government’s	
wage	policy.	Rather	than	being	purely	for	anti-inflationary	purposes,	much	was	made	of	the	security	
it	could	offer	weaker	unions	and	less	organised	groups.	Moreover,	while	the	wage	policy	was	the	
responsibility	of	government,	this	kind	of	mediation	by	the	Labour-supporting	press	offered	the	
opportunity	to	reallocate	or	at	least	share	responsibility	for	the	maintenance	of	the	wage	policy	with	
the	unions	by	increasing	scrutiny	on	their	willingness	to	accept	the	government’s	terms.	In	a	similar	
way,	the	Mail	had	initially	supported	a	wage	freeze	during	Heath’s	period	of	economic	intervention,	
having	argued	that	it	was	necessary	so	that	‘the	people	at	the	back	of	the	queue	can	get	a	look-in’,	
insistent	that	a	compulsory	freeze	would	be	met	with	gratitude	that	‘somebody	is	doing	something	
at	last’.101	Concern	for	vulnerable	elements	of	the	working	class	was	much	less	prevalent	when	the	
Conservatives	offered	opposition	to	Labour’s	wage	freeze.	While	coverage	of	working	class	
																																																						
97	Daily	Mirror,	31	January	1973,	p.	19.	
98	Daily	Mirror,	4	January	1974,	p.	7.	
99	Daily	Mirror,	9	January	1974,	p.	2.		
100	Daily	Mirror,	11	January	1974,	p.	2.		
101	Daily	Mail,	4	November	1972,	p.	6.	
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relationships	offered	an	important	insight	into	social	anxieties,	contextual	evidence	suggests	that	
attempts	at	mediation	of	these	tensions	by	the	press	were	not	solely	noble	in	intent.	
	
Paul	Hartmann’s	1979	study	concluded	that	the	influence	of	the	press	had	made	it	‘more	difficult	for	
members	of	the	working	class	to	become	aware	of	their	common	interests	and	conscious	of	the	
importance	of	class	relations	within	their	society’.102	Archival	evidence	suggests	that	the	impact	of	
industrial	relations	coverage	on	societal	and	class	cohesion	caused	anxiety	amongst	those	in	the	
TUC.	In	1977	Len	Murray	attempted	to	address	the	‘many	examples	of	blatantly	bad	reporting’	
which	portrayed	industrial	issues	as	‘primarily	responsible’	for	Britain’s	economic	plight	and	poor	
reputation	abroad.	More	significantly,	Murray	highlighted	the	limited	media	understanding	of	the	
problems	facing	unions	in	times	of	‘great	technological	change	and	economic	stress’,	where	inflation	
and	unemployment	threatened	the	‘ordinary	families’	that	the	labour	movement	sought	to	
represent,	while	‘any	suggestion	that	something	over	the	odds	may	be	sought	by	unions	is	
immediately	highlighted’	by	the	media,	as	he	reserved	particularly	criticism	for	the	press.103	It	seems	
unlikely	that	the	decision	to	speak	publicly	about	these	issues	was	simply	a	symptom	of	the	TUC’s	
well-documented	failure	to	respond	to	media	pressure	on	trade	unionism’s	reputation.	Although	
this	focus	on	industrial	unrest	and	provocative	wage	claims	was	not	a	new	trend,	as	this	research	has	
already	attested,	it	is	evident	that	these	patterns	were	of	particular	concern	to	the	trade	union	
movement	at	a	time	of	national	anxiety	about	the	inflationary	impact	of	wage	claims	and	the	cost	of	
living.	Such	a	statement	reflected	the	intense	difficulty	of	the	TUC	to	convince	the	public	of	its	desire	
and	ability	to	defend	the	general	interests	of	working	people,	as	a	collective	group,	rather	than	the	
sectional	demands	of	strong	and	militant	unions.	Comprehensive	media	scrutiny	of	industrial	unrest	
was	a	major	hurdle	in	this	aim.	
	
Overall,	the	overlap	of	this	research's	central	threads,	politics	and	economics,	reflects	the	centrality	
of	industrial	relations	in	British	media	culture	at	this	time,	as	well	as	the	increasing	role	of	the	state	
in	industry.	The	intervention	of	the	government	in	industrial	relations	was	increasingly	unwelcome,	
building	on	scepticism	about	productivity	initiatives	from	the	1960s.	Not	only	did	the	government’s	
approach	to	industrial	relations	inflame	tensions	between	unions	and	government	in	the	settling	of	
wage	policies,	but,	arguably	more	significantly,	government	intervention	in	companies,	public	and	
private,	was	seen	to	be	counterproductive	to	industrial	peace	on	the	shop	floor,	as	well	as	the	
																																																						
102	Paul	Hartmann,	‘News	and	Public	Perceptions	of	Industrial	Relations’,	Media	Culture	and	Society	1,	(1979),	
p.	270.	
103	Len	Murray,	Introductory	Statement	to	the	TUC	‘Trade	Unions	and	the	Media’	Conference,	February	17	
1977;	TUC	Archive,	Modern	Records	Centre,	University	of	Warwick	(MSS.292D/286/3]	
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competitiveness	of	British	industry.	The	right	wing	press	was	consistently	and	persuasively	able	to	
portray	the	political	interests	of	the	Labour	government	as	antithetical	to	those	of	the	British	
taxpayer	and	raised	questions	about	the	willingness	of	the	government	to	reward	genuine	success	in	
industry.	Nationalisation	had	undermined	confidence	in	British	management	of	industry,	despite	
continued	faith	by	some	newspapers	that	the	product	line	was	adequate.	This	perception	of	
industrial	mismanagement	was	particularly	problematic	due	to	the	continued	perceptions	of	the	
‘British	disease’	and	the	complex	relationship	between	Labour	and	the	TUC.	
	
As	far	as	the	portrayal	of	unions	was	concerned,	they	continued	to	be	directly	implicated	in	Britain's	
rising	inflation	and	its	failing	industry,	as	myths	about	their	peculiar	willingness	to	strike	continued	to	
shape	media	narratives.	Influential	elements	of	the	media	continued	to	be	frustrated	by	the	
sectional	interests	of	individual	unions,	despite	the	country’s	economic	plight,	and	their	perceived	
lack	of	'social	conscience’.	There	was	increasing	concern	that	government	involvement	at	both	
Leyland	and	Ford	had	let	unions	off	the	hook,	as	they	were	seen	to	make	the	most	of	the	Labour	
government's	electoral	instability	and	its	complex	ties	with	the	TUC.	Soaring	inflation	encouraged	
widespread	acceptance	of	some	degree	of	unemployment,	in	a	crucial	change	in	economic	outlook,	
which	had	further	negative	implications	for	the	labour	force	and	expectations	of	the	union	
movement	to	defend	its	members’	interests.	Where	the	labour	force	did	find	support	from	media	
outlets,	this	was	largely	inconsistent,	and	was	often	implemented	in	order	to	pursue	or	undermine	a	
certain	political	agenda.	
	
As	far	as	the	media	was	concerned,	the	nature	of	newspaper	debate	reflected	the	emerging	
influence	of	the	Sun	as	it	sought	to	reshape	language	around	the	priorities	of	its	growing	working	
class	readership,	and	provide	the	foundations	for	Margaret	Thatcher’s	political	success.	The	tabloid	
Mail	found	a	stronger	voice,	indicated	in	its	cautionary	references	to	Weimar	Germany	and	union	
conspiracies	at	Leyland,	albeit	in	a	very	different	way	to	the	Sun.	The	lukewarm	reception	for	
government	intervention	in	industry	from	the	Mirror	and	the	Guardian	illustrated	the	degree	of	
uncertainty	about	Labour’s	response	to	perceived	decline	amongst	its	supporters.	The	Mirror,	
implicated	in	Labour’s	decreasing	popularity,	found	it	increasingly	difficult	to	appeal	to	the	concerns	
of	its	established	readership,	as	conventional	social	conflicts	evolved	and	the	influence	of	industrial	
correspondents,	like	Goodman,	waned.		
	
Whilst	political	militancy	continued	to	be	a	popular	theme	of	press	coverage	of	trade	unionism,	this	
period	was	more	notable	for	the	fractures	that	threatened	to	appear	along	new	fault	lines,	beyond	
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traditional	concepts	of	class,	and	ultimately	undercut	notions	of	solidarity	and	social	conscience	
amongst	the	labour	force.	The	preponderance	of	unemployment	opened	up	possible	divisions	
between	the	employed	and	unemployed,	the	growing	militancy	and	bargaining	power	of	the	major	
unions	provided	questions	about	the	status	of	weaker	organized	groups,	and	the	inconsistencies	of	
political	intervention	frustrated	public	sector	workers,	as	their	private	company	counterparts	
enjoyed	wage	increases.	The	fractured	portrayal	of	the	working	class	in	coverage	of	trade	union	
affairs	not	only	dislocated	trade	unionists	from	their	traditional	roots,	which	allowed	them	to	be	
more	easily	singled	out	by	the	media,	but	also	fed	into	patterns	of	cultural	consumerism,	placing	
emphasis	on	the	working	class	individual.	Such	coverage	helped	to	support	the	strategy	of	the	Sun,	
now	so	influential	in	the	press	arena,	as	the	‘populist	champion	of	down-to-earth	pleasure-seekers,	
as	opposed	to	the	humourless	intellectuals,	do-gooders	and	officials	who	sought	to	intervene	in	and	
disrupt	the	lives	of	ordinary	working-class	readers’.104	
																																																						
104	Bingham	and	Conboy,	Tabloid	Century,	p.	188.	
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Conclusions		
	
Reflecting	on	Labour’s	1979	election	defeat,	in	conversation	with	Mirror	journalist	Geoffrey	
Goodman,	Len	Murray,	former	General	Secretary	of	the	TUC,	termed	the	events	of	1979	as	a	
‘fragmentation	of	trade	unionism’	that	forced	him	to	‘question	[his]	assumptions	and	all	the	things	
[he]	had	always	worked	for’.1	Murray’s	description	of	fragmentation	reflected	a	gradual	and	
contingent	process,	which	applied	not	only	to	trade	unionism’s	relationship	with	the	Parliamentary	
Labour	Party	but	the	ultimate	disintegration	of	consensus	in	British	politics.	The	decline	in	public	
support	for	trade	unions	was	intensified	by	the	mediation	of	press	and	latterly	television,	as	patterns	
of	partisanship	and	tabloidization	played	an	influential	role.	From	the	mid-1970s,	the	new	tabloid	
culture	shifted	decisively	against	them.	
	
Three	key	factors	combined	to	generate	this	change	in	trade	unionism’s	status.	Firstly,	the	fragility	
and	decline	of	the	left-wing	media,	as	well	as	a	lack	of	strategy	from	the	TUC,	left	the	labour	
movement	without	a	voice	in	the	mainstream	media.	This	was	particularly	problematic	as	the	Labour	
Party	wrestled	with	the	tensions	between	representing	its	party	and	the	nation.	Secondly,	broader	
social	change	damaged	the	basic	collectivist	assumptions	that	trade	unionism	was	built	upon,	as	
society	became	more	individualistic	and	consumer-orientated.		Thirdly,	the	resurgence	of	the	right-
wing	media,	led	by	the	Sun	and	the	tabloid	Mail,	was	important	in	undermining	trade	unionism’s	
position.	The	success	of	its	rhetoric	was	demonstrated	in	its	ability	to	permeate	supposedly	neutral	
news	providers	such	as	the	BBC.	
	
A	significant	element	of	union	demise	was	the	disintegration	of	the	left-wing	media’s	response	to	
the	political	pressure	on	the	unions.	This	was	indicated	initially	by	the	Herald’s	slump	in	sales	and	
eventual	closure,	and	subsequently	the	Mirror’s	declining	power	and	appetite	for	trade	union	issues.	
The	Mirror	struggled	to	deal	with	the	popular	impact	of	the	Sun	in	redefining	industrial	relations	
coverage.	This	degradation	of	left-wing	media	authority	made	the	TUC’s	prospects	of	challenging	
prevalent	themes	and	frames	of	coverage	difficult,	even	if	they	had	been	able	to	provide	a	more	
convincing	response	to	the	changing	media	landscape.	The	archival	evidence	has	suggested	that	the	
charge	of	‘fatalism’	on	the	part	of	the	unions	is	an	unfair	one,	given	the	continued	discussions	about	
publicity	both	inside	the	TUC	and	with	media	representatives.	In	1974,	the	miners’	strategy	was	
directly	influenced	by	the	impact	negative	coverage	could	have	on	the	strike’s	success	and	Labour’s	
election	campaign.		
																																																						
1	Goodman,	Bevan	to	Blair,	p.	219-220.	
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However,	it	is	clear	why	such	negative	impressions	of	trade	unionism’s	approach	to	publicity	have	
been	so	widespread.	Where	the	TUC	attempted	to	improve	its	image,	deeply	held	scepticism	about	
the	motives	of	the	press	undermined	its	actions.	Both	the	TUC,	in	its	discussions	with	the	BBC	over	
educative	programmes,	and	the	Herald,	in	its	commitment	to	‘serious’	news,	demonstrated	a	lack	of	
understanding	about	popular	tastes.	The	perceived	public	demand	for	‘emergency	coverage’	and	
simplified	narration	masked	the	complexities	of	the	trade	unions’	role	in	British	industry	and	the	
movement	struggled	to	respond	directly.	The	decision	to	research	and	report	on,	rather	than	
intervene	in,	the	Winter	of	Discontent	coverage	epitomises	the	TUC’s	approach.	
	
Wider	media	trends	undermined	the	core	relationships	and	accepted	attitudes,	referenced	by	
Murray,	which	trade	unionism’s	positive	status	had	been	built	upon.	As	time	went	on,	concepts	of	a	
cohesive	British	public	identity	became	problematic	and	the	media	often	cast	trade	unionists	outside	
or	against	such	interests.	As	the	realities	of	Britain’s	changing	place	in	the	world	economy	became	
apparent,	accounts	of	rivalry	with	old	enemies	became	less	compelling	and	the	appeal	of	nostalgia	
faded.	Instead,	this	rhetoric	was	orientated	around	the	relationship	between	unions	and	the	
national	interest.	As	far	as	international	competitors	were	concerned,	they	now	came	to	be	
understood	as	the	potential	saviours	of	British	manufacturing.	Moreover,	the	media’s	binary	
distinction	between	moderates	and	militants,	established	in	the	1950s	Cold	War	context,	changed	
balance	across	the	period,	so	as	to	define	increasing	numbers	as	extremists	and	underplay	the	role	
of	moderating	influences.	This	was	part	of	the	media’s	growing	discomfort	with	the	disintegration	
and	destruction	of	the	boundaries	between	the	industrial	and	political:	a	pattern	that	was	firmly	
established	by	the	late	1960s.	The	media	frequently	attempted	to	reconstruct,	conjure	or	recall	this	
out-dated	demarcation	as	a	means	of	delegitimising	politicised	industrial	action.	The	process	of	
politicisation	in	the	industrial	sphere	was	almost	exclusively	portrayed	as	desirable	for	fulfilling	
unions’	aims	and	thus	instigated	solely	by	union	representatives,	despite	direct	involvement	in	
industrial	matters	from	the	likes	of	Wilson,	Heath	and	Castle.	Significantly,	this	gradually	permeated	
the	way	left-wing	newspapers	also	understood	trade	unions’	political	role.	While	the	Mirror	had	
been	keen	to	embrace	trade	unionism’s	politicisation	under	a	Conservative	government	in	the	
1950s,	this	soon	changed.	Its	influential	coverage	of	the	1960s	and	early	1970s	often	only	intensified	
perceptions	of	the	union’s	political	threat,	as	it	sought	to	bolster	the	position	of	the	government.	
The	Guardian	was	more	discerning	in	its	position	on	Labour	policy,	as	a	primary	critic	of	Labour’s	
attempts	to	ground	wages,	but	it	too	became	critical	of	the	political	motives	of	trade	unionism.		
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Notions	of	working-class	collectivism	and	solidarity,	initially	used	by	the	media	to	exert	pressure	on	
the	principles	of	trade	unionism,	became	increasingly	difficult	for	organised	labour	to	negotiate,	as	
their	appeal	declined.	Sections	of	the	centre-left	sought	to	distance	themselves	from	traditional	class	
identities	in	order	to	broaden	their	appeal,	or	represent	a	‘national	interest’,	and	respond	to	
changing	perceptions	of	what	it	meant	to	be	‘working	class’.	Simultaneously,	the	Labour	
government,	which	was	often	called	on	to	intervene	in	industrial	planning	and	wage	management,	
was	increasingly	seen	as	an	ineffective	or	interfering	force	in	industrial	issues.	The	complex	
relationship	between	nationalisation	and	industrial	action,	which	stemmed	from	cynicism	towards	
the	Attlee	government’s	nationalisation	programme,	through	to	the	extensive	financial	
commitments	to	British	Leyland,	gradually	undermined	media	support	for	Labour’s	attempts	to	
support	Britain’s	key	industries.	The	Leyland	case	allowed	the	media	to	suggest	that	the	union’s	
involvement	in	the	company	was	exploitative,	whilst	also	arguing	that	Labour’s	investment	was	
motivated	by	the	party’s	electoral	interests,	rather	than	those	of	the	nation.	These	two	forces	
combined	to	cloud	Labour’s	identity	and	hinder	its	attempts	to	provide	unifying	answers	to	Britain’s	
industrial	problems.	
	
The	Sun	was	particularly	successful	in	responding	to,	and	stimulating,	this	change	in	cultural	
attitudes,	as	it	sought	to	provide	messages	to	transcend	conventional	class	boundaries.	Its	influence	
was	initially	established	by	its	broader	entertainment	provision	but	it	gradually	gained	a	footing	in	
political	discourse.	Under	Larry	Lamb’s	editorship,	it	was	a	primary	driver	in	ensuring	that,	as	the	
left-wing	media’s	messages	fragmented,	the	right-wing	press	converged	on	powerful	patterns	of	
industrial	coverage.	This	primarily	consisted	of	an	intensification	of	established	narratives,	indicative	
of	the	cumulative	impact	of	industrial	relations	coverage,	as	coverage	became	more	uniform	in	style.	
Over	the	course	of	the	period,	reports	of	trade	unionism	were	simplified	and	shortened	to	skim	over	
the	intricacies	of	strikers’	motivations.	Newspapers	published	sensationalised	headlines	that	
highlighted	the	impact	of	industrial	action	on	daily	lives,	typically	through	rising	prices,	diminished	
supplies	or	redundancies.	The	emphasis	on	everyday	life	was	one	of	the	key	ways	in	which	
newspapers	regularly	sought	to	mobilise	public	support	for	its	industrial	agendas	and	purposes,	even	
at	times	of	supposed	apathy	or	indifference.	Likewise,	the	growing	personalisation	of	coverage,	part	
of	the	cult	of	celebrity	which	permeated	wider	entertainment	coverage,	also	affected	industrial	
relations	coverage.	This	tendency	applied	to	coverage	of	both	politicians	and	trade	unionists,	often	
focussing	on	matters	of	personality	and	appearance,	and	placed	responsibility	for	broader	structural	
problems	at	the	feet	of	individuals.	The	power	of	this	coverage	was	ultimately	demonstrated	in	the	
personalised	criticisms	of	James	Callaghan	to	emphasise	a	supposed	crisis	of	authority.	Overall,	
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these	trends	in	tabloid	journalism	helped	editors	and	journalists	to	maintain	public	interest	and	
influence	opinion	but	they	often	masked	the	realities	and	problems	within	British	industry.	
	
The	emergence	of	this	consumer	age	was	not	a	phenomenon	that	news	organisations	simply	
promoted	or	commentated	on.	The	press	had	to	engage	directly	with	these	trends	in	order	to	
survive	in	an	increasingly	competitive	market.	This	meant	newspapers	had	to	make	sure	they	were	
successful	sources	of	entertainment	to	maintain	a	commercial	image	to	appeal	to	popular	tastes	and	
the	demands	of	advertisers.	These	demands	inevitably	contributed	to	issues	of	simplification	and	
personalisation	in	industrial	relations	coverage.	Most	significantly,	the	clamour	for	improved	living	
standards	and	the	increase	in	shop	floor	activity	had	a	direct	impact	on	the	media’s	relationship	with	
press	and	production	unions.	It	is	clear	by	the	late	1970s	that	the	financial	strain	on	media	
organisations	caused	by	industrial	action,	indicated	by	events	at	the	Times	and	the	BBC	and	directly	
referenced	by	Larry	Lamb,	caused	an	important	shift	in	editorial	attitudes.		
	
As	the	media	became	more	forthright	in	its	partisanship,	the	media’s	frames	of	explanation	for	
Britain’s	supposed	decline	gradually	converged	and	contracted	in	their	range	and	variety.	This	was	
particularly	true	amongst	the	press	but	these	convergences	gradually	permeated	television	
coverage,	despite	the	BBC’s	consultation	with	trade	unionists	and	its	commitment	to	neutrality.	By	
the	end	of	the	period,	problems	with	industrial	productivity	and	competitiveness	were	broadly	
explained	as	a	failure	of	the	labour	force	and	the	indiscipline	of	unions,	despite	the	many	other	
shortcomings	of	British	industry.	This	convergence	in	the	frames	of	explanation	simultaneously	
placed	pressure	on	the	union	movement,	whilst	absolving	government	and	employers	from	
responsibility.	
	
This	research	has	provided	a	more	holistic	understanding	of	the	varied	motivations	for	specialised	
and	unbalanced	media	scrutiny	of	British	industry.	The	media’s	preoccupation	with	manufacturing	
industries	was	significant	in	the	proliferation	of	the	decline	narrative	and	reflected	struggles	to	
adjust	to	Britain’s	loss	of	status	in	this	field.	As	Tim	Claydon’s	work	demonstrates,	the	motor	industry	
bore	the	brunt	of	criticism,	disproportionate	to	the	number	of	strikes	experienced.	The	influence	of	
militant	shop	stewards	in	stimulating	strikes	was	a	key	focus	and	provided	an	important	platform	for	
the	media	to	divide	strikers	from	the	public	interest.	Research	by	the	Glasgow	Media	Group	
suggested	that	trade	unionism’s	disruptive	threat	to	Britain’s	emergent	patterns	of	consumption	
was	a	significant	influence	on	levels	of	industrial	scrutiny.	This	research	has	suggested	that,	beyond	
the	cases	in	the	mid-1970s,	the	influence	of	disruption	to	production	and	inconvenience	to	
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consumers	was	so	significant	as	to	prompt	newspapers	to	request	compromise	on	wage	
agreements,	even	at	the	expense	of	government	policy.	Moreover,	as	with	the	balance	of	particular	
industries,	this	research	has	established	the	imbalance	in	television	coverage	also	applied	to	the	
interviews	and	sources	used.	Repeatedly,	media	coverage	focused	on	workers	and	their	
representatives,	or	sometimes	customers	or	patients,	rather	than	employers	and	management.	
Given	the	continued	dialogue	amongst	trade	unionists	about	the	problematic	image	of	trade	
unionists	provided	by	such	coverage,	and	the	continued	lack	of	scrutiny	of	managerial	roles	in	
Britain’s	industrial	demise,	this	was	another	important	influence	in	the	decline	of	the	status	of	the	
trade	unions.	
	
The	increased	partisanship	of	newspapers	was	particularly	important	as	the	dominant	
understandings	of	the	management	of	the	economy	evolved.	The	‘post-materialist’	turn	of	the	
media,	to	encourage	unions	to	turn	their	attention	away	from	simple	wage	increases	and	towards	
greater	rights	and	security	for	workers,	seems	to	have	been	primarily	motivated	by	an	anxiety	about	
the	so-called	wage	‘leap-frog’.	Strikes	and	high	wage	demands	were	predominantly	understood	as	a	
cause	of	inflation,	rather	than	a	response	to	the	rising	living	costs	which	newspapers	regularly	
reported.	As	inflation	became	a	greater	problem	for	the	British	economy	in	the	1970s,	the	British	
media,	symptomatic	of	a	broader	change	to	the	‘policy	paradigm’,	became	more	relaxed	about	the	
prospect	of	so-called	‘temporary	unemployment’	as	a	means	of	stemming	inflation.	This	shift	in	
attitude	placed	significant	pressure	on	the	trade	unions,	as	the	labour	force	became	increasingly	
anxious	about	the	future	of	their	jobs.	This	was	particularly	true	in	manufacturing	industries	after	
early	experiences	of	modernisation	and	automation.		
	
Morality	was	a	common	thread	to	debates	over	wages	and	the	economy,	despite	this	change	in	
emphasis,	and	its	influence	gradually	intensified	over	the	period.	Jim	Tomlinson’s	work	explores	how	
the	government	used	ideas	of	morality	in	order	to	‘manage	the	people’	and	curb	wage	
expectations.2	This	thesis	has	expanded	on	the	themes	of	this	work	to	illustrate	how	these	ideas	
were	utilised	by	the	press,	initially	as	a	means	of	delegitimising	supposedly	excessive	wage	claims.	It	
was	given	new	meaning	by	Labour’s	1960s	productivity	drive,	as	government	rhetoric	had	a	long-
term	impact	on	the	narratives	of	the	media.	By	the	1970s,	the	tabloid	press	infused	morality	with	
greater	emotive	influence,	particularly	during	the	1978-79	strikes	where	coverage	emphasised	the	
threat	to	lives	and	communities.	Gradually,	moral	language	was	employed	to	denounce	industrial	
																																																						
2	Tomlinson,	‘Reinventing	the	“moral	economy”’,	p.	356.	
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action,	regardless	of	the	terms	of	strikers’	demands,	and	its	power	was	indicative	of	the	influence	of	
impact-orientated	coverage.	
	
Morality	was	one	of	a	number	of	themes	that	were	malleable	and	were	regularly	shaped,	often	
incoherently,	to	suit	a	media	organisation's	broader	political	agenda.	Industrial	action	in	the	mining	
industry	was	dealt	with	rather	differently	to	other	industries	for	the	majority	of	the	period,	despite	
widespread	‘absenteeism’	and	public	scepticism	about	nationalisation,	partly	because	of	respect	for	
the	miners,	which	deemed	them	‘justified’	or	‘deserving’	in	their	pursuit	of	higher	wages	or	better	
conditions.	These	kinds	of	specific	attitudes	towards	groups	of	workers,	bound	in	complex	moralised	
rhetoric,	were	rarely	explained	or	made	explicit	but	were	ad	hoc	and	underpinned	by	complex	social	
assumptions.	A	further	indication	of	such	inconsistencies	was	found	in	notions	of	British	
exceptionalism,	which	were	simultaneously	bound	in	nationalistic	satisfaction	and,	on	the	other	
hand,	negative	declinism.	Symptomatic	of	British	attempts	to	adapt	to	its	new	position	in	the	
international	economy,	this	inconsistency	placed	significant	pressure	on	the	role	of	organized	
labour,	through	debates	about	productivity	and	the	‘British	disease’,	despite	many	similar	
experiences	abroad.	This	shifted	media	focus	away	from	the	justified	scrutiny	of	the	design	and	
quality	of	British	products,	and	the	management	of	manufacturing,	which	was	generally	considered	
to	be	unproblematic,	or	often	sources	of	British	pride.		
	
The	greatest	indication	of	the	inconsistency	of	coverage	was	the	fact	a	media	organisation’s	position	
on	industrial	action	was	often	dictated	by	their	views	on	the	incumbent	government.	Contrary	to	
popular	perceptions,	the	British	media	did	not	universally	denounce	all	forms	of	industrial	action,	
and	were	often	sympathetic	to	miners’	grievances,	even	if	they	opposed	the	nature	of	their	protest.	
Where	media	organisations	opposed	the	incumbent	government	or	their	industrial	policies,	striking	
unions	could	expect	greater	support	or	sympathy	for	their	position,	albeit	with	important	caveats.	
Similarly,	as	concerns	grew	about	the	stifling	impact	of	strict	pay	policies	on	productivity,	the	right-
wing	newspapers	were	increasingly	supportive	of	‘deserving’	attempts	by	unions	to	defy	voluntary	
wage	restraint.	This	flexible	perspective	on	industrial	action	is	significant,	given	common	
assumptions	about	right-wing	media	attitudes	towards	trade	unionism.	However,	by	the	same	
token,	left-wing	newspapers	would	sometimes	be	more	critical	than	their	right-wing	counterparts	of	
particular	strikes,	as	seen	with	the	‘red	scare’	of	the	1966	NUS	strike,	in	order	to	provide	support	for	
the	Labour	government.	Moreover,	inconsistencies	and	incoherencies	were	not	reserved	for	
columnists	and	editors,	but	pollsters	and	their	respondents	too.	This	made	the	job	of	policymakers	
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increasingly	difficult,	as	they	attempted	to	navigate	these	forums	of	opinion	while	the	rhetoric	of	
union	conflict	intensified	and	media	partisanship	became	more	common.		
	
Media	coverage	of	trade	unionism,	along	with	the	Troubles	in	Northern	Ireland,	underpinned	the	
portrayal	of	Britain	as	an	‘ungovernable’	nation,	as	the	Winter	of	Discontent	symbolized	an	
‘ideological	failure	to	which	the	only	answer	was	the	neoliberal	alternative’.3	This	was	the	key	
ingredient	in	making	the	‘manufactured	crisis’	of	the	tabloid	press	so	successful.	1979	represented	
the	final	annual	increase	in	membership	and	trade	unionism	would	never	attract	the	same	attention	
as	it	had	during	the	1970s.	Industrial	relations	faded	from	the	political	agenda	and	the	influence	of	
trade	unionism	over	British	politics	was	punctured.	As	this	research	has	highlighted,	the	media	
demand	for	control	and	reform	of	the	union	‘problem’	was	not	new	in	1979,	but	perceptions	of	the	
correct	solution	had	changed.		
	
In	the	years	that	followed,	it	became	clear	that	the	fractured	left-wing	of	British	politics	lacked	the	
ability	to	resist	the	dominant	frames	and	presented	‘no	major	drive	to	build	an	alternative	
understanding	of	what	had	gone	wrong’	in	British	industry.4	These	trends	undermined	opposition	to	
Conservative	policies	of	deindustrialisation	which	further	damaged	the	position	of	working-class	
trade	unionism.	Where	industrial	unrest	did	occur,	the	right-wing	tabloids	continued	to	intensify	
their	pressure	on	trade	unionism,	which	in	turn	became	more	radical	in	its	forms	of	action.	In	the	
case	of	the	1984-85	miners’	strike,	the	miners’	concerns	about	the	economic	impact	of	large-scale	
pit	closures	were	largely	ignored	by	the	media	in	favour	of	a	focus	on	Arthur	Scargill,	the	supposedly	
despotic	leader	of	violent	miners.	In	continuance	of	conflict	motifs,	their	undemocratic	action	was	
posed	against	the	police,	respectable	representatives	of	law	and	order.	Although	coverage	of	this	
defeated	strike	symbolised	a	significant	change	in	public	moral	status	for	the	miners,	many	of	the	
themes	to	coverage	represented	considerable	continuity	with	strike	reports	of	the	1970s.	The	
industrial	tensions	of	the	1980s	formed	a	coda	to	the	battles	played	out	in	the	1970s.	
	
																																																						
3	Thomas,	‘“Bound	in	By	History”’,	p.	273.	
4	Greg	Philo,	‘Political	Advertising,	Popular	Belief	and	the	1992	British	General	Election’,	Media,	Culture	&	
Society	15	(1993),	p.	413.	
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